The Jakarta Post, 22 Aug. 2000

Malino peace process flawed

Prasetyohadi, Researcher in Conflict Transformation, Jakarta

It was indeed a show of good will on the part of the central government to host a two-day reconciliatory meeting between the conflicting parties in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

But the significance of the meeting, which began on Aug. 10 in the Central Sulawesi capital of Palu, became questionable when the Christian delegation, citing security and transportation difficulties, did not show up. Perhaps, in an expression of resentment toward the meeting.

Meanwhile, thousands of people in Poso have fled their homes. The Malino I peace accord signed on Dec. 20, 2001, is seen as seriously damaged, and its signatories can hardly see the light at the end of the tunnel if the methods and procedures of the talks are not significantly altered.

In the case of the Malino I accord for Poso, both parties' denial of involvement in fresh attacks should have clearly indicated the invalidity of the mediation and lack of trust on the part of the mediators, who resumed the meeting only after the recent outbreak of violence. So it is indeed futile and a waste of time.

The process of the Malino meetings, either the first for Poso or the second for Maluku, does not allow for the development of a long-term program. The talks are designed to proceed for only two days, with preparations of a few weeks. Indeed, the Malino talks are designed to be held only once, involving all parties. This cannot be the case in conflict resolution, given the usually deep hatred and thirst for revenge on both sides.

Peace talks take a great deal of time, and the agenda for talks should come from the participants -- not be imposed from above. The short, condescending Malino meetings limit all participants to the formality of a declaration. Thus no one can adequately ensure their sincere implementation.

The identification of the actors in the conflicts also remains weak, which can be seen in the insufficient representation of participants at the talks.

The representation of the military, police and civilians involved in the armed conflicts is indeed very low. Thus, groupings along religious lines in the representation cannot be considered adequate ground to assume reconciliation.

Peace talks that do not include the real actors in a conflict are meaningless. It is worse if the signatories are expected to implement the agreement and stop armed attacks. In the case of Poso, indicators point to the involvement of skilled, unidentified outsiders in a number of the attacks.

In fact, most of the Malino peace talk signatories, either for Poso or Maluku, are local community leaders, the majority of whom have no access to or contact with well-trained combatants and snipers, carrying automatic weapons.

Again, the success of a peace deal assumes the willingness of the parties to adopt viable deals. And to reach such a precondition, mediators and/or facilitators should reroute the process from scratch, embracing community organization management.

If success is really the goal, mediators should bow to the preferences of the conflicting communities and change the procedures of the talks. If confrontation occurs, facilitators should not shrink away. Keep them talking, whatever difficulties they encounter.

In the violent incidents that have taken place after the peace agreements in Poso and Maluku, there have been hardly any attempts to seek justice. The security officers remain weak beyond explanation, failing to do their jobs in an almost criminal manner.

With recent major outbreaks of violence in Poso destroying the peace deal, and once participants in the peace talks acknowledge this situation, reconciliatory efforts which have so far been "top down" should begin to involve civil society in advocating human rights.

Who will do this if not the people themselves?