OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT
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Volume 2

PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR

Kamanto Sunarto
with Melina Nathan and Suprayoga Hadi
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This study, the second in a series of volumes titled Overcoming Violent Conflict, results from the contributions of a large number of individuals and institutions. Primary credit for the written material in this volume goes to Kamanto Sunarto of LabSosio, the Department of Sociology of the University of Indonesia; Melina Nathan; of UNDP-Indonesia, wrote the sections on ‘Responses by Government and UNDP’ and ‘Issues Arising from Responses’. Suprayoga Hadi contributed the final section on ‘Capacities for Peace’.

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Executive Summary

In 1999, violence broke out during the independence referendum in East Timor and an estimated 270,000 East Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara. This report examines the impact of that unprecedented refugee crisis on the region, the deficiencies of post-conflict management and the ongoing tensions between the displaced East Timorese and locals of West Timor.

This Peace Development Analysis of West Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Province, focuses on forms of conflict between indigenous West Timorese and displaced East Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objectives of the study were to investigate: the causes and impacts of these social tensions, the social capacities that can contribute toward peace and human development, and the vulnerabilities of such social capacities. The research team conducted interviews and/or group discussions with informants from NTT provincial, district and local governments, provincial and district legislative bodies, civil society organisations, the local media, displaced East Timorese residing both inside and outside camps, and West Timorese locals. Research took place in West Timor, in Kupang municipality, Kupang District and Belu District, from 7 July through 31 July 2004. Secondary data were collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.

In the wake of the post-referendum violence, an estimated 55,388 East Timorese families entered West Timor. The influx of so many displaced East Timorese had a major impact on the local communities in which they settled. In particular, four districts and one municipality in West Timor, NTT Province faced numerous challenges in the field of human development because of the refugees.

The flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to West Timor was followed by various small-scale conflicts between locals and displaced East Timorese which tended to take place around camps for displaced East Timorese. The inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide variety of factors, such as disputes over the utilization of communal land, the illegal appropriation or destruction of private and communal property and competition in traditional markets.

Informants stated that the presence of large numbers of displaced East Timorese together with the presence of army and police units near the West...
The key actors in East Timor related violence and hostile acts committed in West Timor since 1999 have been displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese who sought refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum. The pro-Indonesian armed militia was formally disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large numbers of firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities, but by no means all of their weapons.

Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of violence were also committed by members of regular army and police units previously stationed in East Timor as well as by those stationed in West Timor.

The victims or targets of violence during the initial stages of the presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor consisted of other East Timorese, members of local/host communities, members of the Indonesian civil service, UN workers and others regarded as opponents, such as the foreign press. Following their exodus or forced deportation to West Timor, pro-independence East Timorese became targets of violence, including murder. The data in various reports show that the highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict involving displaced East Timorese occurred between 1999 and 2000. The murder of three UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6 September 2000 by militia members led to the declaration of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the evacuation of all UN staff from West Timor, and the disruption of aid to the displaced East Timorese.

The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East Timorese who had to leave all their assets and most of their personal belongings in East Timor. While the subsequent formation of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste has put an end to the armed conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been achieved. Prominent East and West Timorese caution that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace in the region.

Many ongoing local conflicts stem from tensions between displaced East Timorese and West Timorese local communities due to different cultural backgrounds as well as resentment over disparities in assistance received and competition over scarce resources.

Informants stated that cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and colonial experiences contributed to the social distance between the displaced

East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese. The displaced East Timorese are Catholic, whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are predominantly Protestant.

Many displaced East Timorese felt they had been used to obtain aid from domestic and overseas sources, and questioned the accountability and openness of the management of allocated funds. Displaced East Timorese camp residents also claimed that government agencies often discriminated against them in the provision of public health and education.

While East Timorese employed by the state continue to receive their monthly salaries, many East Timorese who traditionally earned their livings as peasants or working in the informal sector have no means of livelihood in West Timor. This has placed additional economic burdens on host communities, as well as putting pressure on scarce local natural resources.

Prevailing methods of traditional land resource management were disturbed by the influx of East Timorese. The permanent settlement of displaced East Timorese in host communities has also compelled host communities to allocate some of their land, voluntarily or otherwise, to the displaced East Timorese. Disputes over the management of, and access to, natural resources, such as land and water, are potential sources of conflict.

The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor placed a burden on the region’s health and educational facilities. The exodus to West Timor disrupted the schooling of many East Timorese children. Although various arrangements eventually led to an increase in the absorption capacity of local schools, camp residents interviewed stated that many children still chose not to attend school, or dropped out.

At the outset, rates of infant mortality and malnutrition were high among the displaced. Many displaced East Timorese families were unable to access health services provided by the government. Displaced East Timorese women had already suffered various forms of violence while in East Timor. Many displaced East Timorese women faced further problems in West Timor.
Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, a range of emergency programs have been designed to mitigate the humanitarian problems resulting from the exodus from East Timor and to find durable solutions for East Timorese. Support for the evacuation of displaced East Timorese to West Timor was followed by humanitarian aid in the form of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health and educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid in repatriating displaced persons who wished to return to East Timor.

The Indonesian government, NGOs and foreign and international donor agencies have sought to address socio-economic inequality by declaring an end to the displaced persons status of the East Timorese, and by extending equal treatment to displaced East Timorese and locals. Programs have also been initiated focusing on the economic empowerment of resettled residents, income-generation for camp residents, and voluntary participation in international migration programs.

Peace-building initiatives include the facilitation of meetings between residents in East Timorese camps and host communities as well as communities where they will be resettled. Cross-border visits have been set up to facilitate reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste residents. East Timorese civil service employees and military personnel formerly stationed in East Timor have been relocated from camps and reassigned to units in their organizations within as well as outside West Timor, while former members of the militia have been encouraged to pursue their interests through political means.

Despite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by various agencies, the root causes of conflict between East Timorese camp residents and locals remain unresolved: the occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land owned by locals; competition for scarce natural resources, and competition for jobs. The only viable solutions—the relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—have progressed very slowly.

East Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and repatriation programs due to lack of jobs and inadequate services. Meanwhile, many camp residents still have no sustainable livelihoods; the discontinuation of assistance has exacerbated these difficulties, and the competition for scarce natural and social resources continues.

Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the jealousy of locals, whereas durable solutions, such as the provision of food aid for disadvantaged families among locals, have not been made available to displaced East Timorese living in camps.

Past as well as present human rights violations by members of the state apparatus are also a main source of fear and uncertainty among the populace and a fundamental obstruction to peaceful development.

NGOs are actively involved in providing information to camp residents, but the activities are short-term and so not sustainable. Observers suggest that intervention programs aimed at resolving the problem of the displaced East Timorese can only be effectively implemented by changing the behaviour and attitudes of their leaders. The physical isolation of many camps, limited access to electronic and printed media due to poverty and limited communication between locals and camp residents also hinder the flow of relevant information from the outside world.

Displaced persons are slow to move out of camps. Internal factors include: unwillingness to be relocated, even to another location within West Timor, if this involves separation from relatives and friends and unwillingness to be resettled in areas outside West Timor. External factors include the close patronage bonds between displaced East Timorese and their leaders, negative information and disinformation about repatriation, resettlement and transmigration programs, the lack of arable land in West Timor and the government’s limited budget.

Peace Capacities identified by this assessment include increasing democratisation and decentralisation of power as well as the strengthening of civil society. Peace capacities also consist of peace-building initiatives by government agencies, traditional/local leaders and NGOs. Activities include the facilitation of meetings between both groups and the promotion of peace between students from both groups through the establishment of peace schools.

The local government has also begun to provide services without distinguishing between former displaced persons and locals, thus enhancing inter-group relations and reducing an important risk to peace. Specific sectoral attention should focus on improved governance, delivery of basic services, economic recovery and empowerment of victims of conflict.

There are several ways to increase the peace building capacity of the government, affirming its role as a dominant actor in averting potential conflict. One is to increase the government’s capacity to make refugee management policies that are sensitive to potential conflict.
Village governments are also important actors, and it is imperative to increase the capacity of and support for these governments in their efforts to open forums for dialogue between refugees and the local community. It is also important to encourage refugee involvement in decision-making at the village level.

Finally, it is imperative that all stakeholders participate and be actively involved in the planning and implementation of peace and development programs. The emphasis in peace-building activities should be on participatory, empowering bottom-up grassroots approaches.

There are a number of important steps to promote social welfare, among them improving living conditions and expanding employment opportunities (with the appropriate supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment or underemployment does not become a potential for conflict.

Understanding land issues, including ownership and usage, is central to promoting social welfare. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which refugees are settled in small numbers among the local community, could become a mechanism to reduce the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to aggression if triggered.

Improving refugees’ access to appropriate health care can be done by enabling community health centres (PUSKESMAS) to give cheaper health care to refugees, and encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proactive in their services. Health education specifically related to healthy living would provide a forum for dialogue between refugees and the local community, while simultaneously helping them to care for environmental health; more paramedics need to be educated within refugee and local communities.

Refugees’ citizenship status must be affirmed so refugees can access government aid, including health care and education. The government needs to improve the schools, address the serious lack of teachers and provide scholarships to student who need aid and have Schools can be sites for new education and communication programs in peace-building skills and curricula that teaches multicultural education principles.

Special services should be provided for women in exile, especially women who no longer have husbands, both in relation to reproductive health and their vulnerability to violence, as well as their access to and control of basic public facilities in all programs to ensure that women are not left behind in peace building efforts. Programs for advocacy and support for victims of violence – including domestic violence - need to be introduced. Programs for the empowerment of women are also recommended, especially regarding participation in formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and in politics.

Economic empowerment should be aimed at both refugee and local communities. To enable equal access, there needs to be a more detailed assessment to determine the indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable forms of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can also be coordinated with the border area accelerated development program.

The security context in West Timor can be influenced by the situation in Timor Leste. Indicators need to be developed to anticipate insecurity or destabilization across the border as well as an early response system to minimize the impact in West Timor. Support needs to be provided for human security programs, such as the empowerment of human rights watch (HRW) activities and advocacy programs, and the empowerment of organizations involved in the performance of legal, health, psychological and economic support for victims of human rights violations.
In 1999, violence broke out during the independence referendum in East Timor and an estimated 270,000 East Timorese fled to the neighbouring Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tengara Timur, NTT). This report examines the causes, dynamics and impacts of conflict between these displaced East Timorese and the local population of West Timor.

1. Research Process

This Peace and Development Analysis of West Timor, East Nusa Tenggara Province, focuses on forms of conflict between indigenous West Timorese and displaced East Timorese between 1999 and 2004. The objectives of the study were to investigate the causes and impacts of this conflict, the social capacities that can contribute toward peace and human development, and the vulnerabilities of such social capacities.

The research team conducted interviews and/or group discussions with informants from NTT provincial, district
and local governments, provincial and district legislative bodies, civil society organisations, the local media, displaced East Timorese residing both inside and outside camps, and West Timorese locals. This research took place in West Timor, in Kupang municipality, Kupang District and Belu District, from 7 July through to 31 July 2004 (see Annex 1). A provincial workshop was conducted in Kupang on 29 July 2004. Participants included Kupang-based informants who have previously been interviewed and/or members of their affiliated organizations. Secondary data was also collected prior to, during and after the fieldwork.

1.2 NTT Provincial Overview

East Nusa Tenggara Province, NTT, is divided into one municipality (the provincial capital of Kupang) and 14 districts: Alor, Belu, East Flores, East Sumba, Ende, Kupang, Lembata, Manggarai, Ngada, North Central Timor, Rote Ndao, Sikka, South Central Timor and West Sumba. These are comprised of 170 subdistricts, 2,207 desa (rural villages) and 309 kelurahan (urban villages). The total population of NTT in 2002 was 3,924,871, of which 39.42 percent live in West Timor. There are 11 major local ethnic groups in NTT. These are Alor, Ende, Larantuka, Manggarai, Ngada, Nge Reo, Rote, Sabu, Sikka, Solor and Sumba ethnic groups. The majority of NTT’s population is Catholic.

Prior to the colonial period, the region of NTT was ruled by numerous indigenous and independent ethnic groups, which were continually competing and engaged in wars against one another. The roots of present-day competition for power, prestige and privilege among major ethnic groups in the province can be seen in rivalries of the pre-colonial and colonial eras. During Dutch colonial rule NTT was part of the Sunda Ketjil (Lesser Sunda) region; later, in the 1950s, it was renamed Nusa Tenggara by the Indonesian Government and included the islands of Sumbawa, Lombok and Bali. According to Heather Sutherland, a Dutch historian and cultural anthropologist, Nusa Tenggara has ‘a long history of contact with the outside world. Foreign ships—Chinese, Javanese and Malay—had been trading in the area since the fifteenth century.’

On 11 August 1958, through Law No. 66 Nusa Tenggara was divided into three distinct provinces: Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara), Bali and Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara). A. S. Pello, NTT province’s first governor, inaugurated the new province of NTT on December 20, 1958.

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Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Overview of East Nusa Tenggara Province (NTT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location:</strong> 8-12 degrees South Latitude and 118-123 degrees East Latitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land area:</strong> 47,349.9 square kilometers (2.49 percent of Indonesia’s area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sea area:</strong> 200,000 square kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borders:</strong> Flores Sea (north), Indian Ocean (south), Democratic Republic of Timor Leste (east), West Nusa Tenggara Province (west)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of islands:</strong> 566 islands (42 with inhabitants); largest islands: Flores, Sumba and Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average temperature:</strong> 27.6°C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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In 1979 President Soeharto’s New Order government introduced Law No. 5 on village government, requiring the structure of all local governments to be uniform; as a consequence, traditional political systems in NTT and elsewhere lost their power. Although the unseating of existing traditional local governments soon led to various sociological and political problems, dissatisfaction with the law could not be voiced openly until after the fall of the New Order government in 1998. In 1999, delegates to the Traditional Communities of the Indonesian Archipelago Congress (Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) criticised the marginalization of traditional communities brought about by three decades of New Order rule.

The delegates, traditional leaders representing Timor, Rote and Flores claimed that various national laws allowed the government to usurp traditional rights to land and natural resources in the name of opening up the archipelago to the market economy. They pointed out that millions of hectares of traditional community land had been converted into concessions for large-scale extractive industrial enterprises without the permission of the communities. The NTT Traditional Communities charged that the standardization of agricultural patterns through the use of seed, industrial fertilizers and the monoculture system marginalized traditional agricultural patterns so important to communities.

As a result of the nation-wide reform movement that began in 1998, local government and local communities in NTT have initiated the ‘revival’ of adat (customary) law. This process has included the emergence of a local movement aimed at obtaining legal recognition for hak ulayat (communal land rights) and calls for the provincial government to scrap the Peraturan Daerah No. 8, 1972, a regional regulation which states that all customary land is under state control.

Elites from Rote, Sumba and Sabu, and more recently from Flores, have dominated the social, economic and political dynamics of NTT, especially in the provincial capital Kupang.

Ethnicity is closely related to religion. Most Catholic bishops, pastors, brothers and nuns as well as Islamic ulamas (religious leaders) are stationed in Flores, whereas most Protestant preachers, bible teachers and Sunday school teachers tend to be stationed in West Timor and Sumba (see Annex 3). Since religion in NTT is inextricably intertwined with ethnicity, ethnic rivalry for control of strategic executive and legislative positions at the provincial level inevitably contains undertones of religious rivalry, especially between Catholics and Protestants. Ethnicity and religion have always played an important role in the election and appointment of local public officials, and ethnic and religious issues are accentuated during local elections.

In the 2004 national elections, however, NTT voters tended to vote for nationalist parties rather than religious parties. In 1999, during the nation’s first free and fair election since 1955, the dominant Functional Group Party (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar) saw its support in NTT decline to 39.61 percent (in the 1997 elections, it had garnered as much as 94.94 percent). The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) garnered 39.04 percent. In the 2004 election for seats in the DPR, the Golkar Party and PDI-P remained the front-runners.

7.) Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa [Law No. 5, 1979 on village government], Lembaran Negara Tahun 1979 No. 56 Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 3153.
9.) Ibid.

When an estimated 270,000 East Timorese Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) entered West Timor in 1999, many of them for an indefinite period, the four districts and one municipality in West Timor as well as NTT Province faced numerous challenges in the field of human development. The NTT provincial government defined these challenges as 'barriers to development', including 'high rates of poverty, low educational levels, low levels of health'. The majority of the population of most villages in the four districts in Timor work in agriculture: in Kupang district, all 187 villages are predominantly agrarian; while between 96 and 97 of the villages are agrarian in South Central Timor, North Central Timor and Belu.

The Indonesia Human Development Report 2001 and the Indonesia Human Development Report 2004, a collaborative effort between Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS, National Development Planning Agency), Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS, Central Statistics Bureau) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), contained national, provincial and district/municipal data on development, poverty and gender disparity using indices applied by the UNDP to measure the state of human development in the world. These indices consist of the Human Development Index (HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI), Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender-related Development Index (GDI). Using these indices, the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP data show that NTT Province's HDI, GEM and GDI scores in 1999 and 2002 were lower than the national average scores, while the HPI score was higher (see Tables 2 and 3). The data reveal disparities between districts in West Timor as well as an urban-rural divide. Kupang Municipality's 1999 and 2002 HDI scores were higher than the national average and its HPI scores are very low. South Central Timor District, on the other hand, has very poor HDI, HPI and GEM scores.

Although the majority of the population was either Catholic or Protestant (see Figure 1), religion did not play an important role in this election. The newly established Christian party, the Peace and Prosperity Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS) only received one seat, while the overwhelming majority of voters supported nationalist parties. Golkar won five seats, PDI-P three, while the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKPI), Enhancement of Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI) and Pioneer Party (Partai Pelopor) each won one. For the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections, see Annex 2.11

**Table 1**

Religious affiliations in NTT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>55.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


13.) ‘Permasalahan Pembangunan di Nusa Tenggara Timur’ ['Problems of development in East Nusa Tenggara'] (Pengelolaan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur (2003), op. cit.


BPS data on poverty in NTT in 2004, quoted by Kompas, shows that between 10.55 percent and 37.38 percent of the population of four districts and one municipality in Timor live below the poverty line (see Table 4).16

Referring to data in the UNDP Global Human Development Report 2000, Gaspersz and Foenay observe that: ‘the income per capita of the population in NTT Province . . . is lower still than the income per capita of the population in the poorest state in the world (Sierra Leone).’17 Referring to the BPS-BAPPENAS-UNDP 2001 Indonesia Human Development Report they further observe that ‘income per capita in East Nusa Tenggara is the worst in Indonesia,’ and that South Central Timor district has the lowest income per capita in Indonesia.18

In assessing developmental challenges, the provincial government has pointed to a number of incidents that have had adverse societal and economic effects.19 These include the Kupang riots on 30 November 1998 and the influx of displaced East Timorese during 1999. The large numbers of Asian and Middle Eastern illegal immigrants in NTT seeking entry to Australia, along with the East Timorese, compromise the provincial government’s ability to act. Their presence has major political, psychological and security implications, puts pressure on social services, and also attracts international concern, but the district and provincial governments have limited resources to deal with the problem.

However, a comparison of 1999 and 2002 data shows that average HDI scores (and national rankings) in all areas of West Timor except Kupang District have increased – an indication of an overall increase in human development. HPI rankings have decreased, except in Belu District. While the GEM scores of NTT province have remained relatively constant, GEM scores in West Timor (except in Belu district) have declined. GDI scores in NTT province have also remained relatively constant – an indication that overall gender disparity in the province has remained constant. In West Timor, however, no clear pattern emerged; in some districts GDI scores have increased, while in others scores have decreased.

### Table 2

Comparison of NTT, West Timor and National Figures for Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI) 1999 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/ West Timor District/ Municipality</th>
<th>1999 HDI Rank</th>
<th>Nation HDI</th>
<th>2002 HDI Rank</th>
<th>Nation HDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTT</td>
<td>60.4 24</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>60.3 28</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang</td>
<td>57.0 266</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.9 328</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central Timor</td>
<td>49.2 290</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.7 325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central Timor</td>
<td>53.7 281</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.5 312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belu</td>
<td>51.8 285</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.3 318</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang Municipality</td>
<td>66.6 80</td>
<td></td>
<td>70.9 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPI</td>
<td>29.5 21</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>28.9 24</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang</td>
<td>32.2 247</td>
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<td>27.5 231</td>
<td></td>
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<td>North Central Timor</td>
<td>34.7 259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belu</td>
<td>30.5 212</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.3 227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang Municipality</td>
<td>16.7 36</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.4 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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19.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.
Because of NTT’s harsh natural conditions, many NTT locals are forced to migrate to, or seek employment in, other parts of Indonesia or Eastern Malaysia (Table 5).

Table 5  
Lifetime Migration of NTT 1980 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Migrant</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In migrants</td>
<td>35.007</td>
<td>46.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out migrants</td>
<td>47.534</td>
<td>99.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migrants</td>
<td>-12.527</td>
<td>-53.132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BPS. Statistics of Nusa Tenggara Timur: ‘Nusa Tenggara Timur in Figures’

1.3 The Impact of East Timor’s Independence Referendum

In 1976, the Indonesian Government annexed the territory of East Timor (at that time a Portuguese colony), and integrated it into the Republic of Indonesia. The annexation of the province led to more than two decades of conflict between East Timorese pro-independence supporters and the Government of Indonesia. Casualty numbers vary. Quoting a United Nations Economic and Social Council source, Tadjoeddin reports that between 1975 and 1980 an estimated 100,000 East Timorese were killed, and that between 1980 and 1984 another 100,000 were either killed or died from disease or starvation.\(^\text{20}\) In one incident alone, in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 12 November 1991, the Indonesian army fatally shot between 50 and 400 unarmed East Timorese, who were demonstrating against the killing of an East Timorese. The Indonesian authorities estimate a much lower figure, estimating fatalities in East Timor at

around 30,000.\textsuperscript{21} The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that between 100,000 and 250,000 East Timorese lost their lives during this long-running conflict.\textsuperscript{22}

On 27 January 1999, President B. J. Habibie surprised many when he announced that a referendum on independence would be held. On 5 May 1999, the government of Indonesia, the government of Portugal and the UN agreed in New York that the referendum would take place on 30 August 1999 and would be monitored by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{23} More than 78.5 percent of 432,287 registered East Timorese voters chose independence over integration with Indonesia. (Voter turnout was an astounding 98 percent of registered voters).\textsuperscript{24}

As a result of the vote, pro-integration militias, backed by members of the Indonesian security forces, rampaged across East Timor.\textsuperscript{25} In a news report on 11 September, CNN showed Pope John Paul II condemning the acts as ‘slaughter’, while a Vatican official claimed ‘genocide’.\textsuperscript{26}

An estimated 1,000 East Timorese were killed in the violence following the vote, according to UNTAET.\textsuperscript{27} The UNHCR estimates that more than 75 percent of the population was displaced and more than 70 percent of East Timor’s private housing, public buildings and utilities were destroyed. Some 200,000 persons were deported to West Timor and other areas in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{28}

According to NTT Government data, by 19 October 1999 an estimated 55,388 East Timorese families had entered West Timor.\textsuperscript{29} The influx of so many displaced East Timorese was unprecedented in West Timor’s history, and had a major impact on the local communities in which they settled. On 6 June 2001 the Indonesian Government conducted a registration that shows that 96.72 percent of the estimated 284,148 displaced East Timorese were settled in West Timor\textsuperscript{30} (see Table 6).

In the 6 June 2001 registration, 98.02 percent of 113,794 participating East Timorese displaced persons in NTT opted to stay in Indonesia and registered as Indonesian citizens.\textsuperscript{31} The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Research, however, reported, “the UN and international humanitarian agencies claim these numbers are not accurate. International critics suggest that the results of such a count may have been hampered by militia intimidation and discrepancies in the voting procedure”.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Tadjoeddin, Anotomi Kekerasan Sosial dalam Konteks Transisi, ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Pelayanan Kemanusiaan, 37.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Kirsty Sword Gusmao with Rowena Lennox, A Woman of Independence: A Strong Love and the Birth of a New Nation (Sydney: MacMillan Australia Pte Ltd., 2003) 236.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Tadjoeddin, op. cit., 53.
\item \textsuperscript{28} UNHCR. Global Appeal 2000. The Timor Situation. East Timor. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2ebc30 (accessed 20 July 2005). Kammen described the situation as follows: “Two days later this euphoria was shattered by the outbreak of massive violence. Thousands of non-Timorese fled the territory, most returning to their native places in Indonesia. Hundreds of thousands of East Timorese were forcibly evacuated across the border into Indonesian West Timor, while several hundred thousands more fled into the hills”. Kammen, Douglas, “The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor”, in Benedict R.O’G. Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, second printing, (Ohaca, N.Y.: Cornell South East Asia Program, 2002), 156-188.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Belu District (61.42 percent), followed by Kupang District (19.24 percent), North Central Timor District (8.14 percent), Kupang Municipality (5.87 percent), and South Central Timor District (2.06 percent).
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 74-75.
\end{itemize}
Many displaced East Timorese peasants now make a living by labouring on community land owned by locals or land controlled by the Indonesian Government, which the East Timorese had previously appropriated and cleared illegally, or by renting land from local landlords (crop sharing). Others are employed in the informal sector, including selling vegetables and animals (chicken, pigs, cows) in local markets, working as ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers or urban labourers, or selling goods to Timor Leste through cross-border trade.

Many East Timorese who have not been repatriated have taken part in organized relocation programs through which they are integrated with locals, or have left the camps voluntarily for integrated neighbourhoods to live with relatives or in rooms or houses leased by locals. Many East Timorese members of the Indonesian state apparatus (the military, police and civil service) who continue to receive their monthly salaries and accompanying fringe benefits have been reassigned and also live outside camps.

In West Timor the displaced East Timorese are a minority group whose numbers are dwindling. Over the past five years, many have left NTT via organized relocation programs (resettlement and transmigration) as well as spontaneous migration; displaced East Timorese military personnel and civil servants have been reassigned to other locations and services, and still others have been repatriated to Timor Leste. According to the UNHCR, by the end of 2001 an estimated 193,000 East Timorese had been repatriated, including 125,000 in 1999 and 50,000 in 2000. By 28 June 2004 the number of East Timorese displaced persons in NTT had declined to 14,185 persons or 7,094 household heads. (See Table 7). As of May 2005, 4,199 families still remained in camps or refugee-type accommodation.

### Table 6
**Displaced East Timorese in NTT, 6 June 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>District/Municipality</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Timor</td>
<td>Belu District</td>
<td>174,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kupang District</td>
<td>54,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Central Timor District</td>
<td>23,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kupang Municipality</td>
<td>16,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Central Timor</td>
<td>2,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alor</td>
<td>Alor District</td>
<td>3,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flores</td>
<td>Ende District</td>
<td>1,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sikka District</td>
<td>1,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manggarai District</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ngada District</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Flores District</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lembata</td>
<td>Lembata District</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumba</td>
<td>East Sumba District</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Sumba District</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>284,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur 2001, 75.

33.) Ibid.
34.) Ibid.
Tadjoeddin classifies NTT province between 1990 and 2001 as an intermediate conflict area involving 14 incidents of violence, mostly communal in nature (96 percent), of which eight involved at least one fatality. A total of 55 fatalities are recorded. In a presentation of their ongoing research on post-New Order local level conflict in Flores, Barron et al identify the following types of conflict in Flores: natural resource conflicts; administrative disputes; gender/sexual violence; and vigilante retribution.

The PODES 2003 data quoted by Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan shows that 11.6 percent of the villages and hamlets in NTT reported various cases of conflict, namely inter-group fights, fights between members of the

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39.) Tadjoeddin, op.cit. Tadjoeddin defines Communal Riot Prone II (CRP II) as “a district/municipality with a fatality rate between 0.54 and 39.7 per 100,000 residents.” 36 and 82.

40.) Patrick Barron, Rachael Diprose and Joanne Sharpe, ‘Brokering Conflict: Understanding Local Level Conflict Pathways in Indonesia’. (Guest Lecture Presentation at the Universitas Indonesia, 12 May 2004).
community and the authorities, fights between students, inter-ethnic fights, and other disturbances in the field of security. The PODES data furthermore show that in 6.0 percent of the villages and hamlets the conflict resulted in casualties and material damage, in 8.5 percent new conflict was reported, and 51.5 percent of the conflict reported was of a violent nature. In their study in the Manggarai and Sikka districts in Flores, Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan also found that cases of conflict tended to be under-reported by the village authorities. Kompas daily newspaper reported in June 2004 that Police Brigadier-General Edward Aritonang, the NTT regional police chief, regarded NTT as a conflict-prone region. Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms not only vary widely according to each ethnic culture but also are often at odds with Indonesian law. Aritonang cited conflicts within communities over land, marriages, gambling and other customary law disputes in Flores, Sumba and West Timor as creating further inter-ethnic, social and communal violence, which can often lead to fatalities. Consequently, he suggested that judges familiar with customary law be empowered to handle inter-ethnic conflict in the region.

Crime statistics collected at the village level in West Timor show that, in comparison with other crimes, torture or violence is reported by a relatively high number of rural and urban villages (Table 8). They also report a high incidence of other crimes, such as rape and murder.

### Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Municipality</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Looting</th>
<th>Torture/Violence</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Rape</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Murder</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kupang</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33 (43%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Central Timor</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 (15%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central Timor</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 (29%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belu</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21 (23%)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang Municipality</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 (30%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT Province</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>187 (25%)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Violence against women, including domestic violence, is reportedly rampant in NTT. Perempuan di Bawa(h) Laki-laki yang Kalah presents detailed reports of cases taking place before, during and after the 1999 forced deportation or flight to West Timor. Virtually all forms of violence are accounted for: murder, torture, abduction, assault, rape, adultery, extra-marital sex and sexual harassment. High rates of violence against women are detailed in an analysis of reports in Pos Kupang newspaper from January 1998 through December 1999 and a report by the Jaringan Kesehatan Perempuan Indonesia Timur, JKPIT (Eastern Indonesia Women's Health Network). One NGO activist from the Jaringan Perempuan Usaha Kecil, Jarpunk (Women's Small Business Network) in Kupang argues that women face other obstacles as well: reports of domestic violence.

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44.) Komnas Perempuan, Peta Kekerasan Pengalaman Perempuan Indonesia [Indonesian Commission for Women Map of Violence: The Experience of Indonesian Women] (Jakarta, 2002).
against women are not treated seriously by the authorities; girls are not given equal educational opportunities; wives can not obtain bank loans without the consent of their husbands; the regional budget does not allocate sufficient funds for women’s health, and female candidates in the elections for legislators are put at a disadvantage because their names are often placed at the bottom of party lists.45

Violence against women is sometimes rooted in cultural traditions. The payment of belis (the dowry) by the bridegroom’s family to the bride’s family marks the transfer of ‘ownership’ of the bride to the bridegroom’s family, so that in cases of domestic violence a wife cannot return to her family. Among Catholics, because of the church’s ban on divorce, a wife cannot leave her husband, even in cases of spousal abuse.

**2.1 Impact of East Timorese Refugees on Conflict in NTT**

The flight or deportation of East Timorese residents to West Timor was followed by various small-scale conflicts.46 Conflicts between locals and displaced East Timorese, which were widely reported in the mass media, tended to take place around camps for displaced East Timorese. The inter-group conflicts were triggered by a wide variety of factors, such as disputes over the utilization of communal land, the illegal appropriation or destruction of private and communal property, competition in traditional markets, disputes between rival gangs of thugs over the control of territory (which preceded the Atambua tragedy), disputes over the sexual harassment of girls (which led to assault and arson in Tuapukan), and disputes between East Timorese parents and West Timorese teachers over the academic achievement of East Timorese students (which led to the destruction of a school). According to reports by the press and informants, the early stages of East Timorese exodus was accompanied by an increase in crime in West Timor.47

In a chronology of events in its handling of East Timorese displaced persons in West Timor from 4 September 1999 through 2001, the NTT Provincial Government listed cases of conflict involving East Timorese displaced persons. The report lists communal fights with local residents in Tuapukan (26-29 May 1999), the destruction of a UNHCR car in Tuapukan (16 June 2000), riots, communal fights and arson of local homes in Oesao, Tuapukan (1 through 3 July 2000), destruction of property, arson and looting in Noelbaki (27 July 2000), torture of three UNHCR staff in Naen (22 August 2000), the destruction of a government building and property, including official cars and computers, and the torture of four local reporters (30 August 2000). Riots in Webriamata and Atambua followed the murder of a militia commander by locals, resulting in the murder of seven locals in Webriamata and three UNHCR staff in Atambua, the wounding of three civilians (including a UNICEF physician and a Brazilian reporter), and the destruction of private and UNHCR and IOM property (6 September 2000).48

Informants stated that the presence of large numbers of displaced East Timorese, especially during the initial phases of the exodus, together with the presence of army and police units near the West Timor-Timor Leste border, decreased the feeling of personal security among many West Timorese citizens.49 Feelings of personal security were also undercut by manifest or latent rivalry between members and units of the army and police.

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45.) Interview: Kebijakan Publik Belum Berpihak Pada Perempuan [Public Policy Is Not Yet Supportive of Women], Suara Kampung No. 4, May 2004, 11-13. (Note: When voters vote for a party rather than for a candidate the votes obtained are allocated to candidates whose names are at the top of the party's priority list, and the names of female candidates are often placed at the bottom of the list.)

46.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.


49.) A number of informants provided accounts about cases of extortion, confiscation of personal property, non-payment of services rendered, assault, and sexual harassment as well as cross-border smuggling by members of the army. See also U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Reports for 2000, 2001 in http://www.humanrights-usa.et/reports/Indonesia.html .
In a paper, I.G.P. Antariksa discusses cases of violence committed by East Timorese displaced persons in Belu District between 9 September 1999 and 26 July 2003. Cases listed include fatal shootings and stabblings, physical assault, hostage-taking, violent rioting and demonstrations, fights between displaced persons residing in different camps, communal fights with locals, and the assault of Timor Leste residents who wandered into West Timor. Antariksa also lists cases of violence committed by locals against displaced persons, including assault and murder of East Timorese and the abduction of an East Timorese woman.

Key Perpetrators of Violence

The key actors in East Timor-related violence and hostile acts committed in West Timor since 1999 have been displaced pro-integrationist East Timorese who sought refuge in West Timor in 1999 following the referendum on 30 August. These militias are composed of ordinary civilians (mostly peasants); civilian members of the armed militia; members of the Civil Service (Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS); and the Milis, composed of civilian members of the Civilian Defence (Hansip), People’s Defence (Wanra) and People’s Security forces (Kamra), who were accorded formal military status outside formal channels in appreciation of their contribution to the Indonesian state. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) based in London, reports that ‘in early 1999, militias comprised some 50,000 people’. Former child soldiers were found in the militia in camps in West Timor, and, in 2000, 130 displaced East Timorese children were abducted from camps by pro-Indonesian groups to be trained as anti-independence activists.

Victims of Violence

The victims or targets of this violence (during the initial stages of the presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor) consisted of other East Timorese, members of local/host communities, members of the Indonesian civil service, UN workers and others regarded as opponents by the pro-integrationists, such as the foreign press. Following their forced deportation to West Timor, the pro-Indonesian armed militia was formally disbanded in 1999 and surrendered large numbers of firearms and ammunition to the Indonesian authorities, although the Indonesian authorities conducted regular raids, confiscating hidden firearms, informants believe that a large number of firearms remain unaccounted for and could be retrieved at any time.

Unrelated to the influx of East Timorese, acts of violence were also committed by members of regular army and police units previously stationed in East Timor as well as by those stationed in West Timor. Based on reports in the local press and a local NGO newsletter, Campbell-Nelson et al. drew up a selected list of acts of violence against locals committed by army units stationed in East Timor. The cases, reported between 26 September 1999 and February 2000, include fatal shootings and stabblings, torture, rape, robbery, abduction, confiscation and destruction of private property, arson of private homes and rioting, as well as other criminal acts such as gambling.

Some of the cases of brutality by security personnel in NTT highlighted by the media include the fatality of five demonstrators by police in Ruteng, Manggarai and accusations that members of the Indonesian security forces stationed on the West Timor-Timor Leste border raped local women. Some of these rapes reportedly led to unwanted pregnancies and the birth of children without legal status.

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) based in London, reports that ‘in early 1999, militias comprised some 50,000 people’. Former child soldiers were found in the militia in camps in West Timor, and, in 2000, 130 displaced East Timorese children were abducted from camps by pro-Indonesian groups to be trained as anti-independence activists.

53.) Campbell-Nelson et al., op.cit., 265-266.
independence East Timorese became targets of violence, including murder. The data in these reports show that the highest number of fatalities as a result of conflict involving displaced East Timorese occurred in 1999 (six fatalities) and 2000 (16 fatalities, including three UNHCR staff and two UN peace-keeping forces) while four fatalities were reported from January through June 2003.\(^{56}\)

The main losers in the conflict were the displaced East Timorese who had to leave all their assets and most of their personal belongings in East Timor without any prospect of being able to reclaim their lost property; and those who would like to return to East Timor but cannot or will not do so for fear of being brought to justice in Timor Leste for past crimes, for fear of becoming victims of vengeance, and/or because of concerns about finding work in East Timor. The murder of three UNHCR staff in Atambua on 6 September 2000 by militia members led to the declaration of Security Phase V by the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the evacuation of all UN staff from West Timor, and the disruption of aid to the displaced East Timorese.\(^{57}\)

While the subsequent formation of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste has put an end to the armed conflict in East Timor, reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and in Timor Leste has not been achieved. Prominent East and West Timorese caution that reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace in the region. The volatility of relations between Timor Leste residents and the East Timorese in Indonesia was underscored by the murder of two female high school students, residents of an East Timorese camp in Belu District who went to Timor Leste to visit their relatives. This tragedy sparked demonstrations in Atambua by former East Timorese displaced persons in Belu District.\(^{58}\)

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Much of this violence stems from tensions between displaced East Timorese and West Timorese local communities, in areas where the displaced East Timorese settled or were placed by the authorities. The settlements for displaced East Timorese were built on publicly owned land or land owned by West Timorese religious organizations, communities and individuals. According to a NTT provincial study, most locals refuse to accept the displaced East Timorese because of problems related to land and because the displaced persons were perceived as unfriendly and disruptive.59

Local communities at first tolerated the presence of the displaced persons because they saw it as a temporary

Mohamad Yusuf. Sama Makan Kenyang (Full Stomachs for All); etching, 18 x 12.5 cm.

3. Conflict Causes

solution to a humanitarian problem. The plight of the East Timorese even elicited generosity on the part of locals. Gradually, however, attitudes began to change after the survival strategies employed by the East Timorese began to interfere with the livelihoods of locals. For a variety of reasons, many East Timorese did not take part in relocation and repatriation programs but instead remained in the camps. According to NGO informants in Atambua, attitudes toward the East Timorese were also negatively affected by the murder of three UNHCR staff by members of the East Timorese militia.

3.1 Economic Tensions

The issue of economic inequality between displaced East Timorese and local host communities came to light during the initial stages of the exodus into West Timor. Before the East Timorese settled in camps, locals often shared their homes and food, although the locals themselves had little. When the displaced East Timorese started receiving emergency aid from national as well as international sources, locals became jealous when aid—specifically food and shelter—was not made available to them. The term *orang miskin yang harus menolong orang susah*—‘the poor who have to help the needy’—was used in one government document. A government official also used a similar phrase during an interview.

In interviews, NGO informants reported cases in which, soon after their displacement, East Timorese in West Timor profited by selling food they had received from various donor agencies. Informants also mentioned cases in which displaced East Timorese registered their names with multiple donor agencies operating in various locations to obtain as much aid as possible.

The government eventually declared that after 31 December 2002 the displaced East Timorese who opted to become Indonesian citizens would no longer be regarded as displaced persons but would be treated as other Indonesian citizens. Once they became citizens, assistance such as food and water aid was gradually withdrawn. Aid programs were subsequently redesigned to benefit both former displaced East Timorese and the locals equally. Since 1 January 2003 the UNHCR has also ceased to regard the East Timorese in West Timor as refugees and has consequently ceased its involvement in West Timor, including its repatriation assistance. The UN OCHA is also phasing out its activities in Indonesia.

Displaced East Timorese interviewed in camps expressed frustration, disappointment and anger at what they perceived to be unjust treatment and neglect by the Indonesian Government, despite the fact that (according to them) they had risked their lives to defend the ‘Red and White Flag’ of the Republic. West Timorese informants, as well as some displaced East Timorese, said the East Timorese had not come to West Timor voluntarily, but had been forced to leave East Timor and subsequently been transported to West Timor while their houses were burned and their personal property looted.

There were also tensions among various groups of displaced East Timorese. Displaced East Timorese who did not take part in certain government-sponsored relocation programs complained that they were cut off from some forms of aid that were made available to those who chose to relocate. Economic inequality also appeared to be linked to power hierarchies within camps of displaced East Timorese. Those with power had an ability to control access and distribution of aid from donor agencies (deciding who got what and in what quantities), sometimes even misappropriating the aid.

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60) Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit. 36.


62) Ibid. The government’s policy explicitly states that empowerment aid is made available to displaced persons and locals who have settled in resettlement facilities made available by the government. Government data show that empowerment aid distributed includes items such as rice, cattle, clothing, medicine, hand tractors, water installations and typewriters.
3.2 Social and Political Tensions

There were some social and political tensions between the displaced and host communities. Informants stated that cultural differences based on ethnicity, religion and colonial experiences contributed to the social distance between the displaced East Timorese and the indigenous West Timorese.

Many West Timorese considered it incongruous that many East Timorese consider themselves Indonesian citizens while also wishing to return to East Timor. In reply, East Timorese camp residents noted that, despite the fact that they had been formally classified as Indonesian citizens, displaced East Timorese were often not regarded as members of the local community and were not afforded the same rights and obligations. For example, although they were allowed to take part in national elections, they could not vote in local elections for village head. Unlike local residents, they were exempt from land and building tax.

Such acts of exclusion, practiced by many in the host communities, were probably based on fear that the extension of equal communal rights to their displaced East Timorese neighbours would inevitably lead to major shifts in the religious, ethnic, economic, social and political balance within the host communities. Most West Timorese were reluctant to risk the possibility of becoming a minority group within their own communities. They continued to regard the presence of their displaced East Timorese neighbours as temporary, and expected them eventually to move on to new locations.

Informants from government and other agencies state that, due to NTT’s limited natural resources, the government would like to close the camps and relocate the East Timorese to areas outside West Timor. West Timorese viewed displaced East Timorese as rude, domineering, violent, possessive and manipulative. An informant used the phrase mentalitas Porto (‘Portuguese mentality’), referring to the attitudes of displaced East Timorese. A shared perception among many West


64.) It is interesting to note that in the past a certain group in Timor was referred to as "black Portuguese." See I Gede Parimartha, Perdagangan dan Politik di Nusa Tenggara 1815-1915, 2002, op. cit.


residents and their leaders are viewed as paternalistic. Camp leaders often communicate with the outside world on behalf of camp residents. Civil society activists say decisions about important issues such as participation in government-sponsored repatriation are made collectively, not individually. As an example of social pressures, one NGO activist who worked in a camp described an incident in which a number of residents had agreed to be repatriated to Timor Leste but did not show up on the day of departure.

Camp residents also obey their ketua adat (traditional chief). When asked about his willingness to be resettled on Sumba Island, for instance, a camp resident in Tuapukan said, ‘It depends on the power-holder, on the ketua adat. If the ketua adat has given his agreement and has arranged the coordination, and it is agreed upon, then, okay, we will all go there. But we do not go over there just because the government has constructed [settlements].’ Gambling and the production, sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages are reportedly prevalent in some camps. (Previously, the possession of firearms was common.) These practices have exacerbated negative stereotypes of the displaced East Timorese. Some displaced East Timorese have also been suspected of misappropriating aid from donors. Locals in the Kupang District complain that displaced East Timorese families have more children than West Timorese families, and are believed to be either ignorant of, or indifferent to, family planning programs. This perception, even if it is based on reality, should be related to cultural differences because most East Timorese, being Catholics, do not use birth control. Locals are concerned that this perceived imbalance might tip the already precarious ethnic and religious balance in the neighbourhoods to favour the East Timorese.

Displaced East Timorese who were interviewed also held a number of grievances. Many felt they had been used to obtain aid from domestic and overseas sources, and questioned the accountability and openness of the management of allocated funds, as well as the appropriateness of certain aid projects. An informant in Kupang reported that a Ministry of Health research project to investigate the state of their mental health was greeted with hostility because the displaced persons felt that their sanity was being questioned.

In interviews, displaced East Timorese camp residents also claimed that government agencies often discriminated against them. Informants and displaced East Timorese, for instance, reported cases of discrimination by health workers, although it was not clear whether the perceived discriminatory treatment was specifically directed against displaced East Timorese patients, or because health workers had a tendency to discriminate against patients from other ethnic groups, as observed by NTT Governor Piet A Tallo.

Displaced East Timorese reported that they were not included in the government’s bebas miskin, raskin (rice for the poor) program and were given only temporary ID cards. A camp coordinator remarked that East Timorese encountered difficulties obtaining bank loans because of concerns that they might return to East Timor without repaying their loans. Local informants in Naibonat say that government support for the construction of basic housing is only available to applicants who can display a certificate of personal ownership of the plot of land on which the house is to be built—a condition few displaced East Timorese camp residents are able to satisfy. NTT government data shows, on the other hand, that from 2002 through 2004 they had provided aid in the form of building materials to 2,259 household heads in Kupang and Kupang District, 308 of whom resided in camps.

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69.) East Timorese residing in other areas outside NTT also encountered problems with ID cards. See, for instance, Sinar Harapan, 3 June 2003, which reported that the East Timorese residing in Yogyakarta “have lost their country of birth and are still being subjected to unfairness.”
Identity Politics

Religious and cultural differences between displaced East Timorese and locals have on occasion become obstacles to integration. The displaced East Timorese are Catholic, whereas in a number of areas in NTT the locals are predominantly Protestant. Informants report that religious differences have been a problem in Central Timor, Kupang and Sumba. But cultural differences can also stand in the way of peaceful communication, even in areas where the majority of locals are Catholic.

The relationship between refugees and locals varies from place to place. A number of West Timorese as well as East Timorese informants interviewed observed that, over time, the groups tend to integrate. There are some reports of more cooperative interactions between the two groups, especially in integrated neighbourhoods. One government official observed a strong relationship between displaced East Timorese and locals in Oecussi, where the displaced East Timorese work in crop-sharing arrangements within an integrated land management system. One local village organization facilitated a traditional signing ceremony by local hosts to formally accept the displaced East Timorese as members of the local community and hand over land use rights to them. A more integrated relationship was also found in Southern Central Timor.

Other informants observed good inter-group relations in South Belu and in Ngada, Flores and in the eastern part of Kupang District. An NGO activist stated that in one village his organization had facilitated a traditional (adat) signing ceremony. During the ceremony, witnessed by local government officials, the local police chief, and the pastor of the parish, a representative of the East Timorese community formally accepted temporary land-use rights for residential and agricultural use and agreed to obey state, regional, local, customary and church laws, to honour the sanctity of traditional forest, and to return the land to the rightful owners without compensation when the loan expires or when they have to move elsewhere. To facilitate the integration of both groups, the government has adopted a relocation policy it refers to as the pola sisipan (insertion pattern), by which the East Timorese are placed in new settlements where they are integrated with locals.

Interruption between members of the two groups has also begun to occur. However, locals and NGO activists say cultural factors, such as religious differences and the size of the dowry that displaced East Timorese brides often demand from the families of the bridegroom, prevent inter-group marriages from occurring more frequently. Patje O. Tasuib's study in Noelbaki Village for his Sarjana degree found that locals as well as East Timorese tended to reject inter-group marriages.

Media

Some of the daily newspapers in NTT are affiliated with national newspapers, while others are regional or local publications. One regional daily newspaper, Pos Kupang, is part of the Jakarta-based Kompas group. Its staff says that it is cautious and responsible in its reporting of issues relating to displaced East Timorese, for fear of stirring up conflict. It also states that it has a policy of not printing the names of ethnic or religious groups when reporting on conflict, and tries to elicit comments from influential people it regards as potential actors in the resolution of conflict. The chief editor of Pos Kupang is, however, facing libel charges after publishing a report alleging the involvement of police officers in smuggling sugar from East Timor. Another regional daily newspaper, Timor Ekspres, is affiliated to the Jawa Pos group.


The majority of the population in the four districts in Timor works in agriculture. While East Timorese employed by the state (the military, police, civil servants) continue to receive their monthly salaries, many East Timorese who traditionally earned their livings as peasants or working in the informal sector, had no means of livelihood in West Timor. This placed additional economic burdens on host communities, as well as putting pressure on scarce local natural resources.

Prevailing methods of traditional land resource management were disturbed by the influx of East Timorese because traditional communal land, including forests, was forcibly appropriated and utilized without regard.
for existing local customs. Environmental damage was reported in Belu after the traditional forest in Wemer, regarded by local communities as communal property and by the government as protected forest, was cut down and turned into agricultural land. A Belu District forestry agency report states that the actions of former East Timorese residents and local residents resulted in the damage of more than 4,000 hectares of protected forest area. The permanent settlement of displaced East Timorese in host communities has also compelled host communities, including religious organizations, to allocate some of their land, voluntarily or otherwise, to these displaced East Timorese. Disputes over the management of, and access to, natural resources, such as land and water, are potential sources of conflict. Inter-group relations in a number of locations are volatile and described by informants in terms of bom waktu (time bomb), api di dalam sekam (fire in a haystack) and rumput kering (dry grass).

The impact of the presence of displaced East Timorese on the local and regional economy was also apparent in the formal sector. The government and a wide variety of donor agencies have, over the years, allocated significant funds for programs and projects to assist displaced East Timorese. These funds have been used, among other things, to construct settlements and other forms of infrastructure and to purchase consumer goods and agricultural tools for distribution. Funds were also allocated for related activities: training and other forms of information-education-communication (IEC) activities; the re-registration of displaced East Timorese; workshops, seminars and research, and development activities that benefit public, non-governmental and private organizations, as well as local and regional businesses and industries.

4.2 Impact on Local Education and Health Services

The exodus to West Timor disrupted the schooling of many East Timorese children. When they settled, many had to put off their formal education because of a lack of educational facilities. Most existing schools did not have the capacity to accept the large number of displaced East Timorese children. Consequently, sekolah tenda (tent schools) were established. Recently, attempts have been made to close the tent schools and transfer the students to regular schools. Once in the public schools, the East Timorese faced the same chronic problems faced by low-income West Timorese: paying school fees, purchasing supplies and uniforms, and paying for public transportation fares.

The presence of displaced East Timorese in West Timor placed a burden on the region’s health and educational facilities. An NTT provincial government document cites a host of problems: ‘educational facilities in emergency schools in resettlement locations are in general very limited’, ‘health services from community health centres located near the camps are not optimal because of the frequent absence of physicians and the distance between community health centres and the camps/resettlement locations’, ‘limited medical staff for medical services in various camps’, and ‘malaria eradication efforts by the NTT provincial health service are not optimal’.

75.) When the assessment team visited a camp, the residents were carrying out land-clearing (membersihkan, to clean), stacking firewood which according to them could be sold for IDR90,000, (US$9) per truckload.


77.) Pos Kupang, 8 July 2004.


79.) For a breakdown of emergency aid received or allocated and expenditures made from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001, op. cit.


81.) Pengolahan Data Elektronik Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, op. cit.

82.) For data on the health and education in NTT, see Pengolahan Data Elektronik Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, ibid.

At the outset, infant mortality and malnutrition was high among the displaced. Although various arrangements eventually led to an increase in the absorption capacity of local schools, camp residents interviewed stated that many children still chose not to attend school, or dropped out due to factors such as the distance between camps and existing schools, and the inability of many families to pay school fees. The same factors also accounted for the inability of many displaced East Timorese families to gain access to health services provided by the rumah sakit daerah (regional hospitals), Puskesmas (pusat kesehatan masyarakat, community health centers), Polindes (poliklinik desa, village clinics), Posyandu (pos pelayanan terpadu, integrated service stations) and Postu (pos pembantu, subordinate stations).

The enrolment of displaced East Timorese students significantly affected the ethnic, religious and age composition of schools. Several local informants maintain that inter-group activities are limited and conflict occasionally breaks out. There are also reports of parents transferring their children to other schools to avoid extortion and physical assault by East Timorese students, reports that a school building was vandalized by East Timorese camp residents because many of their children did not pass the final examinations, and reports of a high drop-out rate among displaced East Timorese students.

Displaced East Timorese women had already suffered various forms of violence while in East Timor. Many displaced East Timorese women faced further problems in West Timor, as victims of domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape, involvement in commercial sex, and the disintegration of the family. It is also reported that widows are typically not regarded as the head of their households and therefore face more economic and social difficulties than other families.

4.3 Governance

There is no information on whether the conflict affected institutional capacity, transparency and accountability of public, corporate and civil society governance. Informants reported that displaced East Timorese, the media and civil society organizations demanded transparency and accountability in the management of funds made available by national and international donor agencies. The media has frequently aired cases of public dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency and accountability of the management of funds for the displaced East Timorese. As in other areas of Indonesia, corruption, collusion and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotism, KKN) are endemic in NTT, and the reform movement thus far has failed to improve the situation.

During the assessment team’s stay in West Timor, cases of corruption involving government officials, members of the legislature, as well as prominent figures in the private sector, were reported in the local media on an almost daily basis.

In a speech, NTT Governor Piet A. Tallo warned that some people had turned poverty into projects (memprojekkan kemiskinan) for their own benefit. Quoting Pos Kupang, Kompas reports that Indonesian Corruption Watch has classified the corruption rate in NTT as the sixth highest in Indonesia. For example, some NGOs, the NTT DPRD and East Timorese displaced persons have all alleged the misappropriation of humanitarian aid from the Japanese government totalling IDR 53,123 billion.

86.) See, for instance, Campbell-Nelson et al., op. cit.
87.) For a breakdown of emergency aid received or allocated and expenditures made from 1999 through 2001, see Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2001.
89.) Kompas, 16 November 2004.
90.) Republika Online, 16 October 2003 and 17 October 2003.
Since the beginning of the conflict, a range of emergency programs have been designed to mitigate the humanitarian problems resulting from the exodus from East Timor and to find durable solutions for East Timorese. The Indonesian Government, the NTT provincial and district governments, and the military and police all worked on these programs, in cooperation with private, state-owned and regionally-owned enterprises, political parties, national, local and international civil society organizations, international and regional organizations, and foreign governments. Support for the evacuation of displaced East Timorese to West Timor was followed by humanitarian aid in the form of access to emergency food aid, shelter, and health and educational facilities for displaced East Timorese, and aid in repatriating displaced persons who wished to return to East Timor.

A UNHCR report evaluating the repatriation program estimates that 90 percent of the East Timorese in West Timor—225,000 people—had returned to Timor Leste.
by May 2003.\textsuperscript{91} By 2002, 1,373 of 4,323 separated East Timorese children had been reunited with at least one parent.\textsuperscript{92} Other resettlement and transmigration programs helped East Timorese who wished to remain in Indonesia relocate throughout NTT and other provinces.

Many donor agencies have been actively involved in providing emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction services: the Australian Red Cross; Care International Indonesia (water and sanitation, income-generation and other livelihood recovery); Catholic Relief Services; Christian Children's Fund Indonesia (health-related children and youth infrastructure, rehabilitation and nutrition); CONCERN, Danish Refugee Council; Food and Agricultural Organization (refugees, agriculture and income-generation); International Organization for Migration; International Rescue Committee; OXFAM Australia; Save the Children UK (health and education, children and youth); United Nations Children's Fund (education); UNDP (multi-sector, local settlement programme); UNHCR and a number of West Timorese NGOs.\textsuperscript{91}

Government agencies and civil society organizations have initiated various peace-building programs to facilitate communication between displaced East Timorese and locals. West Timorese locals as well as East Timorese camp coordinators established links between the two communities. Language has been one of the focuses: It has been suggested, for instance, that terms such as \textit{warga baru} (new residents) or \textit{warga lokal baru} (new local residents) be used, rather than \textit{pengungsi} (displaced persons) or \textit{eks pengungsi} (former displaced persons), which have come to be seen as derogatory. Several informants, however, say that the endeavour is not supported by all locals—the \textit{warga lama} (old residents)—an indication that distrust still exists.

Peace-building initiatives also include the facilitation of meetings between residents in East Timorese camps and host communities. Similar meetings have been set up between East Timorese and members of communities where they will be resettled.

Cross-border visits (‘go and see visit’ and ‘come and talk visit’)\textsuperscript{94} have been set up to facilitate reconciliation between the East Timorese in West Timor and Timor Leste residents.\textsuperscript{95} A local NGO is participating in a Timor Leste Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As part of peace-building efforts, East Timorese civil service employees and military personnel formerly stationed in East Timor have been relocated from camps and reassigned to units in their organizations within as well as outside West Timor, while former members of the militia have been encouraged to pursue their interests through political means.

5.1 \textbf{Responses by Government and UNDP}

In the six years since the post-referendum violence, the national and NTT regional governments in partnership with international donors, foreign and local NGOs have worked consistently at getting East Timorese out of refugee camps and into more permanent housing. In 2002, the Indonesian Government formulated its official policy on resolving the East Timorese refugee problem by giving all refugees the choice of three options: repatriation to Timor Leste; transmigration to settlements outside of NTT; or resettlement within NTT. The East Timorese were given until 31 December 2002 to decide and since remaining in the camps was not an option, it was believed that there would be no more refugee camps or refugees in 2003. Housing and relocation were handled by different government agencies such as the Department for Regional Settlement and Infrastructure, Department of Manpower


\textsuperscript{95} See UNHCR Global Report 2002, op. cit., p. 348.
and Transmigration, Department of Social Affairs and the military. The results of these efforts however fell short of the original objective:

1. From the beginning of the crisis until December 2002, 42,063 households moved out of the refugee camps into more permanent housing leaving a balance of 9,805 households in the camps.
2. In the financial year 2003, 2,397 households were rehoused leaving a balance of 7,408 households in the camps as of March 2004.
3. In the financial year 2004, a further 3,209 households were rehoused with the Department of Manpower and Transmigration resettling 1,530 households; the Department of Regional Settlement and Infrastructure providing housing for 500 households and the Department of Social Affairs providing housing assistance for 4,199 households.
4. As of May 2005, 4,199 families still remained in camps or refugee-type accommodation.96

The main problems encountered included insufficient socialisation of the options to the East Timorese refugees as well as adequate information on living conditions in the new settlements and a begrudging acceptance or outright hostility from the local host communities. In light of the uneven progress, the Indonesian Government supported by UNDP decided to adopt a more participatory and sustainable approach towards resettlement that would factor in both the needs of the host community as well as the refugees. Host communities were recognised as the key to successful local settlement; settlement without the host community’s agreement or coerced agreement could be a cause for future violence.

The key characteristics of participatory local settlement include:

- Host communities and refugees are invited to participate in planning and implementation, assuring participation of women.
- Host communities and refugees reach agreement without coercion.
- Host communities participate in detailing the support they need to receive refugees.
- Refugees participate in decisions on settlement locations and on the support needed for a sustainable livelihood.
- The needs of women and children are taken into account in the planning and implementation.
- Local government authorities are expected, with the support of UN agencies, to take the lead in the planning and implementation by appropriate agencies, including: government entities, NGOs, community organisations and private sector.
- The local settlement programme proposes two funds to support the settlement of refugees and the sustainable development of the host community. The Community Development Fund will address the immediate impact at community level including settlement and village development support. The Area Development Fund is aimed at promoting the economic and social advancement of the area in which the refugees have been resettled and to reduce potential jealousy among communities who benefit from the arrival of refugees and communities that could not accept refugees and hence could not benefit from the Community Development Fund.

As there was little field experience in the local settlement of refugees following this participatory and sustainable approach, a small-scale pilot project was established to coordinate mechanisms, build capacity and generate ‘lessons learned’ to scale up the programme. UNHCR and UNDP agreed to support the implementation of local settlement programme pilot and signed the first Exchange of Letter (EOL) in November 2002. The EOL stipulated that 1,100 households would be settled by the end of 2003 with total budget allocated of US$1.2 million from the European Union (EU).

This local settlement programme had two dimensions. UNDP in collaboration with the Department for Regional Settlement and Infrastructure (National level) assumed responsibility for the host community dimension. UNHCR and the implementing partners (NGOs) assumed responsibility for the refugee dimension, i.e. informing refugees about local settlement support, recording refugee aspirations, identifying refugees who would match available settlement opportunities, moving refugees to new locations and providing shelter and livelihood support.

Due to constraints in the coordination among the different actors and the imperative of meeting the time limit on the use of EU funds, the target beneficiaries were drastically reduced, from 1,100 households to 550, then to 70 households at the end of 2003: 50 in West Sumba district and another 20 in West Timor. The budget allocation was accordingly reduced to US$270,631.

5.2 Issues Arising from Responses

The slow progress and numerous setbacks in resettling the East Timorese refugees both through conventional methods as well as the innovative participatory local settlement approach has provided many useful lessons that can be applied to the remaining East Timorese refugees as well as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in other parts of Indonesia.

5.2.1 Lack of coordination between different programme dimensions

The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot emphasised the importance of both the host community and refugees, however both dimensions are inter-linked; the progress or steps taken by one dimension are highly dependent on the results of the other dimension’s activities. Poor coordination and communication mechanisms between the two main programme components resulted in delays or, in some cases, the premature moving of refugees before local communities had facilities to accommodate them. In future, the programme should ensure better coordination and clearly articulate the responsibilities and timelines for delivery by each participating agency.

5.2.2 Changing priorities in government policy on refugees

While the Indonesian Government clearly articulated three options for East Timorese refugees, the priority settings for each option changed several times, adversely affecting the outcome of the local settlement pilot. For example, when the repatriation option was prioritised, the programme was not allowed to explicitly promote the option of resettlement.

Initially, local settlement programme policy stated that resettlement would only take place outside West Timor. Accordingly East Timorese refugees expressed an interest in relocating to West Sumba district. However when the Indonesian Government changed its policy and allowed resettlement within West Timor, nearly all refugees who had already registered for West Sumba backed out, preferring to remain in West Timor.

To prevent this from recurring, programme facilitators should ensure that decisions to relocate are made on the basis of genuine options, i.e. that refugees register because they are genuinely convinced that they are moving to viable locations and not because they do not have any other alternative.

5.2.3 Inconsistent policies on settlement areas

The Indonesian Government’s policy on refugees is inconsistently implemented. This is apparent in the variety of settlement strategies created by different government agencies. For example, the Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure provides shelter in the form of simple houses, which differ from the standards of the Department of Manpower and Transmigration; for its part, the Department for Social Affairs provides building materials. Each sector has different unit costs which creates jealousy among the participants in the various programs.

5.2.4 Need for standardisation of settlement activities

Resettlement is a multi-stakeholder effort. The Departments for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure, Social Affairs and Manpower and Transmigration are all responsible for housing preparations. The Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure is also responsible
for the provision of public facilities, i.e. water and sanitation, roads, bridges and the like. Social Affairs is responsible for food and living allowances before and after the resettlement, while Manpower and Transmigration is responsible for the transportation of refugees from the camps to transit sites and resettlement locations.

In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, additional players such as the UNHCR and NGO implementing partners were involved in helping the refugees while UNDP and the Department of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure dealt with the host communities’ needs through local NGOs. A lack of coordination and integration of individual activities at the beginning of the pilot led to conflicting agendas, duplication of work and unnecessary delays in project delivery.

In the pilot local settlement project, the National Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure assigned responsibility for coordinating the programme to the NTT Provincial Settlement and Regional Infrastructure department. The district government, which is ultimately responsible for the sustainability of the programme, was given a minor role. To accelerate the settlement process and optimise results, the relevant provincial and district sectors should review their responsibilities and allocate on the basis of the comparative advantage and respective expertise of the different sectors and levels of government. Maximising involvement of the district governments will improve their commitment to assume responsibility for the sustainable development of the settlement locations, which in the past have so frequently been neglected. At the national level, the Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure should play a monitoring role, provide technical assistance and ensure the availability of funds.

In the past, the Indonesian Government has located new settlers in locations isolated from the host community. Such actions have, in some cases, undercut social cohesion and created tensions between the host community and the settlers. In the East Timorese Local Settlement pilot, the new settlers have been mixed with the local community. This insertion strategy accelerates integration between the new settlers and the host community.

Significant improvement in communication and coordination between the UNDP team and the West Sumba District Government occurred after the bupati established, by official decree, the Resettlement Working Group. The creation of a dedicated task force resulted in a new awareness on the specific roles and responsibilities of the working group and district government. The district government assumed the lead in implementing the local settlement pilot and became deeply involved in all aspects of the programme, including becoming familiar with the programme’s approach, the implementation and coordination arrangements, and other responsibilities assigned to district agencies.

Government and NGO data on the number of East Timorese refugees in camps differ by wide margins and are not regularly updated in spite of the fact that the refugees are highly mobile. No systematic information is available regarding the number of refugees willing to settle.
outside West Timor. In September 2003, the Indonesian Government conducted a registration of East Timorese refugees but did not publish the results. To improve the planning and identification of settlement opportunities, more systematic information is required on the number of refugees that may be willing to settle outside West Timor and the localities outside West Timor where the refugees would be willing to settle.

Updated information on refugees should be shared frequently by the various agencies and organisations, such as the police, the military, the Ministry of Home Affairs, SATKORLAK and NGOs. Information on refugees should be updated in order to support informed decision-making in the identification of settlement locations.

Information about location settlements in Sumba was facilitated by the Centre for IDP Services (CIS) and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), particularly through ‘go and see visits’ (GSVs) by representatives of interested refugees and ‘come and talk visits’ (CTVs) by representatives of host communities and as such, information reached a limited number of people. At the early stages of the pilot, the general population of refugees in the camps was not well-informed about settlement opportunities outside of West Timor. Information that was available was not well-packaged or evenly circulated to the refugee population. In addition, questions/issues raised by the refugees were not properly answered or addressed. To gain a more favourable response from refugees, all institutions concerned need to improve communication with the refugees and utilise various media such as community radio which has a broad reach.

At present, matching refugees are identified after a settlement opportunity has been found and community agreement has been established. If an insufficient number of refugees accept the settlement opportunity, the time and effort expended in establishing the community agreement goes to waste. Instead, processes to identify host communities and refugees who willing to participate should run in parallel, with intermediate milestones for each process that would support and accelerate the parallel process.

Communities agree that refugees require proper housing but express concern that their own housing could be of a much lower standard than the houses made available to refugees. Communities should be informed of the support that will be available to refugees, including the quality of housing. Compared to locally prevailing standards, refugee support may be perceived as excessive and become a source of jealousies, which could lead to tensions between the host community and the settlers. Potential host communities may not be interested in receiving refugees if the programme cannot adjust to local conditions. A similar rationale applies for access to water supply standards. If a standard of 100 metres is applied (distance walked to fetch drinking water), this would disqualify most of the settlement opportunities that local communities are able to offer. In the future, the programme should review the standards for refugee support and formulate standards that permit adaptation to local conditions to ensure that support for refugees is perceived as proportional to the living conditions of the host community.

The East Timorese Local Settlement pilot has not only benefited its direct beneficiaries such as refugees and impacted local communities in the settlement locations but has also contributed to building and strengthening the capacity of institutions and individuals involved such as the National Executing Agency (Department for Settlement and Regional Infrastructure), the District Government of West Sumba, the NGO implementing partners and the community committees in each location that managed the Community Development Fund.

The slow and uneven progress in resettling the East Timorese refugees can also be attributed to the lack of capacity within Indonesia to address the needs of refugees/IDPs as well as host communities in a transparent, timely and coordinated manner. The lessons learned from these past responses will increase local and national capacities to address the remaining IDP/refugee households.
Peace Vulnerabilities

Despite conflict resolution and peace-building efforts by various agencies, the root causes of conflict between East Timorese camp residents and locals remain unresolved: the occupation by East Timorese of communal land and land owned by locals; competition for scarce natural resources, and competition for jobs. The only viable solutions—the relocation of displaced East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia or their repatriation to Timor Leste—have progressed very slowly due primarily to East Timorese still residing in camps who are unwilling to participate.

There are several reasons why the displaced East Timorese are reluctant to take part in relocation and repatriation programs. Lack of jobs and livelihood income sources is one; another is the spectre of inadequate services. Meanwhile, many camp residents still have no sustainable livelihoods and are dependent on aid, despite having lived in camps for five years. The discontinuation of assistance has exacerbated these difficulties.
Impoverished, many of the East Timorese camp residents continue to occupy land owned by local communities and individuals. The locals, the majority of who are poor themselves, have begun to demand the return of their land. Competition for scarce natural and social resources continues. Although inter-group social relations have improved over time, significant cultural differences—including religious differences—have given rise to stereotyping. This increases the risk of conflict.

Humanitarian assistance for refugees has stoked the jealousy of locals, whereas durable solutions, such as the provision of food aid for disadvantaged families among locals (the rice for the poor program), have not been made available to displaced East Timorese living in camps. Disputes concerning the illegal occupation and utilization of private and communal land, water resources, as well as other forms of personal or community property, have not been satisfactorily resolved. Consequently, there is a need for dialogue between IDPs and host communities of concern to build peace between displaced East Timorese and the local community and to resolve inter-group problems.

All of these factors have contributed to the creation of social distance between the two groups. On the one hand, perceived socio-economic inequalities in the past led to jealousy on the part of locals during the initial stages of the conflict. On the other hand, resentment is evident among displaced East Timorese over what they perceive as discriminatory treatment, even after having opted for Indonesian citizenship. These conditions, if left unresolved, have the potential to lead to open conflict between the two groups in the future.

Past as well as present human rights violations by members of the state apparatus are the main source of fear and uncertainty among the populace and a fundamental obstruction to peaceful development.

In its capacities-vulnerabilities analysis, the UN Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Indonesia 2003 has listed three major problems in NTT, namely lack of essential services (particularly health related), informed and voluntary choice, and integration/settlement of refugees.97

In camps and resettlement locations for displaced East Timorese, the UN team noted a lack of essential services, particularly health related. The discontinuation of water aid programs has led to hardship; in settlement areas located far from water sources, water is unfit for human consumption. Schooling and health facilities in camps are inferior to those provided to neighbouring local communities. The assessment team also found that, because of poverty, residents have limited access to essential services such as transportation, basic medical services, prescription drugs, tuition, and the purchase of schoolbooks, equipment and uniforms. Camp residents report that long distances from schools and an inability to pay tuition fees have caused many youngsters to drop out from school. Nonetheless, some camp youths have successfully enrolled in universities.

According to the review, NGOs are actively involved in providing information to camp residents, but the activities are short-term and so not sustainable. Some observers, noting that camp leaders attempt to control information from the outside world, suggest that intervention programs aimed at resolving the problem of the displaced East Timorese can only be effectively implemented by changing the behaviour and attitudes of the camp leaders, as well as external influential figures. Other factors, such the physical isolation of many camps, limited access to electronic and printed media due to poverty, and limited communication between locals and camp residents, also hinder the flow of relevant information from the outside world.

In keeping with the findings of this report, a 2003 UN document states “refugee children and some host communities [were] highly at risk of malnutrition and other

disease threats." The discontinuation of humanitarian aid for displaced East Timorese has adversely affected the human development of families living in camps, especially those who have yet to establish sustainable livelihoods in West Timor. The assessment team has encountered families who, due to a lack of food, were forced to consume porridge made of the core of trees and drink unhygienic ground water carried from distant locations.

The slow movement of displaced persons out of camps is caused by a number of internal as well as external factors. Internal factors include: unwillingness to be relocated, even to another location within West Timor, if this involves separation from relatives and friends and unwillingness to be resettled in areas outside West Timor. (During interviews the camp residents cited a number of reasons such as being too far from East Timor, their native land, and from relatives still living in East Timor; their unwillingness to ‘cross the sea’, and their unwillingness ‘to become refugees once again’. The displaced people are unwilling to be repatriated due to their concern about the economic and political situation in Timor Leste. They particularly worry about the prospect of being tried for serious crimes and becoming targets for revenge. The recent murder in Timor Leste of two female high school students from an East Timorese camp in Belu District has heightened such concerns.

External factors associated with the slow exodus of displaced East Timorese include the close patronage bonds between displaced East Timorese and their camp leaders, as well as with other influential persons living outside the camps, so that important individual decisions are often not made independently but are subject to group control.

Another external factor is the amount of negative information and disinformation about repatriation, relocation, resettlement, and transmigration programs obtained through gossip, personal experiences, as well as personal accounts from people who took part in such programs but later decided to return to the West Timorese camps. Problems include a lack of transparency and accountability in the management of aid programs; and broken promises or perceived shortfalls between what had been explained and the realities later encountered, such as the absence of promised essential facilities or support in relocation or resettlement sites. Other important external factors include the lack of fertile land in West Timor and the government’s limited budget.

6.2 Capacities for Peace

Peace Capacities identified by this assessment are the increase of autonomy and democracy in local politics and the strengthening of civil society’s role in society.

Peace Capacities also consist of peace-building initiatives by government agencies, traditional and local leaders, and NGOs (including the facilitation of meetings between both groups and the promotion of peace among students from both groups through the establishment of peace schools).

The local government has also begun to provide services without distinguishing between former displaced persons and locals, thus enhancing inter-group relations and reducing an important risk to peace. Increased consultation, advocacy and capacity building activities by local NGOs could also provide a Capacity for Peace. Specific sectoral attention should focus on improved governance, delivery of basic services, economic recovery and empowerment of victims of conflict.

There are several ways to increase the peace building capacity of the government, affirming its role as a dominant actor in averting potential conflict.

98.) Ibid., 120.
99.) In its most likely scenario, the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia estimates that “30-40 percent repatriate, 5 to 10 percent settle off Timor and majority of remainder continue residence in camp communities.” Ibid., 123.
100.) Koran Tempo, “Warga Atambua demo pembunuhan di Timor Leste” [Atambua residents demonstrate against murder in Timor Leste], 8 February 2005.
One is to increase the government’s capacity to make refugee management policies that are sensitive to potential conflict. This would include:

- Increasing the capacity to map existing and potential conflicts;
- Analysing the effects of policies on the aforementioned (potential) conflict;
- Understanding the principles, concepts and practices of management policies that actively contribute to peace building.

Village governments are also important actors, and it is imperative to increase the capacity of and support for these governments in their efforts to open forums for dialogue between refugees and the local community, through activities which are relevant and advantageous to local needs and conditions. These activities could centre on: hygiene and health education, sports activities and economic revival job creation). It is also important to encourage refugee involvement in decision-making at the village level, as well as in village and sub-village development meetings (musrenbang desa and musrenbang dusun), in particular in resettlement locations.

Finally, it is imperative that all stakeholders—the subjects of development endeavours as well as civil society organizations—participate and be actively involved in the planning and implementation of peace and development programs. The emphasis in peace-building activities should be on participatory, empowering bottom-up grassroots approaches.

There are a number of important steps that can promote social welfare.

1. **Support efforts to improve living conditions**, including appropriate housing and basic infrastructure and facilities. Improvement of settlements also needs to focus on ways in which the beneficiaries can make their livelihoods (with the appropriate supporting infrastructures), so that unemployment or underemployment does not become a potential for conflict in the future.

2. **Understanding land issues**, including ownership and usage, are central to promoting social welfare. As stated in this paper, they have been central to tensions among refugees and the communities around them. The pattern of settlement insertion, in which refugees are settled in small numbers among the local community, could become a mechanism to reduce the ghettoisation of the refugees, which can lead to aggression if there is a trigger.

3. **Improving refugees’ access to appropriate health care**. This can be done by:
   - Enabling community health centers (PUSKESMAS) to give cheaper health care to refugees.
   - Encouraging PUSKESMAS to be more proactive in their services, including regularly visiting camps or resettlement locations when needed. This is important because many refugees are not used to being treated in PUSKESMAS; if they are not encouraged to do so, late treatment can be fatal.
   - Attempts to resolve administration of the citizenship of refugees, so that they can receive social security programs that will help them to obtain appropriate health services.
   - Facilitation of health education to produce paramedics within the refugee and local communities. Health education specifically related to healthy living (hygiene education) would provide a forum for dialogue between refugees and the local community, while simultaneously helping them to care for environmental health (preventative action against disease).

4. **Aid for education**. Education aid can be given through:
   - Improvements or provision of educational facilities.
   - Clarifying the citizenship status of refugees so they can access aid provided by the state to pay educational costs.
   - Providing scholarships to those who really need it and who have academic ability.
   - Urging the government to give serious attention to the lack of teachers. In addition, there should
be support for peace-building programs include short-term support for information, education and communication programs in peace-building skills, and long-term support for the learning of multicultural education principles, such as respect for and appreciation of cultural diversity, in primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions. This could be integrated into the competency-based curricula introduced in 2004.

5. Rehabilitation or development of social infrastructure in locations where limitations in social infrastructure are a cause of conflict. Installation of infrastructure also needs to be accompanied by development of maintenance mechanisms which are utilized as forums of communication between the two communities, for example, the formation of the Water Committee for regulating the usage and maintenance of water facilities, whose members are from both communities.

6. Providing special services for women in exile, both in relation to reproductive health and their vulnerability to violence, as well as their access to and control of basic public facilities. Particular attention should be paid to women who no longer have husbands. This special attention is needed in all programs (cross-cutting) to ensure that women are not left behind in peace building efforts, as the principle of gender mainstreaming needs to be applied. Programs for advocacy and support for victims of violence – including domestic violence – need to be introduced.

Programs for the empowerment of women are also recommended, especially regarding participation in formal schooling, small and medium enterprises, and in politics, such as in the election of female national, regional as well as district/municipal legislators and in the presidential elections.

6.2.3 Local economic recovery

Poor economic conditions exacerbate conflict (i.e. fighting over employment). Economic empowerment should be aimed at both refugee and local communities, so that jealousies are not created and negative stigmas/stereotypes are avoided. To enable equal access, there needs to be a more detailed assessment to determine the indicators for targeted beneficiaries and suitable forms of economic empowerment. Economic empowerment can also be coordinated with the border area accelerated development program, which focuses primarily on economic development.

6.2.4 State and human security

Given the large number of East Timorese refugees in West Timor who still communicate with friends and relatives and obtain information about the conditions in Timor Leste, the security context in West Timor can be influenced by the situation in Timor Leste. As a result, indicators need to be developed to anticipate insecurity or destabilization across the border as well as an early response system to minimize the impact in West Timor. In addition, support needs to be provided for human security programs, such as the empowerment of human-rights-watch activities and advocacy programs, and the empowerment of organizations involved in the performance of legal, health, psychological, and economic support for victims of human rights violations.
Provincial, district and village government officials
- Officials, NTT Provincial Government, Kupang
- Official, Belu District Government, Atambua
- Official, village government, Belu District
- Official, village government, Kupang District
- Neighbourhood association functionaries, Kupang District

Provincial and district legislators
- Member, NTT Province People's Representative Council, 1999-2004 term, Kupang
- Member, NTT Province People's Representative Council, 2004-2009 term, Kupang
- Member, Belu District People's Representative Council, 1999-2004 term, Atambua

Civil Society Organizations
- Functionary, CIS GAMKI-GMKI (Center for IDPs, Indonesian Christian Youth Movement-Indonesian Christian Student Organization), Kupang
- Functionary, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), Kupang
- Functionary, FPPA (Concern for Atambua Women Forum), Atambua Bishop's Office
- Functionary, Justice and Peace Committee, Atambua Bishop's Office
- Functionary, Justice and Peace Office, Kupang Archbishop's Office
- Volunteers, JPI, Atambua
- Volunteer, JRS (Jesuit Relief Services), Atambua
- Functionary, PIAR (Information Center on People's Adat), Kupang
- Functionary, PPSE (Socio-economic Development Program), Atambua Bishop's Office
- Functionary, Protestant Church, Kupang District
- Faculty member, Widya Mandira Catholic University, Kupang
- Functionary, YASO (Solidarity Foundation), Atambua
- Functionary, Yayasan Sanluma (Humanity Care Foundation), Kupang

Annex 1
Institutional Affiliation of Informants Interviewed

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>No. of Interviews</th>
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<td>1.</td>
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<td>• Member, NTT Province People's Representative Council, 2004-2009 term, Kupang</td>
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<td>• Member, Belu District People's Representative Council, 1999-2004 term, Atambua</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>• Functionary, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), Kupang</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Functionary, Yayasan Sanluma (Humanity Care Foundation), Kupang</td>
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Kelompok Rakyat Biasa, Damai di Hati, Damai di Bumi (Peace at Heart, Peace on Earth), silkscreen on paper, 60 x 45 cm, 2001
### Annexe 2

**NTT Election Results, 1999 and 2004**

by number of Votes, Percentage of Electors and Seats Won

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Party d)</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI/PDI-P</th>
<th>Demokrat</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>Others e)</th>
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<td><strong>1999 Legislative Elections a)</strong></td>
<td>Votes:</td>
<td>609,890</td>
<td>618,899</td>
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<td>41,327</td>
<td>27,228</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage:</td>
<td>39.61%</td>
<td>39.04%</td>
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<td>41.87%</td>
<td>27.91%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>April 2004 Legislative Elections</strong></td>
<td>Votes:</td>
<td>1,045,157</td>
<td>447,710</td>
<td>54,192</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage:</td>
<td>51%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>July 2004 Presidential Election b)</strong></td>
<td>Votes:</td>
<td>432,823</td>
<td>1,346,116</td>
<td>312,777</td>
<td>8,757</td>
<td>58,341</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage:</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
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<td><strong>September 2004 Run-off c)</strong></td>
<td>Votes:</td>
<td>1,115,507</td>
<td>438,648</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage:</td>
<td>71.78%</td>
<td>30.22%</td>
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**Notes:**

a) During the 1999 Legislative elections 48 political parties vied for seats.
b) In the July 2004 presidential elections there were 2,156,814 valid votes in NTT.
c) Because in the July 2004 presidential election no party achieved a majority, a run-off was held in September 2004.
d) Representing the political parties as presidential and vice presidential candidates were, respectively: for Golkar, Winanto and Salahluddin Wahid; for PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi; for the Democratic Party, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla; for PPP, Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar; for PAN, Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo.
e) Other parties include PKPI, PDDI, Partai Pelopor and PDS.

**Sources:**

### Data on Religious Functionaries in NTT (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Bishops</th>
<th>Priests</th>
<th>Brothers</th>
<th>Nuns</th>
<th>Preachers</th>
<th>Bible Teachers</th>
<th>Teachers of Sunday School</th>
<th>Ulamas</th>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Islam</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>East Sumba</th>
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<th>South Central Timor</th>
<th>Belu</th>
<th>Kupang Municipality</th>
<th>Alor</th>
<th>Flores</th>
<th>Sumbawa</th>
<th>Maumere</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3,124</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>900</td>
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**Source:** Pengolahan Data Elektronik Pemerintah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

- **BAPPEDA**: Regional Development Planning Board
- **BAPPENAS**: National Development Planning Board
- **BAKORNAS-PBP**: National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees
- **BPS**: Central Statistics Bureau
- **CIS**: Centre for Internally Displaced People Service
- **CSO**: Civil society organization
- **DPR**: People's Representative Council
- **DPRD**: Regional People's Representative Council
- **DPRD I**: Provincial People's Representative Council
- **DPRD II**: District/Municipal People's Representative Council
- **GEM**: Gender Empowerment Measure
- **GOLKAR**: Functional Group
- **HANSIP**: Civilian Defence Force
- **HDI**: Human Development Index
- **HPI**: Human Poverty Index
- **JRS**: Jesuit Refugee Service
- **INSIST**: Indonesian Society for Social Transformation
- **KAMRA**: People's Security Force
- **KIMPRAS-WIL**: Regional Settlement and Infrastructure
- **KPU**: General Election Commission
- **MPR**: People's Consultative Assembly
- **NGO**: Non-government organization
- **NTT**: East Nusa Tenggara
- **PAN**: National Mandate Party
- **PDI-P**: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
- **PEMDA**: Regional Government
- **PNS**: Civil Service
- **PODES**: Village Potential
- **Poliandes**: Field Health Post
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>Posyandu</td>
<td>Integrated Health Service</td>
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<td>Puskesmas</td>
<td>Primary Health Centre</td>
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<td>Pustu</td>
<td>Primary Health Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>RATIH</td>
<td>Trained Populace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDTL</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Timor Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>REPELITA</td>
<td>Five-Year Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATKOR-LAK PBP</td>
<td>Provincial Coordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees</td>
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<td>SATLAK PBP</td>
<td>District Executing Unit for the Management of Disaster and IDPs/Refugees</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesian National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOHCA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSECOORD</td>
<td>United Nations Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSFIR</td>
<td>United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAS</td>
<td>Uni Timor Aswain, Union of Timorese Heroes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANRA</td>
<td>People's Resistance</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Polisi Dituduh Menculik Mahasiswa [Police Accused of Kidnapping Students], 2 October 2004


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