



ANATOMY OF
SOCIAL VIOLENCE
IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITION :

THE CASE OF INDONESIA 1990-2001

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin

Jakarta, April 2002

**Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition:
The case of Indonesia 1990-2001**

by

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin

Email: zulfan.unsfir@un.or.id

Jakarta, April 2002

UNSFIR working papers are intended to generate transparent public discussions on alternative development policy choices for Indonesia. As a result, it is a standard operating procedure at UNSFIR to actively encourage comments, suggestions and criticisms. Please direct your comments, suggestions and criticisms to the author(s). The views expressed in this paper are strictly personal and must not be attributed to United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) or any UN agency.

Abstract

This paper is the first of a series of studies on social conflicts in Indonesia. The purpose of this paper is to provide an anatomy of social violence in terms of their patterns, trends, regional distribution, severity and intensity. The study includes all incidents of social violence that took place in Indonesia between 1990 and 2001. They are grouped into four main categories, i.e. communal violence, separatist violence, state-community violence, and industrial relations violence.

It is found that communal and separatist violence caused maximum fatalities, accounting for 77% and 22%, respectively. While social violence was not uncommon during the Suharto regime, social violence and fatalities increased dramatically during the period of transition to democracy, reaching its peak in 1999-2000. The incidents of social violence mainly occurred in districts and small towns. Among communal violence, ethnic-religion-migrations related violence alone contributed to around 52% of total deaths in social violence.

Foreword

The present working paper on social violence in Indonesia emerged out of UNSFIR's background work for a projected White Paper on Social Policy. We set out to examine the link between poverty, inequality and violent conflict in Indonesia in the context of the systemic transition triggered by the economic crisis. However, very early on in this it became quite apparent that we would first have to come to terms with the data-base relating to conflict.

Problems with data covered not just its sources and frequency of reporting. They also related to its classification and measurement. Information on social conflict is notoriously difficult to classify. How do we weight alternative forms of damage caused by conflict: death against injury, damage to property against the discouragement of future investment or the abandoning of current projects? How should we analyse conflict against the backcloth of systemic transition? Are certain types of violence only temporary and rather expected reactions to the demise of dictatorial regimes? How do we know if social violence is on the increase compared to pre-transition episodes? Even when data suggest a sharp increase, how much of this is due merely to increased press and political freedom?

How and for what purpose do we divide violent conflict into analytical categories? Are a large number of categories better than a small number if only because they allow a more detailed description of location and event specific variations in the factors triggering social violence? More critically in the context of our own work, are there certain categories of violence such as that related to separatist movements, which should be dropped from the analysis?

These and many other related questions have driven the enquiry behind the present working paper. As the discussions and comments recorded at the end of the paper indicate, the paper has been welcomed by most experts as an important and original first step. We are keen to work with other organisations and projects to ensure the development of a shared data base on social violence. This could then be used by different sets of people for further analysis and elaboration. Hopefully collectively this could then enhance our understanding of the scale and the root causes of social

conflict in Indonesia. It can also shed light on the best package of immediate and medium term measures to prevent the outbreak of future conflict.

We are particularly grateful to all those who have taken interest in the subject, come to various consultations and seminars on the subject hosted by UNSFIR, to those who have shared our concern with the policy relevance of the analysis presented here. We all realise that this is very much a beginning. I present this working paper to you with considerable humility and with a realisation that the scale of the problem demands an organised, and painstaking, collective effort.

Satish C. Mishra
Head/Chief Adviser

About UNSFIR

The United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) is a project established by the Government of Indonesia and the UNDP to stimulate examination of policy options for the country at an important point in the country's development. The work aims to engender wide public discussion of the issues involved in order to build a new social and political consensus for effective and lasting policy implementation.

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Satish Mishra, Anis Chowdhury, Widjajanti Suharyo, Hermanto Siregar, and other colleagues in UNSFIR. My special gratitude is also directed to Ashutosh Varshney (University of Michigan), Iqbal Djajadi and Ratih Kusumadewi (Labsosio, University of Indonesia), Dennis Gallagher and the Conflict Unit of UNDP, Kevin Evans and R. Sudarshan (UNDP), Konrad Huber (UNICEF), Moch. Nurhasim (The RIDEP Institute), Laode Ida (PSPK), Jalal and Khairullah (Graduate school of Sociology, University of Indonesia), Iman K. Nawireja (Sosek IPB), Indrajaya (Bappenas), and HP. Leksanawati (*LKBN Antara*)

This paper was presented in seminars at the UN House, Jakarta, on 21 March 2002, and at the National Commission on Human Rights (*Komnas HAM*), on 5 April 2002. Many constructive comments and suggestions were made by participants. Because of the substantive nature of these comments, they are summarized in a separate section at the end of this paper. I am grateful to all participants in the seminars, among them: Jacqueline Pomeroy, Elizabeth Carriere, Saafroedin Bahar, BN. Marbun, Melly G. Tan, Soeharko Kasran, Bishow Parajuli, Glenn Smith, Farsida Lubis, Andrinof A. Chaniago, Henry Siahaan, Dicky Pelupessi, Basilio Araujo, La Ode Syafiuddin, Nining Nurhaya, Mashudi Noorsalim, Jayadi Damanik, Maria Zuraida and Agus Anwar.

Contents

Abstract	2
Foreword	3
I. Introduction: setting the context	10
<i>The Indonesian crisis and transition</i>	11
<i>The transition and social violence</i>	13
<i>Weakening of the state</i>	14
<i>Aims</i>	19
<i>Organization of the paper</i>	19
II. Methodological notes	19
<i>Definitions of social conflict and violence</i>	20
<i>Methodology</i>	21
<i>Data sources</i>	22
<i>Data management</i>	23
<i>The period of study</i>	27
III. Social violence: A national picture	27
<i>The development of social violence in Indonesia</i>	27
<i>Regional distribution</i>	30
IV. Communal violence: the most severe violent social conflict	34
<i>The development of communal violence</i>	34
<i>The regional distribution of communal violence</i>	35
<i>The regional concentration of communal violence</i>	36
<i>Variations of communal violence</i>	37
V. Separatist violence	42
<i>The case of Aceh and Papua: an aspiration to inequality</i>	42
<i>The case of East Timor: the colonial legacy</i>	47
VI. State-community violence: manifestation of community discontent to the state	49
<i>The transition trend</i>	49

VII. Industrial relations violence: the dominance of violence between community and company	51
<i>The transition trend</i>	51
<i>Two kinds of industrial relations violence</i>	52
VIII. Reading the data: what can be inferred?	54
<i>Concentration of issues</i>	54
<i>Regional concentration</i>	55
<i>Institutions for conflict prevention</i>	57
<i>Is it temporary?</i>	57
IX. Summary and analytical follow up	57
Comments and discussion in the seminar	60
References	70
Appendix	73

List of Tables

Table 1. Social violence by category, 1990-2001	28
Table 2. Classification of conflict area, 1990-2001	32
Table 3. Social violence, by province, by category, 1990-2001	33
Table 4. Communal violence: city and district variation, 1990-2001	36
Table 5. Communal riot prone (CRP) area, 1990-2001	37
Table 6. Communal violence by sub-category, 1990-2001	39
Table 7. Separatist violence in Aceh and Papua, 1990-2001	44
Table 8. Imbalance between region prosperity and community welfare, 1996	47
Table 9. Violence in East Timor	48
Table 10. State-community violence, 1990-2001	50
Table 11. Industrial relations violence, 1990-2001	51
Table 12. Labor strikes, 1990-2001	53

List of Figures

Figure 1. Weakening of the state and strengthening of civil society	18
Figure 2. Social violence, 1990-2001	29
Figure 3. Communal violence, 1990-2001	35
Figure 4. Issue concentration of social violence, based on number of deaths, 1990-2001	55

Appendix

Appendix 1. Regional distribution of communal violence, 1990-2001	73
---	----

Abbreviations

AJI	: <i>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen</i> (Independent Journalist Alliance)
BAPPENAS	: <i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Board)
BPS	: <i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i> (Central Bureau of Statistic)
CERIC	: Center for Research on Inter-group Relation and Conflict Resolution
CIRUS	: Center for Regional and Urban Studies
CRP area	: Community Riot Prone area
DFID	: Department for International Development
DOM	: <i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> (Military Operation Zone)
DPDR	: <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (Regional People's Representative Council)
GAM	: <i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Aceh Liberation Movement)
GANDI	: <i>Gerakan Anti Diskriminasi</i> (Indonesian Anti Discrimination Movement)
GRDP	: Gross Regional Domestic Product
HDI	: Human Development Index
HDR	: Human Development Report
ILO	: International Labor Organization
INFID	: International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
ISAI	: <i>Institut Studi Arus Informasi</i> (Institute for Information's Flow Studies)
Komnas HAM	: <i>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia</i> (National Commission on Human Rights)
Komnas Perempuan	: <i>Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan</i> (National Commission on Anti-violence against Women)
KONTRAS	: <i>Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan</i> (Commission for Disappeared Person and Violent Acts)
Labsosio-UI	: <i>Laboratorium Sosiologi</i> (Sociology Laboratory)
LIPI	: <i>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
LKBN Antara	: <i>Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional Antara</i> (Antara National News Agency)
MoJHR	: Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
MYS	: Mean Years of Schooling
OPM	: <i>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</i> (Free Papua Movement)
PDI	: <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PPSK	: <i>Pusat Studi Pengembangan Kawasan</i> (Center for Regional Development Study)
SUPAS	: <i>Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus</i> (Inter census Population Survey)
SUSENAS	: <i>Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional</i> (National Socio-economic Survey)
TNI	: <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Army)
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	: United Nations Children's Fund
UN-OCHA	: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSFIR	: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery
UNTAET	: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
WFP	: World Food Programme

Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The case of Indonesia 1990-2001

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin

I. Introduction: setting the context

Social violence as a manifestation of social conflict has been paralyzing Indonesia for the past few years. The violence was triggered by the financial crisis beginning in mid 1997, which reached a peak in early 1998 with riots and lootings in several parts of Indonesia triggered by the shortage and price hikes of basic goods. Then, not abating, the violence continued throughout the country with various motives and triggering factors. The riot of May 1998 led to the fall of President Suharto. East Timor separated from Indonesia after a referendum marked by extreme violence, which caused hundreds of deaths and immense damage to properties and infrastructure. The separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, which have existed for a long time, got a new momentum. Communal conflicts ravaged Sambas, Poso, Maluku and Sampit. Further, in Java a number of people suspected as *dukun santet* (people believed to practice black magic or witchcraft) were killed. In sum, the country witnessed an increase in civil commotion, land disputes and political and economic conflicts since the outbreak of economic crisis and the onset of democratic transition.

It cannot be denied that the outbreaks of violent social conflicts are an integral part of the current Indonesian crisis and transition. However, many questions remain. Is social violence a necessary instrument to trigger transition? Or is it an inevitable social cost of the process of transition? Or can transition take place without social violence? Or is social violence unrelated to such rapid social changes? Then, what role do socio-economic and political factors play in the sudden outbreak of social violence? What kind of new social policy regime is needed by a country like Indonesia in order to overcome social conflicts? Certainly, there are no simple answers to these questions. Instead, considerable and multidisciplinary efforts are required.

However, before addressing the above questions, one needs to understand the nature of social violence and locate its spatial distribution. That is, a first step in this research is to document social violence, classifying it according to its proximate and inherent causes, identify its locations and dates and measure its intensity. This paper aims to do precisely that.

The Indonesian crisis and transition

Indonesia is making a historic transition. The Indonesian transition comprises at least three major changes: One is the transition from an autocratic system of politics and governance to a democratic one. The second is from a patron-client and crony capitalist economic system to a rules-based market economy. The third is from a centralized socio-political and economic system to a decentralized one. The changes are still ongoing, yet no one is sure whether they will be successful and will continue smoothly. Similarly, no one is certain how long it will take to reach a new socio-political equilibrium.

The multi-dimensional nature of this transition can only be captured through the lens of systemic transition,¹ which marks a historic discontinuity. The Indonesian transition can be better understood by looking at systemic transitions like in the former USSR or in countries of Eastern Europe (Mishra, 2000 and 2001).

The transition is taking place during the most severe economic crisis Indonesia has ever experienced in its post independence history.² In this context, the economic crisis acts as a catalyst and at the same time as a trigger factor for the transition.³ The

¹ The term systemic transition for Indonesia was introduced by Mishra (2000) who explains political and economic transitions, as well as, how the process should be responded to, by learning from the experience of other countries that have already undergone similar transitions.

² The 13.2 % contraction of the national GDP in 1998 was the worst decline during Indonesian history. The severity was much higher than during the previous crisis in the middle of the 60's. Comparing the movement of stock prices, the magnitude of the post 1997 economic crisis was similar to the impact of the great depression following the 1929 stock market crash in the USA and Europe (UNDP/GOI, 2001).

³ Haggard and Kaufman (1995) discuss the political-economic dimension of democratic transitions, mainly in countries described by Huntington as "third wave" democracies. They raise the following proposition (p. 26): "... *the probability of a democratic transition increases during periods of economic distress.*" In the Indonesian context, this tendency was observed by McBeath (1999), who writes, "*Without the collapse of the economy, (...) there would not have been the opportunity for*

economic crisis was only a beginning. It triggered a multidimensional crisis that caused the sudden breakdown of the New Order structure on all fronts: economic, political and social. The economic breakdown is reflected in the collapse of the crony capitalist and patron-client economic system with its bubble economy.⁴ The political breakdown is evident in the collapse of the authoritarian and centralist regime. This has been followed by a sudden increase in mass political participation, formation of new political parties and the opening up of political debates in the absence of appropriate democratic institutions. The social breakdown can be witnessed in the outbreak of social violence, the breakdown of law and order, and the steep decline in social cohesion. The complexity of transition has been compounded by hurried decentralization in the absence of institutions to tackle issues concerning division of power, finance and expenditure between the centre and regions, and sharing of resources amongst regions.

Thus, the combination of socio-economic and political crisis and transition has resulted in a turbulent situation. It seems that massive social violence potentially occurs in the middle of a turbulent situation, not in a stable one where the economy grows steadily, the degree of welfare increases and when all things are well “ordered.”⁵ The turbulence has caused at least two new developments: (1) a reduced national output while the number of people competing for it has increased; and (2) a significant change in the distribution of power.⁶ During the New Order period, power was concentrated in one person, namely President Suharto, whereas in this period of transition it is distributed among elites of political parties, NGOs, communal groups, the parliament, the media, ethnic groups, and a divided bureaucracy. In addition, decentralization has encouraged central-regional conflicts and inter-region rivalry.

political change.” Hence, it would have been difficult to predict the fall of Suharto –as the first step to transition– in the middle of high and stable economic growth.

⁴ The New Order economy is described as a “bubble economy,” referring to an economy that is growing in the absence of strong fundamentals; therefore, the economy is not sustainable and vulnerable to shock.

⁵ To quote Sen (1999), p. 30, “United we may be when we go up and up, but divided we fall when we do fall. The false sense of harmony may be torn severely asunder when things start unravelling and coming down.”

⁶ The risk of a great change in the distribution of power was put forward in a conference held by the Aspen Institute (1995), “*There is always risk, especially in transitional periods, rapid change in the distribution of power can trigger conflict (...) The most likely and prevalent future conflicts will be internal communal conflicts over competing identities, territorial claims and political institutions...*”

As a result of these developments, the crisis and transition have caused a sudden shift of the relative positions of various groups in society: economic, political and social. Poverty incidence became worse, with the number of people below the poverty line (head count ratio) as well as the degree of poverty severity increasing.⁷ Millions of people have lost their jobs and the proportion of informal workers to total workers has increased.⁸ On the one hand, changes in political constellation have affected many people who lost influence and political access, while on the other hand many new faces suddenly rose to power. Moreover, people who used to be politically respected and idolized are now heavily criticized.

The transition and social violence

What are the links between the transition and the outbreak of social violence? It seems that the current delicate social, political and economic condition provides a fertile ground for social violence. The following studies support this idea. Snyder (2000) warns of the risk of an outbreak of communal conflicts in early phases of democratization. He concludes as follows (p. 310):

“The developing countries’ recent experiences with nationalist conflict run parallel to those of the historical European and the contemporary post-communist states. Democratization increases the risk of nationalist and ethnic conflict in the developing world, but the strength and outcome of this propensity varies in different circumstances.

Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are more likely during the initial stages of democratizations than in transitions to full consolidations of democracy. More over, trouble is more likely when elites are highly threatened by democratic change (as in Burundi, the former Yugoslavia, and the historical Germany) than when elites are guaranteed a satisfactory position in the new order (as in historical Britain, and in much of South Africa and East and Central Europe today). Uncontrolled conflict is more likely when mass participation increases before civic institutions have been extensively developed, as the contrast between Burundi and South Africa suggests. Similarly, ethnic conflict is more likely when the civic institutions of the central state break down at a time of rising popular demands, as in India in the late 1980s and 1990s. Finally, ethnic conflict is more likely when the channels of mobilizing mass groups in to politics are ethnically exclusive.... ”

While Hegre *et. al.* (2001) hold that the peak of domestic violence seems to be associated with political change.⁹ From a cross-country study covering 152 countries

⁷ See Dhanani and Islam (2000).

⁸ The unemployment rate rose from 4.7% in 1997 to 6.3% in 1999 and the proportion of urban informal workers increased from 39% in 1995 to 46% in 1999 (Irawan, *et. al.*, 2000, p. 57).

⁹ Hegre, *et. al.* (2001) propose their hypothesis and proved it later on: “Countries that have undergone a recent political transition are more likely to experience civil war than countries whose political system has remained stable.”

during 1816-1992, they derive an inverted U-shaped curve describing the relationship between social violence and the level of democracy. They conclude: “*Semidemocracies are more likely to experience civil war than either democracies or autocracies.*”

However, it should be noted that not all democratic transitions were accompanied by violence, since there are records of peaceful democratic transitions. Huntington (1991) recognizes that almost all great political changes involved violent actions, but he also gives examples where transitions took place peacefully. Czechoslovakia –a former satellite of the USSR– separated into two countries, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic without any bloodshed. Similar peaceful transitions can be found in Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

In the past, episodes of social violence in Indonesia were related to particular historic changes. For example after independence, a series of regional rebellions in the 1950s occurred with the failure of the experiment with constitutional democracy.¹⁰ A massive violence in 1965-66 marked the regime change from the Old Order to the New Order. Following this trend, we can relate the wave of social violence since 1998 to the current systemic transition.

The weakening of the state

The ongoing Indonesian transition towards democracy is still at an initial phase.¹¹ However, in the early 1950s, Indonesia experienced a period of parliamentary democracy that was marked by the first free general elections in 1955.¹² In the late 1950s, Sukarno replaced this democracy by Guided Democracy.¹³ Democracy did not

¹⁰ The series of regional rebels against the central government in Jakarta were Darul Islam in Aceh, West Java, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) centered in Central Sumatra with its influence reaching the southern part of the Sumatra island, the Universe People’s Struggle (*Permesta*) in North Sulawesi, and the Republic of South Maluku (RMS). Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001, p. 69) estimate that around 30,000 were killed due to internal conflicts in Indonesia between 1956-60.

¹¹ It should be noted that several cross-country studies relate the early phase of democratization to the outbreak of social violence, as pointed out by Snyder (2000) and Hegre, *et. al.* (2001).

¹² It was the period when Indonesia was included in a group of around 30 countries in the second short wave of democratization. The second wave started with the World War II during the period between 1943 and 1962 (Huntington, 1991).

¹³ Indonesia also experienced the backlash from democratization. This backlash turned 22 democratic governments (including Indonesia) to authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1991).

reappear when Suharto became the next dictator in 1966. Indonesia with its present transition towards democracy can be viewed as a country in the last telling examples of the third wave of democratization.¹⁴

Between 1966 and 1980, Suharto consolidated his power. In the process, five to six hundred thousand people suspected of a communist link were killed and political opposition was effectively eliminated. Whatever little opposition there was, the Suharto regime skillfully co-opted in a new consensus under the umbrella of the “Pancasila” principle. This narrowed the political space where plurality of views could flourish and issue-based civil society organizations could develop. Many challenges and obstacles were successfully tackled. The “Malari incident” in 1974 could not weaken Suharto’s power; the 1978 student movement was stifled by the campus normalization; his political opponents were arrested, and the political system was “arranged” in order to sustain his power. The period of 1980-90 was the peak of Suharto’s power, even though it was interrupted by the Tanjung Priok incident when he forced the implementation of the sole basis (asas tunggal) of Pancasila.

The Suharto regime began weakening from the early 1990s as the military’s support started to decline. Then, Suharto pulled the Islamic groups within Indonesian politics to offset the decreasing military support,¹⁵ especially since he allowed the formation of the Indonesian Moslem Intellectual Association (ICMI) in the early 1990s. Another development was the rise of cronies as the regime’s economic support base. However, these realignments of political and economic power base could not save the regime from crumbling with the economic crisis of 1997-98. Suharto was forced to hand over the presidency to B.J. Habibie who acted as a transition president and successfully organized elections for the parliament. Abdurrahman Wahid became the first democratically elected president in 1999.

However, the weakening of the state that started in the early 1990s continued. Since 1998, Indonesia has become a state with successive ineffective governments. It

¹⁴ In the third wave, democratic governments have replaced authoritarian regimes in around 30 countries, starting in 1974 in Portugal.

¹⁵ It was marked by Suharto’s agreement to allow Habibie, Technology Minister at that time, to lead the ICMI, in line with the decreasing influence of General Benny Moerdani, former TNI chief, (Liddle, 1999).

also had to live with the separation of East Timor, and has witnessed a rise in separatist movements in some provinces and social conflicts¹⁶. This is in stark contrast to the early phase of the New Order regime of Suharto.

As the state is continuing to weaken, collective awareness is growing rapidly in people to express their criticism against the long repression and injustices of the previous regime.¹⁷ A weak state is defined as less effective but not necessarily less repressive. A strong state has a domestic support base in civil society which makes its institutions effective and autonomous. But a weak state has to buy off domestic opposition extensively. Its attempt to buy legitimacy through economic and political patronage makes its institutions vulnerable to narrow interest groups. The transition seems to give an umbrella for the strengthening of civil society as an embryo of institutionalization of public aspiration. It is witnessed by the rise of civil society organizations and their breadth and quality of activities during the transition.¹⁸ However, these two opposite developments –the state weakens while civil society strengthens– are happening in the absence of institutions that could control both. This situation can evolve in three different directions, one of which represents a Nash equilibrium¹⁹ with multiple possibilities. The possible development paths are explained in Figure 1.

Panel A depicts a situation where after a period when the state weakens and civil society strengthens, the trend reverses. This can happen when people become nostalgic about stability and progress of the past authoritarian regime in the midst of chaotic socio-political and economic developments during the period of transition.

¹⁶ The links between the outbreak of social violence and the weakening of the state are pointed out by Stewart (1998 and 2000), where some of the conflict in the former Soviet Union can be seen as primarily due to the weakening of state authority and its ability to suppress conflict. The same can also be found as the cause of some of the African conflicts where the weakening of the state –for example in Somalia and Sierra Leone– has permitted conflict to erupt and enlarge.

¹⁷ It has happened because of the lack of political development during the New Order, where attentions were only focused on economic development. The danger of this condition was indicated by the rise of political instability since 1998. This kind of development was already pointed out by Huntington (1996, pp. 4-5): “...it was in large part of the product of social change and rapid mobilization of new group into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions (...) The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in development of political institutions behind social and economic change”.

¹⁸ See Feulner (2001).

¹⁹ Nash equilibrium represents a situation where two opposing forces reach a stable arrangement. This may not necessarily mean that two opposing forces are equal in strength.

This can provide a fertile ground for a dictator to emerge with a very centralist view and it could even happen in the guise of some sort of democracy with a restricted role of civil society.²⁰ Thus, under Path A the whole process of democratization and decentralization can be threatened.

Panel B shows a path where civil society strengthens at the cost of the state. In such a situation, civil society groups can be narrowly focused. Competition among the vested interests to capture as much benefit as possible from the declining state can lead to economic and social decline.²¹

Panel C portrays three possible Nash equilibria. In C_1 , the state continues to decline while civil society after initial strengthening goes into a decline. It is a situation where civil society becomes fractured and tribalized. The state is carved out among various warring factions. This is the case of failed transition of countries like Afghanistan and Somalia, which may remain in this low level equilibrium.

Panel C_2 is a situation where the weakening trend for the state and the strengthening trend for civil society are halted and both follow a steady-state path thereafter. Transitions in East European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovak and Czech Republics can be characterized by C_2 . To some extent, the case of Indian transition from the semi-authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi can also be described by this development path.


Panel C_3 depicts a situation where after initial weakening of the state both the state and civil society strengthen simultaneously. Perhaps one can place transitions of countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal since the demise of dictatorial rules into this category. Of course, this situation of simultaneous strengthening of both the state and civil society cannot continue forever and should stabilize at certain optimal level.

²⁰ We are likely to see such developments in Pakistan. Fears have been expressed by the observers of the Thai political developments that the Thaksin Government is showing signs of becoming an authoritarian regime ala the Mahathir Government of Malaysia (*The Economist*, March 2-8, 2002). A recent survey of public opinion has found the highest approval rating for Thaksins' "social-order" campaign (*The Jakarta Post*, March 5, 2002). The developments in Russia since the election of President Putin can also be characterized by this path.

²¹ See Olson (1982).

The most desirable development path for a transitional economy such as Indonesia would be simultaneous strengthening of the state and civil society until it becomes a mature democracy. However, this is unlikely to emerge if there is no institutional mechanism to contain social violence and mitigate social discontent. Therefore, it is important to build institutions that can mitigate social conflicts. But the questions are, what kind of institutions can manage social conflicts peacefully and dampen social violence? And what are the requirements for such institutions? For answering these questions, one needs to understand the nature and trend of social violence and its spatial distribution in the context of Indonesia's transition.

Figure 1.
Weakening of the state and strengthening of civil society



Aims

This paper is the first of a series of studies on social conflicts in Indonesia. In particular, this paper has the purpose of mapping the acts of social violence that occurred in Indonesia for the last decade. It analyzes the incidence of social violence to provide an anatomy of such acts. The anatomy describes the patterns, the trends, the regional distributions, the level of severity and the intensity of various kinds of social violence. It is intended to obtain a better understanding of what is actually happening as a basis for further analysis. The study includes all incidence of social violence that took place in Indonesia between 1990 and 2001, over 26 provinces.²² The violence in East Timor is discussed in a separate sub-section on separatist violence because of its very specific characteristics.

Organization of the paper

This paper is organized as follows. After the introduction in Section I, Section II describes the methodology of how the database of social violence is constructed. Section III provides a general view of social violence and its development nationally. Then, each category of social violence is elaborated in some details in Sections IV, V, VI and VII. Some tentative interpretations and implications are hypothesized in Section VIII. The paper ends with a summary and future directions of research.

II. Methodological notes

Studying social violence in Indonesia is constrained by the absence of an adequate database of countrywide social violence. Until now, there has been no report documenting countrywide social conflicts and violence, both in terms of its frequency and severity.²³ There are only reports on certain conflicts in the form of academic studies or journalistic reports. There is no institution that regularly collects data on

²² The number of provinces (26) refers to the condition before East Timor got its independence in 1999. Now Indonesia effectively has 30 provinces.

²³ Djajadi's study (1999), which compiles collective violence for the period of 1946 to 16 April 1999, only presents number of incidents indicator (frequency), but no other indicators such as severity level

social violence. Social violence is not part of regular indicators that track social welfare, economy and demography, which are continuously collected through many kinds of regular surveys by the Central Bureau of Statistics or other institutions.²⁴

The absence can be summarized as follows:

- Ø The absence of compilation of methodologically consistent social violence data that cover all incidents over the entire country.
- Ø The absence of severity measurement of social violence that is comparable regionally and across time.
- Ø The absence of a mechanism of up dating the database in a methodologically sound and consistent manner.

The database on social violence developed by this study is aimed to fill this gap. This database will be the first important step in analyzing social violence in the context of Indonesian transition. It will provide an anatomy of social violence that has so far occurred, and will discuss some alternative data sources and their limitations.

The data of social violence based on its categorization, level of severity, and intensity as well as its regional distribution will become important variables in analyzing not just economic recovery, restoration of social life, or decentralization, but also in examining the survival of Indonesia as a nation.

Definitions of social conflict and violence

Conflict in human life is a natural phenomenon. The problem is whether the conflict is accompanied by violent acts or not. Violence can be seen as a manifestation of un-institutionalized conflicts, whereas the opposite, i.e. institutionalized conflicts, can be solved peacefully. There are at least two types of violence: personal and collective (or social). Personal violence is rooted in personal conflicts; while social violence is usually originate from social conflicts. Social violence has a wider social, economic and political implications compared to the personal ones. The object of this study is the collective or social violence. However,

of conflicts. Often the frequency of incidence cannot methodologically be compared both between categories and inter-regions.

an incident that is seemingly personal violence may be deeply rooted in a social conflict, and hence should be categorized as social violence.²⁵

Social violence is closely related to social conflicts: Although in common usage, these two terms refer to more or less the same thing, a distinction should be made. Social violence refers to the physical or real forms of acts, such as destructions, killings, lootings, attacks, burning, clashes, taking hostages, etc., made by a group of people at a certain place and time, while social conflict refers to a more fundamental problem that may lead to an act of social violence. As pointed out by Ocorandi (1998) when analyzing the riot resulting from the shortage of staple foods in early 1998: “Riots are a symptom of a deeper problem.” In this statement, riots are an act of social violence whereas the deeper problem is a social conflict, i.e. race discrimination accompanied by socio-economic imbalances between the native people and the Chinese. Therefore, it can be said that often social violence is a manifestation of social conflicts and is frequently adopted as a way of dealing with conflicts although not all social conflicts end up leading to social violence.

Methodology

The database of social violence is built by using a media approach. This approach is chosen because of three reasons: credibility, availability, and efficiency. However, there are at least two other alternative data sources. The first is the records of the civil government institutions starting from the lowest level, that is, villages or sub-districts. Village monographs contain detailed records of basic socio-economic data, which include violence that are security threats. But the problem is they do not distinguish between social violence and minor security issues such as theft of chickens and the like.

²⁴ For example, Population Census, National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenans), National Employment Survey, Industrial Survey, Demography and Health Survey, etc.

²⁵ Such cases often happen in Aceh, many violent incidents superficially can be said to be of personal category such as one person is shot death by another without involving a lot of people. But we know that such violence in Aceh is deeply rooted in the problem of separatist movement that has long been existent in the province.

The second alternative is police documents. Police carry out data pooling on social order from the lowest level of organization to the highest level (Polsek, Polres, Polda, and Mabes Polri). However, the problem lies in the absence of standardization and the low credibility of police records. In terms of standardization, police reports like village monographs do not differentiate which is purely a crime and which is a social conflict. As for credibility, police records tend to be biased in favor of the interest of the government. Also, police reporting is only a simple matter of routine task with no or little analysis of underlying causes. Compared with the above two alternative approaches, the media approach is more pragmatic in the aspects of credibility and availability.

The following argument will support the reasons for the media approach. Media is an institution that records every important event almost immediately after it happens. In many cases media is the fastest recorder. This argument is based on the agenda setting theory of mass communication, which maintains that there are interactions between media agenda and public agenda.²⁶ Media arranges, filters, and decides the agenda to be presented to the public on the basis of its analysis of public agenda. Media agenda will consist of what is important for the public or what is considered important by the public, as what Jalaluddin Rakhmat notes that mass media does not determine 'what to think', but influence 'what to think about'.²⁷ Besides, the agenda setting theory views that media is a social representation of the public. Thus it can be said that media determines their agenda interactively between the media itself and public and is the social representation of the public view.

Data sources

After deciding to use the media approach, we are faced with the choices of media. There are printed or electronic media, and news office. Printed media could be in the form of daily newspapers, or tabloid and magazines (weekly or monthly). The print media could have national or regional coverage. While the electronic media could be radios, televisions, or on-line news sites. By considering the extent of the

²⁶ Theory of agenda setting is a synthesis of two mass communication theories: bullet theory/hypodermic needle as thesis emphasizing powerful media, with its antithesis, the theory of uses and gratification that emphasizes powerful audience.

social representation of the media choices, we view *Antara* and *Kompas* as having the most role of representing the public.

In this regards, selecting *Antara* and *Kompas* is the best compromise option. It is because both are the most powerful media actors reflecting a strong role of social representation of the public. This is supported by the following arguments. Firstly, *Antara* is a national news office whose news is referred to by almost all other national media (both printed and electronic) and is the most important information window of Indonesia for the international world. Secondly, *Kompas* is a daily newspaper that has the highest circulation amongst the print media in Indonesia. For printed media, the number of readers is the most powerful indicator of its social position. Thirdly, both *Antara* and *Kompas* are nationwide media. Therefore it can be assumed that the balance of report between regions is maintained; relatively there is no bias in favor of certain areas, which is commonly found in local or regional media. They also have news network and consumers throughout Indonesia. These arguments above lead us to believe that both *Antara* and *Kompas* are more objective than other sources.

Thus, the national news agency, *Antara*, and the national daily, *Kompas*, are the two main data sources used in this study, while other sources were also checked.²⁸ The two main sources are read interpretatively, not literally. An incident of social violence is recorded if reported as having at least one victim, be it human (casualties or injuries) or material (such as houses, buildings, damaged or burned vehicles). Sometimes, clear information is not found about the real issue underlying a certain incidence of social violence. If this is the case, other news sources are checked to obtain a minimum understanding of an issue or problem underlying the incidence so that each incidence can be put more accurately into a certain category.

Data management

All information collected in this study is compiled into *UNSFIR database* which is constantly being updated and widened to cover new and emerging issues.

²⁷ See Rakhmat (2000).

Horizontal characteristics. This anatomy is more horizontal in the sense that it records data on social violence that has happened. It does not examine each case in depth. It is only an overall description and inventory of social violence and not an in-depth analysis of specific cases. For example a bloody conflict with thousands of deaths in Maluku is not discussed specifically, but it is included in the category of communal violence. Similarly, the conflicts in Poso, Sampit, Aceh, the May 1998 riot and others fall into their own relevant categories. Detailed investigations of socio-economic causes and consequences are subject matters of two separate studies to follow.

Categories of social violence.²⁹ To make it easier for us to understand the nature of social violence during the last eleven years, we need to place all cases of social violence into some categories. We have chosen four categories based on the group types involved in each act of social violence as follows:

- Communal violence: social violence between two groups of community, one group being attacked by the other. Communal groups can be based on ethnicity, religion, social class, political affiliation or simple village differences and so on. Violence in Maluku, Poso and Sambas are some examples.
- Separatist violence: social violence between the state and the people of certain area, which is rooted in regional separatism, i.e. a movement motivated by the desire of people in certain areas to separate from Indonesia as a country. This social violence refers to the current conflicts in Aceh and Papua, and previously in East Timor.
- State-community violence: violence between the state and the community who are expressing protests and dissatisfaction against state institutions without any

²⁸ All the other sources checked are national print media, i.e. *Tempo*, *Media Indonesia*, and *Republika*, but contribution of these media to the database is insignificantly considered.

²⁹ Previous study by Djajadi (1999) differentiates the orientation of collective violence or social conflicts into 5 types: community vs. community, community against state, state against community, state vs. state, and a mixture. It also classified collective conflicts into 9 types: riots, destruction, clashes, military acts, ethnic clashes, killing, looting, coupe, and sabotage. But the problem is that often an incidence contains two or more types of collective violence that are inseparable. So, the categorization in this study is meant to solve such difficulty and make it simpler.

separatist motives. Some examples are The Nipah incident in Sampang, Madura in 1993, and the Trisakti incident in 1998.

- Industrial relations violence: violence that arises from the problems of industrial relations. These can be external or internal relations. ‘External’ refers to the conflict between the community and the company while ‘internal’ refers to the conflict between the workers and the company (labor disputes). Conflict between PT. Inti Indorayon Utama and community in North Tapanuli regarding environmental issue is an example of the external industrial relations conflict, while the violent labor strike in Sumedang in 1997 is an example of the internal industrial relations conflict.

Selection of indicators. Generally in determining the severity level of social violence, the number of deaths is the most powerful indicator.³⁰ The number of deaths is an accurate and consistent measure, comparable inter-area and over time. One death victim in area A and one in area B have the same value. Seven deaths today have the same value as seven deaths ten years ago. Other severity indicators, for example, the number of incidents, injuries, and damaged or burned houses/buildings/vehicles do not have such features.

Take the example of number of incidents as an indicator of severity. To begin with, it is difficult to determine what is meant by one incident. It can be a small one between two groups that lasts no more than a few hours,³¹ or a bloody conflict –like a civil war– involving an issue that exists continuously for several weeks or months.³² This suggests that the number of incidents sometimes cannot consistently indicate the severity of conflict.

A similar difficulty is found when using the loss of materials as an indicator. For instance the number of damaged or burned houses may mean a little damage such as broken window glasses or complete destruction by being flattened. The range of severity is very wide; therefore, ten houses with broken glasses are certainly not more

³⁰ This method is adopted from the study of Varshney (2001) on communal conflicts in India.

³¹ E.g. a clash between neighborhood in Cirebon, West Java, or between police and a group of mass in demonstration, which causes only few people injured.

³² Like the Dayak-Madura riot in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, in February – March 2001 with at least 371 deaths.

severe than two completely burned houses. In the same way, the loss of other buildings may be of a small police post, an office of the local House of Representative or a luxury complex of shopping center. The variation is so wide that it is not amenable to comparison across time and space.

However merely ignoring the number of victims other than casualties is not a wise approach. If this was done, a lot of records of social violence would be forgotten and there would not be any indication of social violence. When reports of deaths are not obtained, this study uses other indicators of social violence, namely the numbers of incidence, injuries, damaged houses or buildings and vehicles. They also indicate the severity of violence resulting from social conflicts although they are less satisfactory indicators than the number of deaths for the purpose of spatial comparison, both across time and region. We also need to consider using other indicators to gauge the severity of different categories of social violence.³³

Data quantification. The quantification of casualty indicator faces two problems. The first is when there are inconsistencies in the number of reported deaths between different sources cited in *Antara* and *Kompas*. And the second is when the data are reported in the form of ranges.³⁴ In dealing with these problems, the rule of using the lower figure, not the higher figure, is used. Following Varshney (2001), minimal numbers are considered superior to maximal numbers. The reason is that, on subjects that are emotionally and politically charged and where government data are unreliable, we cannot generate an inter-subjective consensus on the highest numbers reported, when scholars cannot find out “exactly how many” people died based on direct evidence or experience. However, we are likely to get a consensus on “at least so many people died”. The same rule is applied for other damage indicators, i.e. injuries, damaged houses, buildings and vehicles.

While the “lower figure” rule is methodologically superior, one should bear in mind its downward bias. In addition, despite the two main sources’ –*Antara* and

³³ E.g. violent conflict between companies and workers (labor disputes), usually in the form of labor strike, rarely causes human death or material damage. Therefore, it is necessary to look at other indicators that can measure the severity of violence, e.g. the number of workers involved and loss of working hours.

Kompas– nationwide coverage, it is possible that some incidents of social violence went unreported.

The period of study

The period of study is the last decade of the 20th century, i.e. from 1990 to 2001. It covers two periods: the stable era of New Order (1990 to 1997) and the transition period (1998 to date). So, acts of social violence in both periods can be compared. However, it must be borne in mind that press policies differ in two eras. Before the 1998 reform, the Indonesian press was under an authoritarian regime where there was no freedom of press. News coverage on social violence was very restricted. After 1998, the press got relatively more freedom to report and the number of media increased sharply. So, reports on social conflict and violence become more open. Thus, the data of social violence before 1998 tend to underestimate. It is also possible in the post 1998 period for media reports on violence to be an overestimate. However, the comparison will enable us to obtain a picture of change from the stable period under New Order into a transition period, subject to the above caveats, and merely understand the phenomenon of social violence during transition.

III. Social violence: A national picture

The development of social violence in Indonesia

Based on the categorization developed in the previous section, aggregate figures of social violence are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, social violence in Indonesia during 1990-2001 caused at least 6,208 losses of human lives. Of all categories of social violence, communal violence is the most severe, when measured by the number of deaths. Communal violence caused around 77% (or 4,771 deaths) of the total deaths due to social violence, followed by separatist violence with 22% casualties (1,370 deaths).

³⁴ For example, if it is reported that there are dozens people killed, it can be said that the minimum figure is 12.

Figure 2 shows that deaths from social violence mostly occurred in the transition period –since 1998, it increased sharply. However, it should be noted that this figure does not include casualties resulting from the application of Military Operation Zone (DOM) in Aceh and Papua between 1989 and 1998. The DOM casualties are separately discussed in a section on separatist violence, and so is the social violence in East Timor.

Although explosion of violence has occurred since 1998, it does not mean that there was no social violence during the Suharto era. As mentioned earlier, the reporting of such incidents was tightly controlled. Despite the regime’s repressive nature, social conflicts began to break out in open violence in the early years of 1990s. In 1993 when the New Order regime was still very stable but weakening, three important cases appeared: the Nipah tragedy, the Haur Koneng incident and the case of Marsinah. In 1995 there were two cases and in 1996 this increased to eight cases. They included the operation to free the Team of Lorentz 95 taken hostage by the liberation movement in Papua, the 27th July tragedy in Jakarta, the Dayak-Madura conflict in Sambas, the riots in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya. The year 1997 saw 15 cases of social violence, for example the riots in Banjarmasin and Rengasdengklok.


Table 1. Social violence by category, 1990-2001

Category	Number of incidents ^{*)}	Number of incidents with minimum 1 death	Number of deaths (minimum value)	% Death to total death
<i>Communal violence</i>	465	262	4,771	76.9
<i>Separatist violence</i>	502	369	1,370	22.1
<i>State-community violence</i>	88	19	59	1.0
<i>Industrial relations violence</i>	38	4	8	0.1
Total	1,093	654	6,208	100

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Note: ^{*)} Number of incident recorded in this column defined as incident with minimum 1 damage indicator reported, the damage could be death or injury (human damage), or house/other building or vehicle destroyed/burned (material damage).

Figure 2.
Social violence, 1990-2001



As can be seen from Figure 2 social violence peaked in the period of 1999-2000. This peak could be due to two factors, first is the sudden outburst of latent/suppressed conflicts after the collapse of the Suharto regime. The second factor is the increased press freedom in reporting during the transition period. Subject to caveats regarding the regime differences with regard to press freedom and the method of dealing with social conflicts, one can reasonably conclude that both severity and incidents of violent social conflicts increased during the transition period. Although the amount of and severity of social violence declined in 2001, it is still too early to ascertain a trend.

Although this study does not cover the entire New Order period, we should still note several incidents of social violence prior to 1990, such as the killing of thousands of people suspected of a communist link in 1965-66,³⁵ the *Malari* incident³⁶ (15

³⁵ Estimates of deaths in the social violence of the mid 1960s related to the massacre of Indonesian Communist Party followers vary greatly, from the smallest figure of 78,000 to the highest figure of 2 million. The figure commonly accepted varies from 500,000 to 600,000 deaths (Sulistyo, 2000).

³⁶ Malari is acronym of *Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari* (the 15 January disaster) 1974. The riot followed the anti Japanese student demonstration during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei

January 1974), the *Tanjung Priok* tragedy³⁷ (12 September 1984), and the long standing separatist movements in Aceh, Papua and East Timor.³⁸

Regional distribution

Social violence occurred during 1990-2001 in almost all provinces in Indonesia with the exception of Bengkulu.³⁹ Incidents of social violence with deaths were found in all regions, except in the provinces of Jambi, South Sumatra, East Kalimantan, and South East Sulawesi.

Based on the intensity of deaths, i.e. number of deaths weighted by number of population, the provinces can be grouped into three categories. The intensity of deaths explains how the population size affects the ranking, e.g. number of deaths same in A and B, but A has less dense population, therefore, A will be ranked higher. This is because in a less dense area, one expects fewer deaths, but to have the same number of deaths as a dense area implies that the violence there was much severe. The three categories are high, medium, and low conflict areas. In Table 2, three provinces are classified into *high conflict area*. They are Maluku (the worst conflict area), Aceh and Central Kalimantan. The conflicts in these areas covered almost all parts of districts or cities. The Dayak-Madura conflict in Central Kalimantan in early 2001 was initiated in Sampit, but then spread to other districts/cities.

Tanaka in Jakarta. Official government statement, at that time, announced that eleven youths had been killed, more than a hundred injured, almost 1,000 vehicles had been damaged or destroyed, 144 buildings had been burned or otherwise damaged and some 820 individuals were arrested (Bresnan, 1993).

³⁷ Number of deaths in this incident is varied and confused, from dozens to hundreds. Bresnan (1993) reported around 63 killed and more than 100 injured, while the investigation of the Human Rights Commission, *Komnas HAM* (2000), reported 24 killed and 55 injured.

³⁸ In Aceh, after the Daud Beureuh rebellion in the 1950's, the separatist movement was started by the declaration of the *Negara Aceh Merdeka* (Aceh Independent State) on 4 December 1976 by Hasan Tiro (Haris, *et. al.*, 1999). While in Papua, armed contacts between the OPM guerilla and TNI were continuously happening since the 1960's (Pigay, 2001). In East Timor, the violence incidents were started by the *Komodo* and *Seroja* Operations in 1974-1975, and the region became the 27th Indonesian province in 1976 (Djajadi, 1999).

³⁹ This study has not found reports on the incidence of social violence in Bengkulu within the period of 1990-2001 both in *Antara* and *Kompas*. However, we cannot yet conclude that this region is sterile from social violence.

The *medium conflict area* consists of eight provinces: Central Sulawesi, Papua, South Kalimantan, Riau, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. The other fifteen provinces are classified into *low conflict area*.

Table 2 classifies Central Java and East Java into low conflict areas although the total number of deaths in both provinces is higher than that of Riau and West Nusa Tenggara, which are classified as medium conflict areas. This is because the number of population in Java compared to the other two provinces is relatively very dense so that the intensity of death becomes relatively smaller in Java rather than that of Riau and West Nusa Tenggara.

Communal violence, which is nationally the most severe social violence, is also the most dominant type of social violence in most areas (Table 2, column 6), except in Aceh and Papua, which are dominated by separatist violence. This is supported by the data in Table 3, which presents the distribution of incidents and deaths by provinces and categories of social violence.

Table 2. Classification of conflict area, 1990-2001

Province (1)	Number of incidents		Number of deaths		The most dominant category of social violence (based on the biggest number of deaths) (6)
	Total (2)	With minimum 1 death (3)	Total (4)	per 100 thousand population ^{a)} (5)	
<i>High conflict area</i> ^{b)}					
Maluku	165	138	1,949	93.4	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
Aceh	464	341	1,238	32.2	<i>Separatist (100%)</i>
Central Kalimantan	16	13	440	27.0	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
<i>Medium conflict area</i> ^{b)}					
Central Sulawesi	15	10	334	17.2	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
Jakarta	55	16	1,230	13.5	<i>Communal (98%)</i>
West Kalimantan	17	9	442	12.2	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
Papua	41	29	136	7.0	<i>Separatist (97%)</i>
South Kalimantan	1	1	124	4.3	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
East Nusatenggara	14	8	55	1.5	<i>Communal (96%)</i>
Riau	17	4	26	0.7	<i>Communal (96%)</i>
West Nusatenggara	12	6	24	0.7	<i>Communal (88%)</i>
<i>Low conflict area</i> ^{b)}					
Bali	9	5	14	0.5	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
North Sulawesi	3	1	9	0.3	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
South Sulawesi	14	3	20	0.3	<i>Communal (100%)</i>
West Java	88	28	71	0.2	<i>Communal (87%)</i>
Lampung	20	5	11	0.2	-
Centra Java	52	17	42	0.1	<i>Communal (90%)</i>
North Sumatra	24	7	11	0.1	<i>Communal (45%)</i>
East Java	32	10	29	0.1	<i>Communal (76%)</i>
Yogyakarta	9	2	2	0.1	-
West Sumatra	6	1	1	0.0	-
Jambi	7				-
South Sumatra	7				-
East Kalimantan	4				-
South-east Sulawesi	1				-
Bengkulu					-
Total	1,093	654	6,208	3.2	

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Notes:

^{a)} Weighted by the number of population based on SUPAS 1995

^{b)} Classifying provinces into high, medium, and low conflict areas based on the data range of conflict severity, i.e. death intensity (column 5). Statistically the data do not spread normally, so the average is not good indicator used as the measure of data concentration. Therefore, to classify the provinces according to the severity of violence, the median (the value is 0.7) and standard deviation (the value is 21.3) approach is used (see footnote 47 for the explanation of this approach). The classification is as follows:

- High conflict area: Death per 100 thousand population ≥ 22
- Medium conflict area: $0.7 < \text{death per 100 thousand population} < 22$
- Low conflict area: Death per 100 thousand population < 0.7

Table 3. Social violence, by province, by category, 1990-2001

Province	Category of social violence							
	Communal violence		Separatist violence		State-community violence		Industrial relation related violence	
	Number of incidents	Number of deaths	Number of incidents	Number of deaths	Number of incidents	Number of deaths	Number of incidents	Number of deaths
Aceh			464	1,238				
North Sumatra	14	5			4	3	6	3
West Sumatra	4	1					2	
Riau	11	25			2		4	1
Jambi	4				1		2	
South Sumatra	3				1		3	
Bengkulu								
Lampung	6	4			8	4	6	3
Jakarta	33	1,209			22	21		
West Java	68	62			13	9	7	
Centra Java	44	38			7	4	1	
Yogyakarta	6	1			3	1		
East Java	22	22			9	6	1	1
Bali	8	14					1	
West Nusatenggara	9	21			2	3	1	
East Nusatenggara	13	53			1	2		
West Kalimantan	13	440			2	2	2	
Central Kalimantan	16	440						
South Kalimantan	1	124						
East Kalimantan					3		1	
North Sulawesi	3	9						
Central Sulawesi	13	334			2			
South Sulawesi	9	20			4		1	
South-east Sulawesi					1			
Maluku	164	1,949			1			
Papua	1		38	132	2	4		
Total	465	4,771	502	1,370	88	59	38	8

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database

IV. Communal violence: the most severe social violence

The development of communal violence

Communal violence is the worst category amongst the four categories of social violence in Indonesia. The following is a description of the trend of communal violence in Indonesia.

The outbreak of a series of acts of communal violence that is generally derived from communal conflicts is an important phenomenon marking the Indonesian transition. The scale of violence increased sharply and new cases appeared immediately after the reform began in 1998 (Figure 2). The number of both incidents and deaths was higher after 1998. There was no reports on incidents and deaths before 1995. In 1995, two communal riots took place in Maumere and Larantuka of East Nusatenggara province.⁴⁰ The riots in Tasikmalaya and Situbondo,⁴¹ the Dayak-Madura riot in Sambas of West Kalimantan province, and the July 27th event in Jakarta⁴² were all communal violence in nature in 1996. The intensity of communal violence went up in 1997; amongst them are the cases of midnight tragedy in Rengasdengklok and riots in Majalengka and Banjarmasin.⁴³

The 1998-year of reform was started by a series of riots in various places. Although they were triggered by the shortage of basic foods, they were immediately followed by a wave of communal riots culminating in the May riot in Jakarta and some other big cities. Since the second half of 1998, various cases of communal violence have occurred in all of the big islands of Indonesia. They were communal riots in Poso, Maluku, Sambas, Sampit, Pangkalan Bun, Luwu, Bagan Siapi-api,

⁴⁰ The incidence in Maumere, where two people were killed, was triggered by mass dissatisfaction at public prosecutor's demand against the defendant in the case of insulting the Hostia Kudus. The same factor triggered the Larantuka case (insulting of Hostia Kudus) when round 3000 Catholics were conducting the ceremony of "Ekakristi" (*Antara*, 1/7/95).


⁴¹ The riot in Situbondo was triggered by mass dissatisfaction at public prosecutor's demand against the defendant in the case of disrespecting "Kyai", a title of Moslem scholars/leaders. Five deaths and at least eight churches burnt. The Tasikmalaya riot was initiated by harsh police treatment to a Moslem student and caused four people killed and tens of shops burnt.

⁴² It was a tragedy at the head quarter office of the Indonesian Democratic Party due to its leadership struggle conspired by the Suharto regime.

⁴³ The Banjarmasin riot (23/5/97), after the Golkar Party's campaign approaching the 1997 general elections, caused 124 deaths.

Mataram, Kupang, and Ketapang, the civil commotion in Jakarta, Cirebon, and Indramayu, the political conflict, and the murder by the masses or crowds of those suspected of killing others through the use of witchcraft, etc.

Figure 3.
Communal violence, 1990-2001



The regional distribution of communal violence

Communal violence has the widest regional distribution. The incidence of communal violence was found at least in 116 district/cities (of total existing 295 district/cities)⁴⁴ spreading over 22 provinces (of the total 26 provinces) in Indonesia.⁴⁵ Incidents with at least one death are found in 66 districts/cities (out of the 116 districts/cities) in 18 provinces (Table 4).

A recent study in India⁴⁶ concludes that communal riots –particularly between the Hindus and Moslems– are the most dominant cases happening in cities (city-specific cases) and concentrate on several big cities. The cases of communal violence

⁴⁴ There are totally 295 districts/cities in Indonesia –231 districts and 64 cities– based on *Indonesia National Human Development Report 2001* (UNDP/GOI, 2001).

⁴⁵ Compared with separatist violence that are only in three provinces: Aceh, Papua and East Timor, state-community violence with death victims was in 15 districts/cities in 11 provinces, whereas industrial relations related conflict with death victims was only in three districts.

⁴⁶ See Varshney (2001).

in Indonesia –as shown in Table 4– provide a somewhat different portrait. The communal violence is not dominant in big cities; in fact, more violence and death occurred in district areas including their capitals, which are small towns. Around 64% of incidents and 58% of deaths in communal violence happened in 87 district areas, whereas communal violence is found only in 29 city areas.

Table 4. Communal violence: city and district variation, 1990-2001

Region	Number of city/district where <i>communal violence</i> occurred	Number of incident	Number of death
District	87	297 (64%)	2,752 (58%)
City	29 ^{a)}	168 (36%)	2,019 (42%) ^{b)}
Total	116	465	4,771

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Notes:

^{a)} All these cities have population of over 150 thousand (according to the 2000 Population Census) and are commonly the capital of provinces. Only 11 cities have over 1 million people (including the capital city of Jakarta with its 5 city areas).

^{b)} Deaths in city areas are mainly from the May 1998 riot in Jakarta that caused 1,188 deaths.

The regional concentration of communal violence

Communal violence is concentrated in several areas, but the areas are spread evenly all over Indonesia. More interestingly, based on the severity of social violence in terms of the number of deaths, the 66 districts/cities can be grouped into three categories. The grouping is based on the median and standard deviation approach, because the data are not normally distributed.⁴⁷ The three area classifications are as follows. First, *communal riot prone I* (CRP I), that is classified as areas with more than 39.7 deaths per 100 thousand population. Second, CRP II, that is defined as areas with deaths per 100 thousand population between 0.54 – 39.7. And third, CRP III, which are areas with less than 0.54 deaths per 100 thousand population. The deaths in

⁴⁷ When the dataset is normally distributed, data are evenly spread around the average, so that the average gives an indication of data concentration and the value of average is identical to median (the middle most value). But if the dataset is not normally distributed, the median splits data equally on both sides. In other words, median is best used as a measure of data concentration. The measure of data dispersion is given by standard deviation from the median.

communal violence are concentrated in CRP I and CRP II, 65% and 33% of 4,771 total deaths respectively (Table 5).

Table 5. Communal riot prone (CRP) area, 1990-2001

Area classification	Number of deaths	% to total death	Number of city/district
Communal riot prone I (death per 100 thousand pop. > 39.7)	3,088	65	8
Communal riot prone II (0.54 < death per 100 thousand pop. < 39.7)	1,594	33	27
Communal riot prone III (death per 100 thousand pop. < 0.54)	89	2	31
Total	4,771	100	66

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Note: See Appendix 1 for detail list of city/district of each CRP area.

The CRP I consists of 8 districts/cities in four provinces, i.e. all of the five districts/cities in Maluku, Poso in Central Sulawesi, Kotawaringin Timur in Central Kalimantan, and Sambas in West Kalimantan. While all of the districts/cities in Maluku fall into the category CRP I, only one district/city in each of the other provinces is of the CRP I category. The regions of CRP I category are often referred to as the eastern part of Indonesia.⁴⁸ The CRP II comprises 27 districts/cities spreading over 14 provinces, whereas the other 13 districts/cities are classified as the CRP III (see Appendix 1 for the details).

Variations of communal violence

Communal violence can also be classified according to the types of issues underlying communal conflicts. The differentiation of communal violence into sub-categories based on the types of issues would lead to a better understanding of its variations and underlying problems. The subcategories are as follows:

(a) Ethnic, religion and migration related violence. This sub-category of communal violence is related to ethnic, religion and migration issues. Migration creates the natives and migrants dichotomy. The combination of these underlying causes (ethnic, religion, migrant-native) into one sub-category of communal violence is due to the nature of religion propagation that was related to particular regions and ethnic groups in the past. Therefore, ethnic groups are usually associated with a particular religion. Problems arose when certain ethnic groups of a particular religion migrated to other area that was already inhabited by other ethnic groups of a different religion. For example, the Madurese migrants in Central Kalimantan are Muslims, while the natives (Dayak ethnic) are mostly Christians. When a violent conflict occurred, it was difficult to determine whether the differences in ethnicity, religion or origin were the underlying cause of the conflict. A concrete example is the bloody communal conflicts in Maluku, Poso and Luwu. The groups in conflict in these areas consist of different religions (Moslem and Christian), and different ethnicity that divided into migrants and natives. While the communal conflicts in Sambas, Sampit, Pangkalan Bun, Bagan siapi-api, and the riots in the transmigration settlement in Kinali of West Sumatra and Jujuhan of Jambi, are characterized only by the issue of ethnic differences and the native-migrant status. Practically, there is no single issue underlying this sub-category of communal violence –religion, ethnic and the origin all are intertwined.

The communal violence related to ethnicity, religion, and native-migrant status is the most severe amongst seven subcategories of communal violence. There were 3,219 deaths or around 68 % out of 4,759 total deaths in communal violence (Table 6). In terms of this severity measure, the ethnic-religion-migration related violence is concentrated on several areas, i.e. Maluku, Poso of Central Sulawesi, Sambas of West Kalimantan, Sampit of Central Kalimantan, Luwu of Central Sulawesi, and Batam of Riau (each of these area having more than 20 deaths). The areas fall under the CRP I and II. Although the casualties are concentrated in a few areas, this type of communal violence was found in many regions, –39 districts/cities spreading over 17 provinces.

⁴⁸ Many studies classify Indonesia into two parts: western and eastern regions of Indonesia. The western region consists of Sumatra, Java and Bali, and the eastern region includes Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusatenggara, Maluku and Papua. The former is generally more developed than the latter.

(b) The May 1998 riots. This sub-category of communal violence refers to the riots in Jakarta and several other big cities like Medan, Padang, Palembang, Solo and Yogyakarta, preceding the fall of President Suharto in May 1998. This type of violence is very specific if seen from the nature of explosion, time and place of occurrence and its close relationship with the fall of a regime; and is therefore put into a separate sub-category, i.e. so-called “the May 1998 riots” as one sub-category of communal violence. In addition to causing thousands of death, the May riots has also caused a great loss of materials,⁴⁹ and about 150,000 people left Indonesia during this riots, of which 70,000 are believed to be ethnic Chinese.⁵⁰

Table 6. Communal violence by sub-category, 1990-2001

Sub-category	Deaths		Incidents	
	Number	% to total	Number	City/district
Ethnic, religion and migration	3,230	67.7	233	39
The May 98 riots	1,202	25.2	6	10
Differences in political views	156	3.3	79	54
Civil commotion (<i>tawuran</i>)	87	1.8	70	28
Issue of ‘ <i>dukun santet</i> ’	65	1.4	28	17
Competing resources	16	0.3	16	10
The food riots	5	0.1	23	22
Others	10	0.2	10	9
Total	4,771	100	465	116

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

(c) Food riots. This communal violence is also very specific. A series of mass riots and lootings for staple foods happened in January to March 1998 when the economic crisis reached its climax accompanied by the fall of Rupiah against the US dollar, being Rp. 15,000 equal to one dollar. Shops and food warehouses in particular were looted.

Food riots occurred sporadically for some time without a long interval, around January and February 1998, at least in 23 locations,⁵¹ i.e. Padang Sidempuan,

⁴⁹ For example, the most severe May 1998 riots in Jakarta recorded 1,026 houses, 4,676 other buildings (shops, offices, markets etc), and 1,948 vehicles damaged and burnt as well as 1,188 deaths (*Kompas*, 3 June 1998).

⁵⁰ Suryadinata (2002), p. 65.

⁵¹ Occorandi (1998) writes that the food riots occurred in 40 towns, but this study found complete information only in 23 locations.

Pagaralam, Jatiwangi, Kuningan, Cirebon, Pamanukan, Cikarang, Tegal (2 locations), Pangalengan, Rembang, Brebes, Jember, Tuban, Pasuruan, Bojonegoro, Bima, Praya, Ende, Sampang, Ujung Pandang and Doggala. And one more incident happened later in September 1998 in Batanghari, Jambi. It was reported that this riot has caused at least 266 shops and warehouses looted, destroyed and burnt, 79 vehicles burnt, and five deaths.⁵²

At the time of violence, prices of goods skyrocketed to 2 to 4 times the normal price. The sharp increase of prices was accompanied by a scarcity of goods especially the basic foods. The condition created a serious adverse effect particularly on marginal groups and middle class. Meanwhile, public opinion developed that Chinese ethnics dominated the distribution line of goods in Indonesia; and illegal piling up of the staple foods that was motivated by speculation to gain maximum profit, was found in various places.

This situation created a collective psychological atmosphere, i.e. mass frustration among the marginal groups who were swelling up in numbers as many lost their jobs due to the economic crisis and company bankruptcy. This condition became the “dry straw,” or immediate cause of the incident of riots and lootings, with the demand for the reduction of goods prices and immediate solution to food scarcity.

Given the fact that the riot was predominantly against the Chinese, this particular incidence could be seen as an ethnic/religious one. But since the underlying cause is the shortage of food and the subsequent rise in food price, we place it under the sub-category “food riot.”

(d) Differences in political views. These differences are often manifested in the form of communal violence. This sub-category includes conflicts within and between political parties, which are then followed by clashes between their supporters. Generally, this kind of violence occurs during elections at different levels. Sometimes violence also occurs among the supporters of the same party due to differences of

⁵² All is an accumulation of minimum numbers of damages reported.

opinion or the choice of party leaders, for example, the violence related to the toppling of Megawati as PDI leader.

Violence as a result of the difference in political views is a new and interesting development to look at. The number of incidents continued to increase with its peak in 1999, which was closely related to frictions between political parties over the general elections in that year. Between 1990 and 2001, the intensity of this conflict decreased. This type of violence is the third most severe (in terms of number of deaths) sub-category of communal violence after ethnic-religion-migration related violence and the May 1998 riot (Table 6). Further, this sub-category has the second largest number of incidents (79 incidents), and it has the widest regional distribution with cases found in 54 districts/cities spreading over 17 provinces. However, the majority of incidents (almost 70%) occurred in Java.

(e) Competing for resources. This sub-category of communal violence is caused by disputes between community groups when they compete for economic resources, but not accompanied by clashes between ethnic, religious, and/or native-migrant groups.

There were 16 deaths in 5 incidents of the total 16 incidents competing for resources. The most outstanding was the land dispute in East Nusatenggara causing 13 deaths, followed by the dispute between fishermen in Jepara (2 deaths), and the clashes between villagers competing for trade area for street vendors in Denpasar where one person was killed.

(f) The issue of *dukun santet* (a person believed to be able to harm or kill others through evil magic or witchcraft). This sub-category refers more to the symptoms on the surface, that is, the murder cases of persons (suspected to be *dukun santet*) by a group of people. However, if it is studied more deeply, there is a possibility that the issue of *dukun santet* was used as a pretext or justification for the killing while the fundamental problem is actually another factor.⁵³ These cases were found only in

⁵³ At least there are three speculations about the underlying reasons for the killings under the pretext of *dukun santet*: one is a revenge over the mass killing of followers of Indonesian Communist Party in the mid 1960s, second is land dispute, and third –highly speculative– attempts made by certain political

Java. The issue became worse around late 1998, starting from Banyuwangi in East Java spreading to Central Java until mid 1999. After a short interval, a series of cases with similar issues appeared in 2000 in West Java.

(g) Civil commotion (Clashes between villages, neighborhoods, or groups). This sub-category is actually rather a vague grouping, but it is true that various cases of mass clashes were found, which are often historically and culturally bound between two groups. There were a large number of cases, which generally concentrated in certain areas, for example clashes in Manggarai, clashes between the neighborhoods of Berlan and Pal Meriam in Matraman, Jakarta, villager clashes in Indramayu, Cirebon and other north coastal areas, Tasikmalaya, Cilacap, Banyumas, Buleleng, and other areas. Further research certainly would reveal the real motive behind the clashes –whether it was economic, political, ethnic, or others. However, due to limited availability of information, it is included in this sub-category. This civil commotion generally occurred in Java, particularly Jakarta, West Java and Central Java.

V. Separatist violence

The separatist violence is discussed in two parts. The first deals with Aceh and Papua, and the second deals with East Timor. As mentioned earlier the nature of and responses of the Indonesian government towards separatist movements in Aceh and Papua differed from that in East Timor.

The case of Aceh and Papua: an aspiration to inequality

Separatist violence in Aceh and Papua is rooted in the long history of discontent against the central government and in how successive governments have treated both provinces so far. The escalation and existence of separatist violence had developed long before the reform and transitional period began. The central government declared Aceh and Papua as military operation zones (DOM) until 1998. In Aceh, the

forces to disrupt East Java approaching the general election in 1999. But there has not been any comprehensive study to uncover the real cause of killings involving the issue of dukun santet. (See the investigative report of *Tempo*, January 8-14, 2002).

Indonesian government began to apply DOM in 1989, based on the security development reported by Ibrahim Hasan, the Governor of Aceh at the time. On August 7, 1998 –not long after the fall of President Suharto– General Wiranto, the then Commander-in-Chief of Indonesian National Army (TNI), officially ended the status of DOM in Aceh. In the same year, DOM in Papua was also brought to an end. The withdrawal of DOM status was one of the reform demands.

The conflict in Aceh dominates separatist violence both in terms of number of incidents and deaths. Violence in Aceh was generally in the forms of armed contact between armed civilians and security officers, mass riots, violence by security apparatus in treating the mass and terrorism by unknown forces (either by civilian or military) against the people. However, these violent actions are deeply rooted in the problem of separatism. Violence in Aceh was also characterized by anti Javanese and Batak ethnic sentiments, where many in both ethnic groups, in addition to security officers, have been slaughtered by the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM). The Javanese who commonly live in the transmigration area are considered to represent the symbol of “colonialism” on the land of Aceh. And the Batak people represent Christianity, while almost all Aceh people are Moslems.

In the middle of 1998, there was a strong hope that the solution to the conflict in Aceh would enter a new phase with the removal of DOM status. However, in reality, the conflict escalated. Political uncertainty and the failure to resolve the issues through a dialogue are thought to have increased the intensity of violence.

Meanwhile, the conflict in Papua for the last three years has been predominantly influenced by the problem around the raising of the “Bintang Kejora” flag. It became more serious following the statement of President Abdurrahman Wahid that allowed the raising of the flag as a cultural symbol of Papua, in his early presidency in late 1999. Practically in all districts of Papua, deaths were found during the flag raising.

The news about separatist violence in both provinces has only been reported more openly since the reform era in 1998. When the DOM was operated in Aceh during the New Order, practically no media wrote objectively about the conflict in the

region. Similarly in Papua, it was difficult to get accurate information about the number of deaths during the operation of DOM.

For the conflict in Aceh, this study only records the reports of violence since 1998 when the first incident of open violence occurred. This was the riot in Lhokseumawe (31 August – 3 September 1998) following the withdrawal of part of the TNI officers from Aceh, with the discontinuation of DOM status in the province. Between 1998 and 2001, the media reported around 1,238 deaths in 341 incidents (Table 7).

Some analyses of the Aceh conflict give several versions of the number of deaths during the DOM operation between 1989 and 1998. The lowest figure is 781 deaths, which is reported by the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM). But Usman Hasan gives a bigger number, i.e. 1,300 deaths.⁵⁴ The highest figure is 1,321 people killed released by The Aceh NGO Coalition for Human Rights (Eda and Darma, p. 14-15).

Table 7. Separatist violence in Aceh dan Papua, 1990-2001

Year	Aceh			Papua		
	Number of incidents	Number of incidents with minimum 1 death	Number of deaths	Number of incidents	Number of incidents with minimum 1 death	Number of deaths
1990-97	-	-	-	2	2	14
1998	7	4	13	2	1	1
1999	129	84	360	6	2	5
2000	189	121	362	17	13	92
2001	139	132	503	11	10	20
Total	464	341	1,238	38	28	132

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

In Papua, most reported incidents occurred after 1998. Nonetheless, there were two reported incidents in 1996. The first was the riot in Abepura that happened on the arrival of the dead body of Thomas Wanggai.⁵⁵ The second was the military operation to release the Lorentz 1995 Expedition Team who was taken hostage by the Papua

⁵⁴ Usman Hasan was a member of special presidential advisory team for Aceh, formed by Ex-President Habibie.

Freedom Organization (OPM) in the Mapenduma village.⁵⁶ The highest intensity of incidents and the biggest number of deaths were in 2000 (17 incidents and 13 deaths). Unfortunately, there is no detail report of how many people were actually killed in Papua before 1998. However, the recently published book written by Leo Suryadinata, a political scientist of National University of Singapore, writes that it was reported that between 13,000 and 80,000 Irianese had been killed since 1969.⁵⁷

So far the separatist violence has just occurred in areas rich in natural resources: Aceh and Papua. However since 1998, along with the political reform followed by the issuing of regional decentralization law by the central government, conflict and tension between the centre and regions has also emerged in Riau⁵⁸ and East Kalimantan⁵⁹ who are struggling to get a larger share of their natural resource income, especially oil and gas revenue. The struggle of Riau and East Kalimantan is likely to develop into a separatist movement.⁶⁰ The separatist spirit has existed, but the way of expressing it has not yet used violent acts like in Aceh and Papua. Therefore, what is developing in the four rich provinces can be classified as the centre-regional conflicts,⁶¹ which may climax in separatist conflicts.

What are the underlying causes of the problem in the four provinces characterized by centre-region conflicts? The following perspective may be offered. The four provinces have similar characteristics: they are rich in natural resources but their community welfare, on average, is not proportionate to their regions' prosperity as represented in their regional outputs. The social welfare such as literacy, life expectancy, etc, of their people is not higher, and even in some areas far behind, the national average for Indonesia. On the other hand, the natural resources in these

⁵⁵ He was one of the figures struggling for the independence of Papua who died when he was in Cipinang prison, Jakarta.

⁵⁶ From 8 January – 15 May 1996, a group of researchers for WWF (Lorentz Team '95) comprising scientists from England, Netherlands, Germany, and Indonesia was taken hostage by the OPM led by Kelly Kwalik in the Mapenduma village, Wamena. The Indonesia Government launched a military operation to free hostages on 9–15 May 1996 after ICRC withdrew as a mediator.

⁵⁷ See Suryadinata (2002), p. 63 and its related footnote.

⁵⁸ Almost one third of total oil and gas revenue is from the province of Riau, and its Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) per capita is more than 2.3 times higher than the national average.

⁵⁹ RGDP per capita of East Kalimantan is almost four times higher than the national average.

⁶⁰ See Tadjoeddin, *et. al.* (2001).

⁶¹ This kind of conflict is often called vertical conflict.

regions are abundant and the regional gross domestic product of these provinces is much higher than the national average (Table 8).

In other words, in the four natural resource rich regions, national policy did not transform local natural wealth into increases in local community welfare. Tadjoeiddin *et. al.* (2001) find a very low correlation between regional output level and community welfare (e.g. education, health, poverty, etc.) in the four resource rich provinces. This is a source of vertical conflict between the centre and regions, because the people of the local communities, especially the indigenous people, believe that they are the primary inheritors of all resources available in their region, but denied of their shares.

**Table 8. Imbalance between region prosperity and community welfare, 1996
(Indonesia = 100)**

Province ¹	The richest city/district	Region prosperity	Community welfare					
		RGDP/capita Real	Exp/cap ² Real	E ₀ ³	Lit ⁴	MYS ⁵	HDI ⁶	Poverty ⁷ 1999
Aceh		139	82	103	111	132	102	62
	Aceh Utara	347	85	102	112	132	103	75
Riau		239	117	104	115	130	104	59
	Kepulauan Riau	281	113	102	110	119	99	42
	Bengkalis	432	100	103	114	126	101	73
East Kalimantan		392	130	102	111	136	103	86
	Kutai	681	123	99	110	126	100	84
	Berau	306	146	101	105	113	98	34
	Bulungan	193	184	106	109	126	103	119
	Kota Balikpapan	397	135	105	113	153	104	70
	Kota Samarinda	212	144	102	115	158	105	73
Papua		165	91	98	83	94	89	232
	Fak Fak	1,604	82	100	108	123	95	241
Indonesia		100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Adapted from Tadjoeiddin *et.al.* (2001), Table 6, p. 296.

Notes:

¹ The four provinces where the centre-regional conflict occurred.

² Real percapita expenditure per month

³ E₀ is life expectancy

⁴ Lit is literacy rate

⁵ MYS is mean years of schooling

⁶ HDI is human development index

⁷ Based on poverty head count from Susenas 1999, taken from the *Indonesia NHDR 2001*

The data considered above indicate the economic outcomes of New Order policies that aimed at improving the aggregate level of community welfare while increasing the nation's economic growth. Undeniably these policies have achieved a low level of inequality with respect to aggregate welfare of the population. But this has come at the expense of some regions, as we see in the low correlation between regional prosperity and community welfare. This outcome has generated a collective awareness in rich regions, particularly among the indigenous people, that they do not receive what they see as their fair share of wealth generated from 'their' land. The aspirations of these people to the share of wealth produced by their region reflect not so much a desire for equality as an "aspiration to inequality". The aspirations are a response to the people's first-hand experience of their community welfare being reduced to, or even lowered below, the national average, even though their regions are rich in natural resources.⁶² These people are rising up against more than 30 years of political and economic repression under the New Order. They are disrupting the artificial stability achieved under the New Order's equalisation policies.

The case of East Timor: the colonial legacy

The violence in East Timor is treated separately in this sub-section, because this case is very specific compared with the separatist violence in Aceh and Papua. On 30 August 1999, in a "popular consultation" organized by the United Nations, close to 80 percent of East Timorese voters decided to reject an autonomy package offered by Indonesia and move towards independence. Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 when the former colonial power Portugal left it without any formal arrangement for the transfer of power. President Suharto promulgated Law no 7, 1976 to annex East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia. This was resisted by the indigenous East Timorese who developed a way of life under the Portuguese colonial period distinct from the Dutch colonial history for the rest of Indonesia. Some of them took up arms and organized armed struggle under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao and Fretilin.

⁶² On Riau's 43rd anniversary, *Kompas* daily newspaper wrote that 20 per cent of the 4.2 million population were living below the poverty line, and almost 70 per cent of the workforce lacked education. See "43 years of Riau: rich in resources, but people are still in poverty", *Kompas*, August 10, 2000.

During East Timor integration with Indonesia, a series of acts of violence occurred between pro integration and pro independent militias as well as violence during Indonesian military operation to suppress the independence movement. Since violence in East Timor was highly politicized by many interest groups, it is difficult to find any exact number of deaths to measure the severity of violence. The Indonesian press was highly restricted in reporting violence in East Timor. As a result, in this particular case we have decided to use reports prepared by the UN.

In a report to the UN Economic and Social Council, Bacre Waly Ndiaye wrote that an estimated 100,000 Timorese out of a population of 700,000 were killed by the Indonesian armed force between 1975 and 1980. The report also mentioned that between 1980 and 1984 another 100,000 East Timorese died or were killed of starvation or disease. However, Indonesia denied this report saying the death toll was more in the vicinity of 30,000. Indonesian troops killed a large number of unarmed protestors at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the capital of East Timor. According to the Ndiaye report, the death toll in the Santa Cruz incident was between 150 and 270. The official figure was 50. However, some other sources put the number at 400 (UN, 2000, p. 5).

Table 9. Violence in East Timor

Date/year	Remarks on violence	Number of deaths
1999	All violence during that year including the massive violence prior to and after the referendum	Around 1000
12 November 1991	The Santa Cruz cemetery incident	50 – 400
1975-84	Civil war and the Indonesian TNI military operation	30,000 – 200,000

Source: Tabulated from UN (2000).

The Human Rights Office of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has estimated that approximately 1,000 people were killed in 1999, when the massive violence occurred surrounding the referendum issue.⁶³ The violence can be differentiated between before and after the ballot day. Before the ballot day, the violence was mainly dominated by the intimidation of pro integration militias,

⁶³ UN (2000), p. 58.

allegedly backed by the Indonesian army. While after the ballot day, the security situation in East Timor deteriorated rapidly. Violence intensified after the announcement of the result favoring independence in early September 1999. This provoked pro-integration militia groups to go on the rampage. They conducted organized and coordinated operations, ransacking towns. It was estimated that more than 250,000 persons were displaced across the border into West Timor.⁶⁴ It is alleged that the pro-integration militias were actively supported by the Indonesian military. So this violence is as much “communal” as “separatist” in nature.

It is difficult to find credible media reports on social violence in East Timor between the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 and 1999, since the Indonesian government treated East Timor as a restricted region. No journalist or foreigner could enter the region without a permission.

VI. State-community violence: the manifestation of community discontent to the state

Social violence that occurs between the state⁶⁵ and community is a manifestation of the people’s dissatisfactions with the process and the ways of managing the state. This can be in the form of conflicts between community groups and state officials (civil or military) or formal institutions of state. This kind of conflict is unlikely to lead to separatism but expression of a strong desire for a change in managing the state. This conflict can be mass violence out of dislike toward military and its symbols, students’ protests due to dissatisfactions with state administration, violence by the security officials in treating violent incidents, etc.

The transition trend

The majority of state-community incidents of violence have occurred during the transition period since the start of reform in 1998, as the community expresses its dislike of the state in the transitional period. However, there were also some such incidents in the previous period. In particular, 1993 was marked by two events that

⁶⁴ UN (2000), p. 54.

attracted national attention: the Nipah tragedy⁶⁶ in Sampang, Madura and the Haur Koneng incident⁶⁷ in Majalengka, West Java. Then in 1996 in Nabire-Papua, there was a riot related to the admission of state civil servant. In 1997, a clash between the army and people in Timika emerged causing four people being shot dead. In 1998 at the start of reform, seven incidents with at least one death broke out, like the shooting of four students of Trisakti University and the Semanggi I tragedy. While the Semanggi II tragedy happened in 1999. A number of mass attacks on police offices and posts have occurred since 1998 in various places as an expression of community dislike of the police, which is at the same time indicating weak police professionalism.

This state-community violence was found in a lot of areas. Incidents were reported in 49 districts/cities spreading over 19 provinces (out of total 295 districts/cities and 26 provinces) throughout Indonesia. Around 60 % of the total deaths and number of incidents due to this violence were in city areas, and the remaining 40 % were in districts. This indicates that the community dissatisfaction against the state is widespread in both urban and regional areas.

Table 10. State-community violence, 1990-2001

Year	Incidents		Number of incidents with minimum 1 death	Number of deaths
	Total	Number of city/district		
1990-96	3	3	2	9
1997	2	2	1	4
1998	32	26	7	28
1999	12	10	2	3
2000	23	17	5	10
2001	16	14	2	5
Total	88	49	19	59

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Table 10 shows that the number of incidents increased sharply in 1998, indicating that the growing courage of the community to express their dissatisfaction through violence accompanied by the decreasing role of the military. This is a new

⁶⁵ The state, here, refers more to state officials or institutions.

⁶⁶ In this incident, five farmers were shot dead when military officers of the local military command, who were safeguarding the officials measuring the land for the building of a dam, attempted to drive away mass protestors against the building of the dam.

trend since the reform movement. In the previous years, state repression was very strong in suppressing community aspirations. The reform has changed completely the way civil society expresses its complaints. Unfortunately, there is a lack of institutional mechanism to manage the state-civil society conflicts in order to prevent them from turning to into social violence.

VII. Industrial relations violence: the dominance of violence between community and company

The transition trend

Like other categories of social violence, the violence connected with industrial relations commonly happened after the 1998 reform year (Table 11). Between 1990-97, for example, media reported only three incidents of this kind of violence. The most important one was the Marsinah case in East Java (9/5/1993).⁶⁸ Eight incidents broke out in 1998, 14 incidents in 1999, nine incidents in 2000 and 4 incidents in 2001. This chronology indicates that this form of social violence also accompanied the transition like the other three types of social violence, mentioned earlier.

Table 11. Industrial relations violence, 1990-2001

Year	Number of incidents	Number of incidents with minimum 1 death	Number of deaths
1990-97	3	1	1
1998	8	1	1
1999	14	1	3
2000	9	1	3
2001	4	-	-
Total	38	4	8

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

The industrial relations related violence was found in 28 districts/cities covering 14 provinces. However, as expected this kind of social violence generally does not end up in deaths. There were only eight deaths in four incidents (out of the total of 38

⁶⁷ The Haur Koneng incident, triggered by careless police handling of a religious group, caused four people killed (one policeman and three civilians).

⁶⁸ Two other incidents were a mass attack against a gold and mining industry of PT. Monterado Mas Mining in Sambas, West Kalimantan (29/3/96), and the riot during the labor demonstration in Sumedang, West Java (31/1/97).

incidents) in four districts (North Tapanuli, Indragiri Hulu, South Lampung and Sidoarjo). A greater loss was of material: 377 houses and buildings and 133 vehicles damaged or burned. Despite relatively few deaths, the loss of material indicates another dimension of the severity of violence.

Two kinds of industrial relations violence

The industrial relations related violence is of two kinds: (1) between workers and companies and (2) between the community and companies. The community here means the people around the location of the company. The violence between the community and companies is found to be more dominant. This type of the violence has caused the majority of incidents and number of deaths (over 80%).

As many as 31 incidents out of the total 38 incidents and 7 out of 8 deaths in industrial relations related violence were the cases of violence between the community and companies, while the rest were caused by the violence between workers and companies.

Does the lower number of death mean that the conflict between workers and companies is not important? The answer is certainly no. To have an accurate understanding of the intensity of conflicts between workers and companies, which is usually in the form of labor strikes, we have to use other indicators. Indicators commonly used by both the Ministry of Manpower and the International Labor Organization (ILO) are the number of workers involved and working hours lost because of the strike. Table 12 shows that the frequency of strikes has been quite high since 1990, and falling slightly in the transition period.

Why has the majority of violence been related to the relations between the community and companies? Conflicts between workers and companies (labor conflict) have more institutional channels in expressing dissatisfactions than conflicts between the community and companies. Labor conflicts had existed long before the beginning of the reform (Table 12), but they were not followed by violence, instead, accompanied by loss of material, e.g. the loss of working hours. This has apparently been caused by the existing institutional mechanism that serves the function of a

mediator such as the Ministry of Manpower and labor unions especially in relatively big industries.

However, for the conflicts between the community and companies, there are no institutions that can function as a mediator. Before the reform, companies in collaboration with the state, or a group of people holding state power used the argument of economic growth and stability, to suppress opposing voices and complaints of the community especially concerning the fair allocation of resources. In general, the company built a good cooperation with the military network down to the lowest level of government (village) such as *Babinsa*, *Polsek*, and *Koramil*, but paid no attention to community concerns.

Table 12. Labor strikes, 1990-2001

Year	Number of cases	Number of workers involved	Lost working hours
1990	61	27,839	229,959
1991	130	64,474	534,610
1992	251	176,005	1,019,654
1993	185	103,490	966,931
1994	278	136,699	1,226,940
1995	276	128,855	1,300,001
1996	350	221,537	2,497,973
1997	287	145,559	1,225,702
1998	234	152,493	12,254
1999	125	48,232	915,105
2000	273	126,045	1,281,242
2001 (Jan-May)	116	73,023	763,061

Source: The Ministry of Manpower.

However, the reform has changed everything. In particular, there has been a rapid increase in civil society groups. The growth of civil society has two aspects. The first is quantitative growth, and the second is the improvement of function, coverage and quality of its movement.⁶⁹ The strengthening civil society made repressive models no longer effective, and the weakening of good corporate governance in business practices made the company unable to have harmonious relations with the

surrounding community. Such conditions pushed the existing conflicts between the community and companies into violent acts.

VIII. Reading the data: what can be inferred?

After the discussion of social violence in an anatomical form, a question emerges: What inferences can be made from the series of statistical facts? Although not analyzed in details, at least some conclusions can be drawn as follows:


Concentration of issues

Death victims in social violence is dominated by communal violence (77%), then, followed by separatist violence (22%). Unlike separatist violence, which is more definite in nature, communal violence has some variations depending on the issues involved. The most dominant issue of communal violence is the ethnic-religion-migration related violence,⁷⁰ which has caused more than two thirds of deaths in communal violence, or contributing more than half (52%) of total deaths in social violence. Thus, it can be concluded that social violence in Indonesia is dominated by ethnic-religion-migration related violence and separatist violence, as shown by the dark areas A1 and B of Figure 4. They account for 74% of total deaths in social violence.

⁶⁹ For a recent literature about the growing civil society after the reform of 1998 in Indonesia, see Feulner (2001).

⁷⁰ Six other issues of the communal violence are the May 1998 riot, different political views, civil commotion, the *dukun santet* issue, competing resources and food riots. For details, see Section IV of this paper.

Figure 4.
Issue concentration of social violence,
based on number of deaths, 1990-2001



Remarks:

§ **A1** = the ethnic-religion-migration related violence (the most dominant issue of communal violence)

§ **A2** = Other issues of communal violence (6 issues)

A = A1 + A2 = the communal violence

B = the Separatist violence

C = the State-community violence

D = the Industrial relations related violence

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Regional concentration

Social violence in Indonesia indicates not only the presence of “issue” concentration, but also the presence of “region” concentration. Separatist violence is concentrated in the provinces of Aceh and Papua, while the ethnic-religion-migration related violence is concentrated in regions included in the category of communal riot prone I (CRP I), covering districts/cities in the provinces of Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. These six provinces contribute around 73 % of deaths in social violence in Indonesia during the period of 1990-2001.

Institutions for conflict prevention

Some studies conclude that the existence of institutions would be able to dampen social conflicts so that they do not lead to violence.⁷¹ The presence of effective institutions is able to act as conflict facilitators, so that the solution does not need to involve violent social acts. While the opposite condition, the absence of such institutions would cause a situation where violence is the way to face social conflicts. The case of Indonesia seems to fit this analysis.

A concrete example is the industrial relations related violence. As discussed in Section VII, the existence of some institutional mechanism through the Ministry of Manpower and labour unions, the workers-employers conflicts could have been largely mitigated. On the other hand, in the absence of facilitator institution the community-company conflicts largely ended up in violence. In sum, these institutions give voice to community/civil society dissatisfactions and exit mechanism for the disputing groups.

Is it temporary?

Do the incidents of social violence in Indonesia display a temporary or permanent trend? From Figure 2 and 3, it can be roughly concluded that the social violence in Indonesia has an upward trend. During the period of study, the deaths caused by social violence occurred in 1993, the figure increased sharply in 1998, and reached its peak in 1999-2000 while the year 2001 witnessed a falling intensity. However, it is too early to ascertain a falling trend.

Are social conflicts and violence related to a particular historic change? Apparently, yes. The massive social violence since 1998 has never been separable from the Indonesia's transition toward democracy. In the past, Indonesian experience with heightened social violence was in the mid 1960s, during the transition from the Old Order to the New Order, which was marked by the out break of the 30 September

⁷¹ See Snyder (2000) and Kriesberg (1998).

1965 Movement. Prior to that, there were regional rebellions in 1950s when the Republic of Indonesia was just formed.

IX. Summary and analytical follow up

This paper is an initial step to a series of studies on social conflicts in Indonesia. In particular, this paper has the purpose of mapping the acts of social violence that occurred in Indonesia during the last decade. It analyzes the incidences of social violence to provide an anatomy of such acts. The anatomy describes the patterns, the trends, the regional distributions, the level of severity and the intensity of various kinds of social violence. The study includes all incidents of social violence that took place in Indonesia between 1990 and 2001.

The incidents of social violence are grouped into four main categories, i.e. communal violence, separatist violence, state-community violence, and industrial relations violence. During the period of the study, at least 1,093 incidents occurred with at least 6,208 killed. There has been a significant upward trend of the number of incidents and the number of fatalities due to social violence during the transition period, reaching their peaks in 1999-2000.

Based on its spatial distribution, moreover the incidents of social violence in Indonesia mainly occurred in districts and small towns compared to big cities. All Indonesian provinces are classified into three conflict areas, i.e. *high conflict area* (Maluku, Aceh dan Central Kalimantan), *medium conflict area* (Central Sulawesi, Jakarta, West Kalimantan, Papua, South Kalimantan, Riau, West and East Nusatenggara) and the remaining 15 provinces are grouped as *low conflict area*.

It is found that communal and separatist violence led to the largest percentage of fatalities, i.e. 77% and 22%, respectively, while the remaining 1% is contributed by the two other categories.

The communal violence covers several dimensions of inter community groups violence; therefore it should be differentiated into several sub categories. Among

them, ethnic-religion-migration related violence caused the largest fatalities. Around 52% of deaths in social violence are found under this sub-category, whereas separatist violence resulted in 22% of deaths.

For the spatial distribution of communal violence, 66 districts/cities where deaths were found in communal violence, are clustered into three *communal riot prone (CRP) area* categories, i.e. 8 districts/cities fall under CRP I (5 districts/cities in Maluku, Poso, Kotawaringin Timur, and Sambas), 27 districts/cities classified as CRP II and 31 districts/cities grouped as CRP III. All regions classified as the CRP I are located in the eastern part of Indonesia.

The issues of social violence are closely related to their locations. Separatist violence exists in Aceh and Papua. While the ethnic-religion-migration related violence concentrated in regions classified as the communal riot prone I (CRP I), covering districts/cities in the provinces of Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. These six provinces contributed around 73 % of deaths in social violence in Indonesia during the period of 1990-2001.

The study has also made some tentative observations about the causes and consequences of social violence, and the importance of institutions to mitigate social conflicts so that they do not turn violent. The detailed analyses of these observations are subject matters of further studies to follow.

Thus, the following topics can be identified as part of further areas of study:

- Ø *The root causes of social violence during Indonesia's Transition.* This study will consist of two parts. First, *the relation between social violence and the Indonesian transition*, that is intended to explore the links between social violence and transition based on Indonesian experience. It can be approached by observing the past Indonesian history of violence and by learning from other country experiences. Second, *the relation between the economic rationality and the competing identity behind the major conflicts in Indonesia*, that will examine the dominance of economic factors and competing identity as causes of major social conflicts. The first part will provide macro overview and analysis, while the second one will be directed to major cases or major conflict areas.

- Ø *The economic and social consequences of social conflict.* This study is expected to estimate the social and economic costs of social conflicts.
- Ø *Social conflicts and the relationship between the state and civil society.* The study will explore what can be learnt from the outbreak of social violence as input for redefining the relationship between the state and civil society.

Comments and discussion in the seminar I
(Irian Jaya Room, UN House, 21 March 2002)

The seminar was chaired by **Anis Chowdhury** of UNSFIR. It was quite well attended, especially by some active researchers from national, multi-lateral and donor agencies. (A list of attendants is attached). After Zulfan's presentation the floor was open for discussion. **Satish Mishra**, (Chief Economist, UNSFIR) provided a brief background to UNSFIR's work on social violence. There was high appreciation of Zulfan's effort and a number of participants pointed out that this work filled an important knowledge gap. It was recognized that no comprehensive database on nation-wide social violence exists and UNSFIR's work is a noteworthy first step. Nonetheless, some limitations of study were pointed out with constructive suggestions for improvements. The following four issues were highlighted by various discussants: a) the importance of gender dis-aggregation, b) the credibility of data related to the main data sources used in this study, c) the categorization of social violence and d) the need for an in-depth analysis of the root causes of social violence.

Elizabeth Carriere (DFID) opened the discussion with an appreciation of Zulfan's paper, but asked where violence against women fitted into the database. The need for disaggregating the data by gender was also highlighted by **Melly G. Tan (Komnas Perempuan)**. It is particularly important to feminize the issue of industrial relations related violence, since most of the industrial workers are women. She pointed out that other institutions, such as Komnas Perempuan, which are concerned with the issue of violence against women, might have information on this. Melly G. Tan also pointed out the importance of having data on violence against children. **Glenn Smith (PMB-LIPI/LASEMA-CNRS, France)** suggested adding a column on Internally Displaced Person's (IDPs) which may capture some gender related violence. According to him this data are easy to obtain.

Jackie Pomeroy (The World Bank) praised Zulfan and UNSFIR for undertaking this task, and mentioned of the possibility of joint World Bank-UNSFIR work on social violence. She also recognized the difficulties of finding reliable information. However, she thought that data were too aggregated and bore the danger of ignoring the initial and/or root causes of conflict. Thus, it complicates the ability

for conflict mediation. In particular, the sub-category of ethnic-religion-migration related violence covered three different issues and blurred the differences and variations within this sub-category. Although in many cases it was difficult to isolate ethnic-religion and migration related causes, in some cases, the issue was clear. For example, the violence in Kalimantan was clearly migration related. She also pointed out the importance of lawlessness. For example in Lampung, a complete breakdown of law and order is visible. In this climate, a small conflict can very fast become a big one and turn into social violence. Thus, perhaps a separate category is needed to capture this, and the police records can be consulted. Melly G. Tan agreed and pointed out that there were overlaps in the classifications, e.g., state-community violence and separatist violence. In fact, separatist violence can also be classified as state-community violence. The categorization needs re- working.

Glenn Smith pointed out that the economic roots of conflict are usually voiced via religious and ethnic positions. An increase of economic benefits for one group usually means a decrease for another. There are ongoing changes in economic positions. For certain regions/districts tables on economic development and a discussion on change in economic positions would be helpful. Glenn Smith also pointed out that the Sambas conflict in West Kalimantan began as a conflict between Malay and Madurese, with the Dayak intervening on the side of the Malay once the conflict was underway. It is explained in the Human Rights Watch report (1997).

La Ode Syafiuddin (BPS) recognized the difficulties with categorization of social violence and suggested to use triggering factors for conflict as indicators for categorization. However, noted that overtime driving factors for violence could change, i.e. from economic to separatist. **Sopril (AJI)** observed that the picture of violence in this study was very linear. **Andrinof A. Chaniago (CIRUS/UI)** asked why political violence was not put in a separate category of social violence. What about the cases of self-justice (street-justice) that frequently occurred over the last few years? Are they recorded or not? **Farsida Lubis (UNDP)** also asked whether the competition for political power and positions was included in the sub-category of violence caused by the competition for resources.

Bishow Parajuli (WFP) asked how credible were data taken from *Antara* and *Kompas* in terms of numbers and coverage and whether cross-checks were possible. Melly Tan agreed, *Antara* is a government source and *Kompas* can be considered almost a government source. Therefore, both sources were not enough to establish an impartial data source. **Henry Siahaan (TIFA Foundation)** suggested that compare the data collected from *Kompas* and *Antara* with data from regional newspapers. He also asked whether the data in this study were comparable with other studies, e.g., George Aditjondro's study on violence. **Mashudi Noorsalim (the RIDEP Institute)** held that data from sources beyond *Antara* and *Kompas* should be added.

Farsida Lubis emphasized the need to analyze root causes of conflict. She pointed out a number of factors. For example, the transmigration programme consists of forced migration and natural migration. In addition, it includes the placement of civil servants. We need to note that the placement of civil servants to the regions is also a source of conflict. The issue of ethnicity is still important and the question of "who-am-I" or search for identity is still going on. It goes back to time before independence. She also asked whether the transition caused conflicts or conflicts caused transition? **Nining Nurhaya (KONTRAS)** pointed out that more attention should be given to the role of military in conflicts. The military often pursues own (business) interests. Frequently, the involvement of the military made the social violence worse.

Dicky Pelupessy (CERIC) observed that the source of community discontent with state institutions/apparatus within the category of state-community violence remained to be explained. In addition, an explanation was necessary about the variety of issues causing the external industrial violence (community vs. companies), i.e. like environmental concerns or job opportunities for local communities. **Basilio Araujo (Ministry of Home Affairs)** agreed with Farsida and noted that civil servant placements and political rivalry were also frequent sources of conflict. La Ode Syafiuddin observed that categories 3 and 4 of social violence in the study (on state-community and industrial relations violence) needed more explanations on their root causes. Bishow Parajuli emphasized cross-cutting issues; a broader angle is as important as a narrow one, i.e. corruption that lead to social violence, e.g., community taking justice into their own hands.

Some (e.g. Bishow Parajuli, Farsida Lubis, Basilio Araujo) also questioned the use of number of deaths as the only indicator of severity of violence. They suggested to widen it to include other indicators such as injuries, violation of freedom. Farsida Lubis pointed out that Dinas Kesehatan was very accurate in writing down information on death, injuries, and sickness. The Dinas data are not well organized, but the material is available for evaluation. Jackie Pomeroy, Melly G. Tan, Sopril and Basilo Araujo also pointed out the importance of case studies.

Satish Mishra explained the reasons behind this aggregative study as a first step towards understanding the phenomenon of social violence in Indonesia. While case studies are useful for they provide details and case specific peculiarities, one need some overall picture before proceeding to case studies. So, this study will be followed up by some case studies and he sought co-operation from such organizations as the World Bank who are involved in such studies. On the use of death as the sole indicator of severity, he commented that it was due to comparability over time and across regions and countries. He also mentioned that categorization was kept to some broad types for the sake of ease in analysis and also on the basis of suggestion from Dr. Ashutosh Varshney of the University of Michigan, a leading expert on social violence who attended Zulfan's presentation of preliminary findings. Satish Mishra also announced the forthcoming visit of Professor Varshney who will be coming to Jakarta at the invitation of UNSFIR for collaborative work.

Jackie Pomeroy held that it was impossible to treat East Timor separately. The case of Papua is historically not much different from East Timor. She also pointed out some factual error in the section on East Timor. Appreciating the discussion around the table, Jackie Pomeroy noted that not everything could be packed into one single paper and suggested to mention at least all the problems, including the Internally Displace Person (IDP) figures, and than do follow-up studies.

In response to Satish Mishra's comments, Melly G. Tan pointed out that it should not be an either-or choice between aggregate and case studies. One should complement the other. She also wondered whether the role of the state has changed since the end of the New Order. Civil society as a power or force is just about to

emerge; it has not strengthened yet. Mashudi also disagreed with the paper's contention that the state has weakened and civil society in Indonesia strengthened. According to him, civil society is still weak and the state through the means of repression by the state apparatus (military/police) is still very strong. Mashudi also wanted to know the basis of choosing the period 1990-2001 for the study.

Anis Chowdhury (UNSFIR) concluded the seminar by thanking all participants for their very constructive suggestions. He foreshadowed a meeting of interested participants and Dr. Varshney in early May at UNSFIR.

Comments on:

Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition:
The Case of Indonesia 1990-2001,

by

Glenn Smith (glenn.smith@laposte.net)

LIPI-CNRS Program "Social Sciences for the Study of Conflict in Indonesia"

Jakarta, 28 March 2002

This paper is an admirable attempt to bring together quantitative data on Indonesian conflicts since 1990 in an effort to discern patterns. The paper does more than simply serve as a good backgrounder on the subject. Better knowledge of recent patterns of conflict in the country is important so that we do not overlook factors when mapping specific conflicts, or modeling early-warning systems. Below, I would like to highlight a few issues that were brought up in the discussion, and suggest some points the author might want to consider in revising the present paper, or focus on in future work.

Several commentators expressed concern that the study is impaired by its failing to take gender into account. This is valid criticism, particularly in light of the author's decision to gauge the severity of conflicts solely on the basis of official deaths. Serious conflicts may cause few deaths, but render many homeless, injured, displaced, or otherwise victimized. The author has argued that only death figures are reliable enough to be used for comparative purposes. In order to better gauge the severity of conflicts, in my opinion, he should consider including the figures for Internally

Displaced Persons (IDPs), in effect, adding a column to the relevant tables in his paper. IDP figures have the advantage of being sufficiently reliable, openly available, broken down in terms of gender and age, and readily comparable. The author should also determine if sex ratios are available for his death figures.

The reliance on quantitative data is natural for an aggregate study. Yet, the gender question, and others raised at the presentation, underlines the difficulty of relying on quantitative aggregation alone in searching for an understanding of conflict. Quantification obliges us to leave some questions untouched, often those that are key elements in the conflict. Take ethnicity, for example. Though the paper does not go into the question of ethnicity, it may be inferred from the data that certain ethnic groups have suffered disproportionately from Indonesian conflict situations (notably, the Timorese, Acehnese, Malukans, and Madurese). Like gender, one would ideally want to see ethnic, religious, and class identities of victims made clear. This would allow us to address key questions such as why some groups are more prone to victimization than others, and which groups are likely to be benefiting from continued conflict. The author might wish to deal with these wider issues in future work.

The need to fit quantitative data into rubrics can lead to misunderstanding, as well. In Table 6 (p. 30), "Ethnic, religion and migration" is held responsible for the vast majority of conflict incidents and deaths, while the category of "Competing resources" is insignificant by comparison. Yet, we know that competition over valued resources is at the root of many if not most conflicts, even though ethnic, religious or political factors may be highly visible. One can argue that most conflicts in Indonesia are systemic, products of the interaction between economics, ecology, culture, religion, and politics. Our task is to weigh the factors and determine which are more important than others. Inevitably, to do so we need to examine the situation at the regional and local levels.

Without studying individual cases, we risk missing the root causes and triggers of violence and conflict. Aggregation, while useful for many purposes, often cannot capture localized events that have an intimate bearing on the outbreak of conflict. For example, conflicts often arise following a sudden deterioration in the economic welfare of specific groups, as when a new logging or mining company suddenly evicts

people who had been living off the land and exploiting its resources. On-the-ground research is needed to determine the events and factors that contribute to lowering a community's conflict threshold. Also, we need to be on the lookout for new elements that radically alter the terms of inter-group relations.

There is no reason to doubt that combining aggregate research with carefully coordinated case study research is the surest way to produce useful knowledge of conflict as well as cogent policy recommendations.

Comments and discussion in the seminar II (*Komnas HAM*, 5 April 2002)

The seminar was hosted by the National Commission on Human Rights (*Komnas HAM*), through the working group of social, economic and cultural rights (the Ecosoc working group) of the commission. The seminar was chaired by **Saafroedin Bahar** of the commission, who opened the seminar by highlighting two points: First, he referred to a classic book written by Craine Brinton entitled *The Anatomy of Revolution*, the main thrust of which is on the process of weakening of the state with analysis that is relevant to Zulfan's paper. Second, the concept of 'aspiration to inequality' that has been used in Zulfan's paper, to explain centre-regional conflicts, he noted that this concept is similar to the concept of 'relative deprivation,' which has a much wider implication beyond simple economic aspects. It has a political dimension of distribution.

After Zulfan's presentation, the floor was open for discussion. Discussions were mainly around three issues, i.e.: a) methodology related to the data sources, b) directions of the weakening of the state and the strengthening of civil society, and c) the need for an in-depth analysis of the root causes of social conflict. The details are as follows.

Agus Anwar of Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MoJHR) wondered about the accuracy of using *Antara* and *Kompas* as main data sources of social violence and highlighted the potential bias between the data reported in the two media

and facts in the field. **Maria Zuraida** (member of the working group) and **Jayadi Damanik** (Komnas HAM) also asked the same point followed by **Teguh Judono** (MoJHR), claiming that the use of media as data sources is subject to the problem of inconsistency in the way data are collected.

Agus Anwar also mentioned that this study was rich in providing information but had less analytical content therefore it needed follow up analyses. The need for more analyses in this study was also pointed out by Teguh Judono. Saafroeddin Bahar stressed the need to analyze social conflicts from different angles using interdisciplinary approach, e.g. study focusing on ethnicity. He, nevertheless, realized that this study was an exploratory one.

Related to the directions of the weakening of the state and strengthening of civil society as depicted in Figure 1, Maria Zuraida asked about the position of Indonesia in 1998. Saafroeddin Bahar explained that among the possible directions in Figure 1, the direction in panel C3 was the best. C3 shows that the state strengthens after weakening, while civil society continues to strengthen. He noted that the state should be the main actor behind human rights enforcement. He also discussed briefly a model in which various types of conflicts might emerge, using the so-called 'nation-state' model. Jayadi Damanik, on the other hand, assumed that the theory of state-civil society relation would only be able to explain the 3rd and 4th categories of social violence, i.e. state-community and industrial relations violence. Jayadi also disagreed with the paper's contention that the state has weakened; according to him, the state is, in fact, still very strong. **Eko Dahana** (Komnas HAM) agreed with Jayadi's opinion. Jayadi also mentioned that several studies on social conflict had already been done, for example, by Selo Soemardjan and ISAI.

Soeharko Kasran (member of the working group), from the perspective of psychiatrist, mentioned the increase in immature attitude and childish behavior of Indonesians (particularly politicians) as an important contributing factor to violent acts. He pointed out the failure of state institutions in implementing their responsibilities, for example, the role of Ministry of Education and Ministry of Religion in educating people, and the role of military and police to create security. In addition, Kasran discussed negative effects of low quality of national leadership.

Widjajanti Suharyo (UNSFIR) clarified the background of why UNSFIR took initiative to carry out this study. Zulfan made quick response to questions and comments, and informed that UNSFIR is forming a cluster on reforming state-civil society relation and is currently planning to create another cluster in order to draft a White Paper on social policy.

Saafroeddin Bahar concluded the seminar by thanking Zulfan for his time and preparation to present the paper to the commission, praising his work, and thanking all participants. He also expressed interest in UNSFIR's work and willingness to have collaborative work with the commission in the near future.

List of participants I (UN Building, 21 March 2002)

Andrinof A. Chaniago	: CIRUS
Anis Chowdhury	: UNSFIR
Basilio Araujo	: Ministry of Home Affairs
Bishow Parajuli	: WFP
Bona Siahaan	: UNDP
Cut Dian Rahmi	: UNSFIR
Dete Aliah	: INFID
Dicky C. Pelupessy	: CERIC
Elizabeth Carriere	: DFID
Endang Turmudi	: PMB-LIPI
Farsida Lubis	: UNDP
Frank Feulner	: UNSFIR
George Conway	: UNDP
Glenn Smith	: PMB-LIPI/LASEMA-CNRS (France)
Henry Siahaan	: TIFA Foundation
Indrajaya	: Bappenas
Jackie Pomeroy	: World Bank
Kharisma	: UN-OCHA
La Ode Syafiuddin	: BPS

M. Zulfan Tadjoeddin : UNSFIR
 Mashudi Noorsalim : The RIDEP Institute
 Melly G. Tan : *Komnas Perempuan*
 Niken Laksmita : UNSFIR
 Nining Nurhaya : KONTRAS
 Nur Aisyah : UI
 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo : PMB-LIPI
 Samsudin Berlian : UN-OCHA
 Satish Mishra : UNSFIR
 Sopril : AJI
 Widjajanti Suharyo : UNSFIR

List of participants II (*Komnas HAM, 5 April 2002*)

Andi N : *Komnas HAM*
 BN. Marbun : *Komnas HAM*
 Brasukra Sudjana : UNSFIR
 Edi Ichwanto : Ministry of Justice
 Eko Dahana : *Komnas HAM*
 H. Agus Anwar : Ministry of Justice
 Hanggoro : *Komnas HAM*
 Hermanto Siregar : UNSFIR
 Jayadi Damanik : *Komnas HAM*
 Mardety : Ecosoc working group, *Komnas HAM*
 Maria Zuraida : Ecosoc working group, *Komnas HAM*
 Nanang Rahardjo : *Komnas HAM*
 Ratna Tobing : *Komnas HAM*
 Rita Aryani : *Komnas HAM*
 Saafroeddin Bahar : Ecosoc working group, *Komnas HAM*
 Soeharko Kasran : Ecosoc working group, *Komnas HAM*
 Staff mediasi : *Komnas HAM*
 Teguh Judono : Ministry of Justice
 Wahyu Effendi : GANDI
 Widjajanti Suharyo : UNSFIR
 Zulfan Tadjoeddin : UNSFIR

References

1. Bresnan, John (1993), *Managing Indonesia: The Political Economy from 1965-1990*, Columbia University Press.
2. Dhanani, Shafiq and Iyanatul Islam (2000), "Poverty, Inequality and Social Protection: Lesson from the Indonesian Crisis", *UNSFIR Working Paper 00/01*, Jakarta.
3. Djajadi, M. Iqbal (1999), *Pengukuran Integrasi Indonesia: Perspektif Keteraturan Sosial Selama Periode 1946-1999*. Unpublished master thesis of the University of Indonesia.
4. Eda, Fikar S and S. Satya Dharma, Eds. (1999), *Sebuah Kesaksian Aceh Menggugat*, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.
5. Feulner, Frank (2001), "Consolidating Democracy in Indonesia: Contributions of Civil Society and State", *UNSFIR Working Paper 01/04*, Jakarta.
6. Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman (1995), *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, Princeton University Press.
7. Haris, Syamsuddin, et. al. (1999), *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan?: Kasus Aceh, Riau, Irian Jaya dan Timor Timur*, Penerbit Erlangga-LIPI-Yayasan Insan Politika-The Asia Fondation, Jakarta.
8. Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001), "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992", *American Political Science Review* 95 (1): 33-48, March.
9. Huntington, Samuel. P (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press.
10. Huntington, Samuel. P (1996), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, London.
11. Irawan, Puguh B, Iftikhar Ahmed and Iyanatul Islam (2000), *Labor Market Dynamics in Indonesia: Analysis of 18 Key Indicators of The Labor Market (KILM) 1986-1999*, ILO Office, Jakarta.
12. Komnas HAM (2000), "Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Tim Tindak lanjut Hasil Komisi Penyelidik dan pemeriksaan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi manusia di Tanjung Priok (KP3T)", diambil dari www.komnasham.or.id.
13. Kriesberg, Louis (1998), *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

14. Liddle, William R. (1999), "Regime: The New Order" in Donald K. Emmerson, ed. *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ME. Sharpe, Inc.
15. McBeath, John (1999), "Political Update" in Geoff Forrester, ed. *Post Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* ISEAS, Singapore.
16. Mishra, Satish (2000), "Systemic Transition in Indonesia: Implications for Investor Confidence and Sustained Economic Recovery", *UNSFIR Working Paper 00/06*, Jakarta.
17. Mishra, Satish (2001), "History in the Making: A Systemic Transition in Indonesia", *UNSFIR Working Paper 01/02*, Jakarta.
18. Ocorandi, Michael (1998), "An Anatomy of The Recent Anti Ethnic-Chinese Riots in Indonesia", <http://www.huaren.org/focus/id/032598-1.html>.
19. Olson, Mancur (1982), *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Yale University Press.
20. Pigay, Decki Natalis (2001), *Evolusi Nasionalisme dan Sejarah Konflik Politik di Papua*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.
21. Rakhmat, Jalaluddin (2000), *Psikologi Komunikasi*, Rosda Karya, Bandung.
22. Rummel, R.J. (2001), "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" (www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SMITH.ART.HTM).
23. Sen, Amartya (1999), *Beyond the Crisis: Development Strategies in Asia*, ISEAS, Singapore.
24. Sihbudi, Riza, et. al. (2000), *Bara dalam Sekam: Identifikasi akar masalah dan solusi atas konflik-konflik lokal di Aceh, Maluku, Papua & Riau*, LIPI, Mizan and kantor Menristek, Jakarta.
25. Snyder, Jack (2000), *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London.
26. Stewart, Frances (1998), "The Root Causes of Conflict: Some Conclusion." *QEH Working Paper no 16*. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
27. Stewart, Frances (2000), "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities." *QEH Working Paper no 33*. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
28. Stewart, Frances (2002), "Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development," *QEH Working Paper no 81*. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

29. Stewart, Frances and Valpy Fitzgerald, eds. (2001), *War and Underdevelopment: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict* (volume I), Oxford University Press.
30. Sulisty, Hermawan (2000), *Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah pembantaian massal yang terlupakan, Jombang-Kediri 1965-66*. Gramedia, Jakarta. (translated from the author's PhD thesis *The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughter (Jombang-Kediri 1965-66)*).
31. Suryadinata, Leo (2002), *Elections and Politics in Indonesia*, ISEAS, Singapore.
32. Tadjoeidin, M. Zulfan, Widjajanti I. Suharyo and Satish Mishra (2001), "Regional Disparity and Vertical Conflict in Indonesia", *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 6 (3): 283-304, December.
33. The Aspen Institute (1995), *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention*, The proceeding of The Aspen Institute Conference on International Peace and Security, August 2-6, 1995, Aspen, Colorado.
34. Trijono, Lambang (2001), *Keluar dari Konflik Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja untuk Perdamaian Maluku*, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta.
35. UN (2000), *The United Nations and East Timor: Self-determination through popular consultation*. Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York.
36. UNDP/GOI (2001), *Indonesia Human Development Report 2001, Toward A New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia*.
37. Varshney, Ashutosh (2001), *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, Yale University Press.

Appendix 1:
Regional distribution of communal violence, 1990-2001

Communal riot prone I^{*)}

No	City/district	Number of deaths 1990-2001	Population 1995 (000)	Number of deaths per 100,000 pop.	Main sub-category
1	Halmahera Tengah	329	164	200	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
2	Kota Ambon	599	313	191	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
3	Kotawaringin Timur	387	450	86	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
4	Poso	334	389	86	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
5	Maluku Utara	446	640	70	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
6	Maluku Tenggara	192	307	63	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
7	Maluku Tengah	383	670	57	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
8	Sambas	418	848	49	<i>Ethnic-religion-migration</i>
Total		3,088			

^{*)} CRP I defined as city/district with number of death more than 39.7 per 100.000 populations

Communal riot prone II^{*)}

No	City/district	Number of deaths 1990-2001	Population 1995 (000)	Number of deaths per 100,000 pop.	Main sub-category
1	Kota Banjarmasin	124	535	23.17	Political views
2	Jakarta (5 districts)	1,209	9,144	13.22	The May 98 riot
3	Kota Batam	21	168	12.49	Ethnic-religion-migration
4	Kotawaringin Barat	20	212	9.42	Ethnic-religion-migration
5	Sumba Barat	27	329	8.21	Civil commotion
6	Kapuas	27	503	5.37	Ethnic-religion-migration
7	Kota Palangka Raya	6	149	4.04	Ethnic-religion-migration
8	Kota Pontianak	18	449	4.01	Ethnic-religion-migration
9	Kota Mataram	12	307	3.91	Ethnic-religion-migration
10	Belu	9	237	3.80	Political views
11	Surakarta	13	517	2.52	Civil commotion
12	Luwu	20	798	2.51	Ethnic-religion-migration
13	Buleleng	13	554	2.34	Mass fighting, political views
14	Kota Manado	9	386	2.33	Civil commotion
15	Manggarai	13	562	2.31	Competing resources (land)
16	Situbondo	5	592	0.85	Ethnic-religion-migration
17	Jepara	7	879	0.80	Political views, competing resources
18	Sikka	2	262	0.76	Ethnic-religion-migration
19	Central Lombok	5	717	0.70	the food riots
20	Semarang	5	809	0.62	<i>Dukun santet</i>
21	Kota Pasuruan	1	163	0.61	Political views
22	Bandung	20	3,390	0.59	<i>Dukun santet</i>
23	Banyuwangi	8	1,473	0.54	<i>Dukun santet</i>
Total		1,594			

^{*)} CRP II defined as city/district with number of death between 0.54 up to 39.7 per 100.000 populations.

Appendix 1: (continued)

Regional distribution of communal violence, 1990-2001

Communal riot prone III^{*)}

No	City/district	Number of deaths 1990-2001	Population 1995 (000)	Number of deaths per 100,000 pop.	Main sub-category
1	Lumajang	5	938	0.53	<i>Dukun santet</i>
2	Pontianak (Kab)	4	873	0.46	Civil commotion
3	Lombok Timur	4	920	0.43	Political views
4	Cirebon (Kab)	7	1,776	0.39	Civil commotion
5	Demak	3	889	0.34	<i>Dukun santet</i>
6	Kupang	2	598	0.33	other
7	Cianjur	5	1,759	0.28	<i>Dukun santet</i>
8	Bengkalis	3	1,087	0.28	Ethnic-religion-migration
9	Tasikmalaya	5	1,872	0.27	Ethnic-religion-migration
10	Indramayu	4	1,514	0.26	Civil commotion
11	Pemalang	3	1,182	0.25	<i>Dukun santet</i>
12	Brebes	4	1,632	0.25	The food riot, civil commotion
13	Kota Yogyakarta	1	420	0.24	Political views
14	Kota Denpasar	1	435	0.23	Competing resources
15	Lampung Tengah	4	2,019	0.20	The food riot
16	Karawang	3	1,585	0.19	Ethnic-religion-migration
17	Bogor (Kab)	8	4,440	0.18	<i>Dukun santet</i>
18	Kota Medan	3	1,910	0.16	Ethnic-religion-migration, the May 98 riot
19	Sukabumi (Kab)	3	1,973	0.15	<i>Dukun santet</i>
20	Kampar	1	676	0.15	Ethnic-religion-migration
21	Pekalongan	1	718	0.14	other
22	Kota Padang	1	723	0.14	The May 98 riot
23	Boyolali	1	856	0.12	<i>Dukun santet</i>
24	Deli Serdang	2	1,791	0.11	other,
25	Bekasi	3	2,780	0.11	Political views, <i>Dukun santet</i>
26	Malang (Kab)	2	2,332	0.09	<i>Dukun santet</i>
27	Kota Tangerang	1	1,198	0.08	Political views
28	Tangerang (Kab)	2	2,422	0.08	Political views
29	Cilacap	1	1,534	0.07	Civil commotion
30	Serang	1	1,641	0.06	<i>Dukun santet</i>
31	Jember	1	2,108	0.05	<i>Dukun santet</i>
Total		89			

^{*)} CRP III defined as city/district with number of death less than 0.54 per 100.000 populations.

Source: Calculated from the UNSFIR database.

Note: Classifying districts/cities into communal riot prone I, II dan III is based on the data range of conflict severity, i.e. death intensity (column 5). Statistically the data do not spread normally, so average is not a good indicator to use as a measure of data concentration. Therefore, to classify districts/cities according to the severity of conflict (communal violence), the median (the value is 0.535) and standard deviation (the value is 39.695) approach is used (see footnote 47 for the explanation of this approach). The classification is as follows:

- Communal riot prone I: Deaths per 100,000 populations > (median + standard deviation)
- Communal riot prone II: Median < Deaths per 100,000 populations < (median + standard deviation)
- Communal riot prone III: Deaths per 100,000 populations > median