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Annabel McGoldrick, Reporting the World, London (annabelmcg[at]aol.com)
and Aya Muchtar, Contributor, Jakarta (aya[at]cbn.net.id):
Breaking the cycle of violence in Indonesia (I-II)
The Jakarta Post, 11-12 November 2002. Opinions page.
(I)
Since the fall of President Soeharto's New Order government four years ago,
many areas of Indonesia have been disfigured by brutal fighting and
bloodshed. A recent study by the Ministry of Defense said no fewer 15
provinces were vulnerable to religious and ethnic conflicts. What is more
difficult is to take the next step and ask the crucial questions -- what
makes them vulnerable and what could be done to protect them?
Thousands of capable people across the country are actively seeking ways to
improve the prospects for their communities. Knowledge is power, and to
empower peace actors, from grassroots to government, it is important to know
about the dynamics of conflict and how they can trap people in repeating
patterns of behavior.
This is where an influential concept from the UK could prove useful in
Indonesia. The "cycle of violence" describes a syndrome whereby trauma
breeds
trauma and fear breeds revenge and retaliation. Above all, it offers clues
for more effective conflict prevention by directing our attention to where a
variety of different interventions can help the situation by breaking this
cycle.
The classic cycle of violence, which ensures that conflict follows conflict,
has roughly seven stages. They are all too familiar to anyone who has paid
serious attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or violence in central
Africa. The agonizing death of Yugoslavia has been another showcase for this
highly recognizable pattern, and it's now flowing in many of Indonesia's
provinces.
This is how the cycle of violence works in the human psyche.
Perhaps you were there, or someone you know witnessed, say, the riots in
Kalimantan, or house-burnings in Poso; did you lose a member of your family,
a friend perhaps?
The first human reaction to such horror is to feel shocked and frightened,
disbelief that such an atrocity has taken place. As people begin to come to
terms with what has happened they then feel pain, sometimes agonizing pain
that dear loved ones have gone. Then the grieving process begins.
Sometimes this takes many years -- Mari Fitzduff, professor of conflict
studies at the University of Ulster Northern Ireland, recently explained at a
conference in London how the constant trickle of tragedies in the province
prevented people from grieving until the let-up in the violence of recent
years.
As people come to terms with their grief and loss they then feel angry -- why
did this have to happen, why did they have to die? Anger hardens to
bitterness. Bitterness is anger plus memory.
Crucially, bitterness stays in the system, as an emotion constantly demanding
that "something must be done" -- something equal to, or worse than,
what was
done to me. So it fuels the call for revenge.
The cycle of violence explored here is conceptualized by Scilla Elworthy,
director of the British NGO, the Oxford Research Group. Dr Elworthy says that
the cycle can only be dismantled within the individual human mind and heart.
According to Dr Elworthy, "Intervention is needed at the point before anger
hardens into bitterness, revenge and retaliation."
"To be effective it must address the physical, the political and the
psychological security of people trapped in violence".
"One without the other is insufficiently strong to break the cycle. In
every
case, the people involved in situations of violence must be supported in the
development of their own resources for transformation."
In Indonesia there have been a number of interventions for physical,
political and psychological security which are primarily concerned with
conflict resolution or mitigation initiatives. This is different from, and
complimentary to, the profoundly important role of relief, development and
human-rights agencies.
o Intervention for physical security
Peacekeeping: Where people have murdered, brutalized or tortured each other,
the first necessity is to keep them physically separated. This is often a
role of the UN, where it is distinguished from peacebuilding and peacemaking
-- working to overcome trauma, restore confidence and encourage
reconciliation.
In Indonesia, the mobile brigade and the Indonesian Military (TNI) are often
dispatched to a conflict zone, in the aftermath of violence, to put up road
blocks and forestall any further attacks. But the record of these
organizations is mixed.
Their own lack of resources, training and awareness, particularly when it
comes to respect for human rights, has often limited their effectiveness. The
International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank, recently added its
voice to those criticizing the TNI as counter-productive, its officers
accused of ordering their men to provoke or maintain conflicts in order to
profit from them.
Protection: When civilians are threatened, driven from their homes, or under
attack they can be protected in a number of ways. In Aceh protection is
provided by Peace Brigades International (PBI). Trained volunteers accompany
local NGO staff in Aceh to go about their daily tasks, providing a witness to
any threats of violence and intimidation.
Tentena, the mainly Christian town on the shores of Lake Poso, has been
caught up in the intercommunal clashes of recent years. The Sintuwo Maroso
Youth Convoy (Amsimar) is a group of mainly university graduates providing
protection to the 30 or so Muslims who've stayed in their homes rather
becoming refugees. They've stood guard over the local mosque as well as the
market place.
Weapons collection: When a province is awash with weapons after violent
clashes, effective schemes are needed to collect and destroy the weapons.
This job has been undertaken in recent years by the police and TNI, but there
has been some criticism of these schemes being ineffective, even
counter-productive.
The Malino Agreements for both Ambon and Poso contained weapon collections
schemes but residents feared that only a token number of weapons were handed
over.
However in July 2002 in Tobelo, North Maluku an army weapon-sweeping
operation proved a trigger for another round of violence as it was considered
unequal by the Muslim community. Thus intervention aimed at physical security
is unlikely to work unless interventions to provide political and
psychological security are being carried out at the same time.
One of the most creative schemes put into practice was in El Salvador in
1995. This was launched by a group of businessmen whose trucks were being
hijacked by heavily armed gangs.
The gangs were formed with guns left over from 12 years of civil war, in
response to a major source of insecurity -- not having enough to eat. So for
every gun surrendered, the businessmen offered food vouchers worth US$100. By
the end of the second weekend vouchers worth $103,000 had been issued. The
President helped, and in three years over 10,000 weapons were handed in.
(II)
One necessary intervention is aimed for political security. Law enforcement
is a pre-requisite of stabilization, whether before, during or after major
conflict -- and it must be seen to be fair and impartial. The Poso conflict
in Central Sulawesi was triggered when a man who had been wounded in a fight
ran to the mosque, to rouse fellow Muslims to strike back, instead of the
police. Why?
The police and Indonesian Military (TNI) are needed to win people's trust;
hence they must reform. Unless the legal and coercive instruments are
perceived as legitimate and independent, the state's capacity to implement
policies to support reconciliation and prosecute human rights violations will
be severely undermined.
For political security the following requirements are needed: o Free
elections: The overthrow of a dictator and installation of democratic process
is a monumental task. It is in new democracies where we can best gauge the
value of free elections.
In 1999 in East Timor, despite the increase in violence by militias against
civilians prior to the election, 98 percent of the electorate voted.
Increased violence after the results came out was a backhanded testimony to
its true significance. Such an incontrovertible public assertion of the
public will could not be ignored, even by those so bitterly opposed to the
process.
o Control of militias: Armed militias or paramilitaries have to be brought to
negotiations. This is not necessarily best done by armed forces; it is the
Henri Dunant Center which has succeeded in bringing the Free Aceh Movement to
the negotiating table with Indonesia.
o Responsible media and good communications (see related article below).
o Economic security: If people are assured that they will be able to meet
their basic needs of food and shelter, they are less likely to make trouble.
One way is community banking, helping local traders to organize their
finances and put their lives on a more sustainable footing. Foshal, an NGO in
Ternate, set up a cooperative in a traditional market, with more than 1,000
customers, mainly street vendors and vegetable stall-holders.
o The next intervention aims for psychological security:
The traumas of victims need attention and, if possible, healing. One way is
by "active listening", whereby an independent witness or witnesses
gives the
traumatized person their full attention for as long as necessary to discharge
their fear, grief and anger. If done well, this way prevents anger hardening
into bitterness and retaliation.
In Manado, in North Sulawesi, refugee children were helped to process their
trauma by singing, writing poems and drawing pictures of their bitter
experiences in North Maluku. Organizers of the project run by Peka, a local
NGO, said that initially the drawings were of knives and weapons -- which
gradually changed to normal childhood scenes of houses and families.
Another group, in Ambon, comprises mothers from Muslims and Christians. This
Movement of Caring Women (Gerakan Perempuan Peduli) provide counseling for
traumatized victims and guidance to other mothers as to how to dissuade their
children from seeking revenge. They also provide the one thing every refugee
parent wants above all -- help with their children's education.
Psychological security requires the following:
o Mediation: During periods of violence, GPP met in a neutral space in Ambon
and kept in touch by telephone. Sometimes mediation is required for this kind
of contact to begin -- by a respected, non-judgmental third party to talk to
members of conflicting groups and facilitate a meeting. In Ambon, one such
party was the peace center of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
o Bridge-building: Countless groups and individuals in Indonesia's
conflict-affected areas work on bridge-building.
The tireless work of religious leaders in Manado is central to why the city,
made up of 60 percent Christians and 40 percent Muslims has resisted the
bloodshed. The capital of North Sulawesi is sandwiched between North Maluku
on one side and Poso on the other. The Interreligious Group Association,
BKSUA, led by luminaries like Jotje Wala, a Christian priest, studied certain
verses both in the Bible and the Koran to get good understanding of both holy
books and to be able to give information to their followers about the
peaceful messages in both great religions.
Bantaya, a local NGO in Palu, central Sulawesi, gathered local farmers to set
aside land to lend to refugees from Poso, and houses for them to live in.
They had some independence, cultivating and selling their own crops.
So it was a form of economic, therefore political, security, but it also
proved that someone cared about them enough to look after them. Add to this
the efforts of local Christian priests to marshal their followers to help
clean and rebuild a local mosque, and you have a community active in
bridge-building -- an important investment in preventing the Poso conflict
from being imported into Palu in the minds of those affected by it.
o Truth and reconciliation: From South Africa to Chile over 20 truth and
reconciliation commissions have allowed people to address their fears and
resentments in public, and in a safe and controlled environment.
The obvious case for truth and reconciliation is the slaughter of 1965-1966
in which as many as a million people may have died, in the name of opposition
to communism. Evidence which has come to light in the U.S. strengthens the
suspicion of CIA involvement in providing lists of names of suspected PKI
members. The children of suspected communists have spoken out, urging
Indonesia to come to terms with this brutal episode.
Many people suppose that victims need to be prepared to forget about what
happened to them. Yet what is needed is something to be done about it,
whether justice, or compensation, or simply someone listening and taking
seriously what they have to say.
Without this, a society cannot move on; the violence and trauma is never
fully expunged, and it carries the dread possibility that people could resort
to the same thing.
o Transforming the cycle of violence:
These brief examples indicate the potency of non-violence. If applied
systematically, robustly and with adequate funding, they illustrate how the
cycle of violence can be transformed.
While efficient measures of evaluating conflict resolution initiatives are
being developed, if they are successful, it is hard to measure their effects
in terms of what did not happen.
Effective conflict prevention will avoid bloodshed, possibly even a
full-scale civil war.
Further, interventions to break the cycle of violence are inadequately funded
-- a particular concern in Indonesia after the Bali bomb. The international
community has been a major source of support for many of the initiatives
mentioned here, providing access to knowledge which has empowered peace
actors.
Jamaluddin, an ulema from Palu, Central Sulawesi and self proclaimed
hardliner, said after a training of "Communicating for humanity":
"I didn't
realize I gave bad influence to many people. I think that was because I had a
lack of knowledge; I didn't have enough understanding towards other people
who are different from me".
But there have been signs that the international community may be in the
process of disengaging, with western embassies sending their nationals home.
Indonesia must not be isolated at this time, and strong early signals of a
continuing commitment by overseas governments and NGOs will be welcome as an
investment in a safer future for all of us.
The writers recently led a training program in peace journalism for the
British Council in Jakarta.
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