Charting the roads to peace
Facts, figures and trends in conflict resolution
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Charting the roads to peace

Introduction

This short statistical overview of peace process trends brings together a small selection of the increasing amount of data and analysis on peace processes past and present. Its purpose is to highlight some key trends for the attention of senior mediators and other leading peace process actors at this year’s Oslo Forum.

Academic study of peace-making is maturing fast. An increasing number of research and policy centres are now producing a range of data sets on peace processes and using them to interpret trends in the practice and outcomes of peace processes.

The arrival of significant hard data on peace is an important and potentially creative complement to the softer qualitative analysis of what works and does not work which has tended to dominate peace policy discussion to date.

The advantage of statistical data is that it allows for a strategic discussion of trends and practices across the whole range of international conflicts and peace processes today. One good graph can give a view of progress in all of the world’s current major conflicts. Just as health professionals can talk about global health trends, mediators and other peace professionals now have figures with which to talk about global peace trends.

In 2006, there were known negotiations taking place in 58% of the armed conflicts around the world.¹

Main points

This year’s briefing on peace process trends is divided into three main parts

- Historical trends from 1920-2000 and recent trends from 1995-2005
- Particular trends in justice and weapons control provisions
- Peace progress in 2006

Long term Trends

- Mediation continues to rise and is known to be active in 58% of today’s conflicts
- Mediators themselves initiated most talks
- States are the most frequent mediators rather than inter-governmental organizations or private organizations

Most mediations fail

- But regional organizations are the most successful type of mediator

Recent Trends

- More wars are now stopped by negotiated settlements than military victory
- But 43% of negotiated settlements relapsed into conflict within five years
- The UN remains the single most active mediator, followed by Norway and the US
- Most peace processes which include justice mechanisms tend towards reconciliation measures rather than accountability
- The rising trend in amnesties is now falling off
- Only 50% of peace processes since 1980 have included weapons control clauses and most of these are limited to DDR

2006

- 2 conflicts ended, 7 were in full processes, 27 were in interrupted processes and 8 were in no known process
- Ceasefire commitments have been made in 14 conflicts and there have been 4 cessation of hostilities agreements
- Only 22% of current conflicts have been the subject of a UNSC resolution

The disadvantage is that statistics are often better at collecting information on incidence than impact. So, for example, a set of figures might tell us that more and more peace agreements included human rights clauses in a certain period but tell us nothing about if and how these clauses were implemented on the ground.

A set of statistics also often raises more questions than it answers. We have deliberately raised some of these further questions in the narrative, which accompanies the charts, in case participants think them worth exploring next year. The essential confidentiality of peace processes, especially in the early phases, also creates a core problem for counting mediation activity, which is inevitably reflected in incomplete data on current processes.

Despite methodological limits and ambiguities, we hope that the graphs and charts in the following pages will prove useful to this year’s participants in the Oslo Forum. This first briefing is intended as something of a pilot to see if there is further demand for a regular statistical update at future Forums.
In 2006, there were no known negotiations or consolidated peace processes in 8 settings: Afghanistan, Colombia (FARC), the Philippines (Abu Sayaf), Iraq, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Central African Republic, Russia (Chechnya) and Turkey (PKK).

How much mediation?

Figure 1 shows the incidence of mediation over the last century. It looks at what percentage of conflicts has received mediation each year between 1920 and 2000. Overall, it shows a steady rise with a number of occasional sharp increases, which then fell back.

The steep rise in the 1920s and early 1930s coincides with the new wave of liberal internationalism, the creation of the League of Nations and the widespread popular peace movements, unprecedented in modern times, which arose after World War I. The sharp decline in the 1930s and 1940s not surprisingly coincides with the rise of fascism and the Second World War.

Figure 1: The incidence of mediation over time
Mediation then picked up again throughout the Cold War, rose dramatically at its end but then declined fast between 1996 and 2000. Looking beyond this graph, new data now shows that the incidence of mediation is currently rising again and has reached 58% of armed conflicts in 2006.\textsuperscript{3}

This trend raises an important question. Why, even at the best of times, do more than 40% of the world’s conflicts receive no mediation at all? Is this the result of political neglect, a lack of mediation capacity or the resistance of certain wars to the principle of mediation itself?

**Mediation styles**

Figure 2 looks at the same period (1920-2000) but examines the incidence of the three main types of mediation style which tend to be used in these various mediations.

Facilitation is the least interventionist style and sees the mediator simply providing the physical space, communication channels and oversight for a process by which the parties solve the conflict themselves. Formulation sees a mediator making a substantive contribution to a process by conceiving and suggesting solutions. Manipulation is the most interventionist style in which mediators use their own power to lever the parties into agreement.\textsuperscript{3}

What is interesting in this graph is that all three mediation styles are used consistently, rising and falling together fairly evenly as key tools of international peacemaking throughout the decades. Facilitation remains the majority approach, although frequently challenged by formulation, while manipulation remains the minority style. Further analysis might usefully reveal if the more interventionist styles of formulation and manipulation arise because they are required by certain types of conflict or because they are preferred by certain mediators.

Similarly, it is interesting to explore whether one mediation style has a tendency to create more lasting peace than another. Wilkenfeld et al suggest that the more interventionist strategies (formulation and manipulation) tend to secure more formal agreements and do not necessarily leave the parties more dissatisfied with the process. However, a process of facilitation seems more likely to lead to less post-agreement tension across the whole conflict area.\textsuperscript{4} Wilkenfeld’s study also suggests that facilitation by a so-called “weak mediator” is least successful when both parties have military parity.

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\textsuperscript{2} Ibid p12.
\textsuperscript{3} These definitions, like figure two, are taken from Wilkenfeld et al., Mediating International Crises, Routledge, London, 2005, chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid pp78-88.
**Who starts talks?**

**Figure 3** looks at who initiated international mediation between 1945 and 1995. Interestingly, mediators themselves initiate the most talks by offering their services directly to a conflict. But concerned international and regional organizations who are not mediating themselves in a conflict also effect important introductions for mediators, acting as key mediation brokers. To a lesser extent, the parties themselves ask for mediation, usually with both parties suggesting it.

Most interesting is the early dance between state and intergovernmental organizations which, since the mid-1950s, has given way to a clear precedence for state mediation which currently accounts for more than 60% of all mediation. This challenges the popular assumption that most peace processes are lead by intergovernmental organizations. Instead, peace processes are not wedded to multilateralism but are driven by individual states.

**Figure 4** looks at which kind of mediator has mediated most in the last eighty years – intergovernmental organizations, states or NGOs and private individuals. Not surprisingly, NGOs and private individuals remain the small, niche players in mediation.
In 2006, there have been “ceasefire” commitments made in 14 conflicts (regardless of duration) and 4 “cessation of hostilities” declarations have been issued in Angola, Lebanon, East Sudan and Uganda.

"PEACE POINT NO. 3
Peace Process Yearbook 2007"
Who mediates?

Figure 5 puts more recent flesh on this picture to show which actors have dominated mediation in the period from 1995-2005. It shows who has mediated in how many conflicts and for what percentage of all conflict years added together during that decade. The UN comes out as the leading single mediator, with the AU and IGAD as other significant inter-governmental mediators. However, key mediators like Norway, the USA, Russia, Italy and Switzerland lead a much wider array of state mediators.

Figure 5: Who mediates most?
**Who is best?**

Figure 6 takes a look at success. It assesses mediation outcomes by the type of mediator involved between 1945 and 1995. It does not yet show data for the decade 1995-2005.

Most obviously, this table shows that the majority of mediations are unsuccessful. Some 50-60% of all mediations fail.

If success is counted as including any progress from a ceasefire to a full settlement, then regional organizations ("other IGOs") lead the field. They are significantly better than states, the UN and NGOs. But even regional organizations have a failure rate of 50%. It may also be interesting to look further at why the UN reaches more partial settlements but fewer full settlements than other mediators.

Definitions of success could perhaps be examined in more detail by the mediation profession. The high rate of outcome failure may not capture other good things that emerge in an unsuccessful process, like the establishment of relationships and political principles, which can then be picked up again and used in later talks. In future, mediators may want to define success in a more calibrated way that captures other outputs than agreements alone.

Importantly, the fifth column of the chart shows that a multi-actor peace process is the second best performer. This seems to confirm the current orthodoxy that multi-track peace processes do have an advantage over most single track processes by involving more people and including more perspectives. The figures say nothing, however, about how best to create, manage and coordinate a multi-track process.

Half of the 44 conflicts analysed in 2006 have claimed less than 10,000 lives throughout their duration but around 22% of the conflicts have led to more than 100,000 deaths. The most lethal conflicts are those in South Sudan, DR Congo, Somalia, Burundi and Darfur.

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**Peace Point No. 4**

Peace Process Yearbook 2007
What stops wars?
If mediation is unsuccessful more often than not, then what does stop wars? And do wars start more often than they stop?

Figure 7 compares the onset and termination of wars by decade between 1950 and 2005.

This chart shows that more wars stopped than started in the 1950s, in the 1990s and between 2000-2005. But, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s more wars started than stopped. The chart also clearly shows a significant spike in the 1990s where many more wars started but also stopped.

The brown columns raise the question of why wars start and whether mediation does everything it can to prevent them. This is not addressed in this report except to observe that most policy discussion about mediation focuses on stopping wars which are already underway, rather than on preventing wars which have not yet started. In other words, mediators tend to react to war much more than they try to prevent it. As the profession develops, mediators may want to put as much emphasis on preventing wars as stopping wars.

In the meantime, what about the grey columns? What stopped all these wars? Was it mediated negotiations, military victory or something else?

Figure 8 from the Human Security Briefing, looks at three main ways that wars stop – military victory, negotiated settlements or gradually fading out (termed as “other”).

The most striking trend in war terminations observed by the Human Security Centre is that, in the last 60 years, mediated settlements have become far more common. In the 1990s, negotiated settlement overtook military victory as a means of stopping wars and, also in this decade, an average of 12 conflicts stopped each year – more than double the average of the previous decades.

In short, more wars stopped in the 1990s and more of them were stopped by negotiation. Previously, military victory stopped wars twice as much as negotiation. In the 1990s, the opposite became true. Between 2000 and 2005 this rise continued and there were four times as many negotiated settlements (17) as there were military victories (4).®

It is not clear what exactly these figures say about war and mediation today. Is the increase in negotiated settlements a reflection of the “un-winnable” nature of much modern insurgency and counter-insurgency war? Is the rise in negotiated settlements the result of significant improvements in the effectiveness of mediators? Or, does it indicate the emergence of a global negotiating culture – a new willingness of warring parties to negotiate and to be seen to negotiate?

Figure 7: Average number of armed conflict onsets & terminations per year, 1950 - 2005

Source: UCDP Human Security Centre Dataset

Regardless of this rise in negotiated settlements, it is important to note that figure 8 still shows that most armed conflicts from 1980 onwards have been stopped by wars just fading out than by negotiated settlement or victory.

Which wars start again?

However, this picture of rising negotiation is not as good as it sounds. Victories tend to end wars once and for all. This is not true of negotiated settlements which are three times more likely to relapse into renewed war than military victories.

Reoccurrence of war is a major problem for negotiated settlements. This has been particularly true in the 1990s. The numbers behind Figure 9 show that 43% of wars in the 1990s restarted within five years of an initial negotiated agreement. The longer term trend for the period 1946-1999 shows that 29% of negotiated settlements returned to war within five years.6

Because negotiated wars restart, their duration also tends to outstrip victorious wars. Data shows that wars which work to a negotiated solution last almost three times longer than wars which are won militarily.7 This is not necessarily a bad thing. Long wars may not automatically mean more death and suffering. Short wars can be quicker but more devastating. The intensity and damage of any war, therefore, needs to be considered alongside its duration in any future analysis.

There is also some evidence from the UCDP dataset that longer and reoccurring wars are linked to wars of territory rather than governance. In other words, governance can be negotiated and traded more easily than land. But the persistence of war is not only linked to land. It is also likely that agreements failed because they were badly designed and supported.8 Both these factors - land disputes and peace process design - present a major challenge to mediators.

The jury is still out for the five year period of 2000-2005, which at the moment suggests that conflicts ending in victory are now restarting more than negotiated settlements. Termination trends need to be watched carefully. If more conflicts do now start again after a victory, it may suggest that no group need ever feel beaten because international negotiation culture is such that they can always start fighting in some small way as a fast track to renewed negotiations. This might suggest a new paradox in global peace trends – that the rising culture of negotiation fosters the practice of war as a negotiating method.

The most persistent trend in restarted wars is, of course, in the “other” categories. Some 50% of wars which simply phase out seem also to phase in again with great regularity. This is surely an argument for trying mediation in as many conflicts as possible because the restart rate is worse without it.

Figure 8: Number of armed conflict terminations by victory, negotiated settlement or other

Figure 9: Percentage of state-based armed conflicts restarted in under 5 years

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6 Ibid p20
7 Ibid p21
8 Ibid p21
In 2006, the majority of conflicts took place in countries with a low Human Development Index, although 25% of them are in countries in the intermediate range of this index.

--- PEACE POINT NO. 5
Peace Process Yearbook 2007

Section 2

Trends in justice and weapons control

Weapons control and measures for restoring a sense of justice in society are two critical ingredients in contemporary peace processes, which have received much attention in recent years. The following charts present some initial observations about the inclusion of clauses on weapons control and justice from research carried out by or on behalf of HD Centre in the last year.9

More reconciliation than accountability
Figure 10 shows eleven different kinds of justice mechanisms which have been agreed as instruments to secure a more just and peaceful society.

Strikingly, it is the mechanism least associated with fairness and the rule of law - amnesty - which is most common. Taken together with prisoner releases and the reintegration of combatants (each of which can also fly in the face of accountability in certain situations) these three peace

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strategies make up nearly fifty per cent (49%) of all justice provisions during the period.

By contrast, a tendency towards more formal justice based on accountability and punishment through trials, truth commissions, compensation and vetting are small, accounting for only 26% of justice provisions in these peace agreements.

In other words, the most active proponents and perpetrators of war are relatively unchallenged by law in most peace agreements. When justice mechanisms are adopted, the overwhelming trend is towards strategies of co-existence, forgiveness and reconciliation instead of legal accountability.

This suggests that mediators and negotiators find it easier to reach an agreement which deliberately “moves past” the immediate causes and grievances of the war, and that the negotiators may have more personal interest in doing so. Many justice provisions are also left vague in an agreement. They lack detail on the specifics of implementation and monitoring.10

More formal accountability mechanisms like courts and truth commissions are not as few as peace agreements suggest. There is an interesting discrepancy between the low number of such mechanisms identified in agreements and the actual number that exist. Most trials and truth commissions are negotiated after peace agreements or separately alongside them. This trend perhaps confirms the assumption held by many involved in peace processes that it is better to leave accountability to other venues and institutions further down the road.

Peace with or without justice

Figure 11 looks at a sample of 77 peace agreements from between 1980 and 2006 and shows how many peace agreements adopted any kind of justice mechanism. Of the 77 agreements, 61 contained some form of justice clause while only 16 contained no reference whatsoever to any kind of justice mechanism.

Of the agreements which did have justice clauses, it is striking how many emerged between 1990 and 2001. This spike in justice mechanisms represents a “human rights heyday” in peace process drafting, which has since declined markedly between 2001 and 2006.

Figure 11: Agreements with/without justice mechanisms and/or amnesty, 1980-2006

10 Ibid p25.
Amnesties are evidently the favourite justice mechanism of peace agreements, being positively included more than any other. Amnesties are either unlimited “general” amnesties or “limited” amnesties – the latter applying to all crimes except war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Nevertheless, amnesties are still in a significant minority of agreements overall. A practice of no amnesties was the norm throughout the period. But amnesties rose fast as an instrument in peace agreements in the 1990s.

Figure 12 looks at the number and types of amnesties during the period.

This graph shows general amnesties coming into vogue between 1993 and 1999. They then declined in favour of limited amnesties around 1998. But since 2000, they have fallen out of fashion and agreements without any amnesties have dominated the trend since 2000, with the exception of 2004 and 2005. The next few years should see whether a stronger presence of the International Criminal Court sets any consistency to a low level of amnesties.
Weapons control
Disarmament and weapons control has long been argued for as a necessary precondition to any lasting peace in armed conflicts, particularly where a seemingly endless supply of small arms and light weapons circulate and where inhibitions on gun violence are low. So, it is surprising how few peace agreements actually have robust weapons related clauses.

Typically, weapons clauses relate to DDR – disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. However, given the vast numbers of guns in global circulation – some 640 million – other measures such as strengthening gun laws and reducing weapons stocks are equally important.

A review of 318 different types of peace agreements (ceasefire, cessation and final agreements) from 120 distinct peace processes between 1980 and 2006 has shown that only 50% of recent peace processes have included weapons clauses. Of 120 processes, 61 made reference to weapons control. This indicates that tackling weapons issues is often a highly contentious part of peace making involving strong ideological, psychological and cultural challenges associated with laying down arms.

Figure 13 shows the percentage of peace agreements by year which included weapons clauses.

In 2006, a small number of states (Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland), half of them with fewer than 10 million inhabitants, have stood out during the year for having active peace diplomacy structures.
Going beyond DDR alone

Figure 14 looks in more detail at 12 different types of weapons related activities that were agreed in these agreements and processes. They range from DDR, to weapons collection and destruction, to the specific attention required to disarm child soldiers through to deliberate postponement of the issue.

DDR is the leading weapons related ‘instrument’ in peace processes in the last 16 years, with provisions for it in 29% of the reviewed agreements. Such disarmament is usually of irregular forces such as armed groups or militias only, with the reintegration component consistently suffering from lack of attention and resources. As part of disarmament, collection and custody of weapons are the next most popular methods of weapons control.

DDR undoubtedly dominates current practice related to weapons control in peace processes. But there are obvious weaknesses in many disarmament programmes, which make it unwise to rely on it as the single most important weapons control strategy in peace processes. DDR’s singular focus on former combatants and security sector reform frequently misses important aspects of wider weapons control that can address gun culture and reduce armed violence in society at large.

This raises the question whether more can be done in peace agreements and during the negotiating period to sensitize parties to wider strategies for reducing weapons availability and misuse.

Only 22% of the 44 conflicts have been deemed worthy of a UN Security Council resolution during 2006.

Figure 14: Types of weapons related activities in agreements & processes 1980 - 2006

Source: HD Centre
Facts, figures and trends in conflict resolution

Bias towards ex-combatants

Disarmament clauses in agreements to date are almost completely targeted at ex-combatants but such people may not be the only critical group for arms control. Current global estimates suggest that while armed groups hold a mere 1% of small arms and light weapons, the civilian population holds some 60% of such weapons worldwide. In many post-conflict situations, the greatest challenge of reducing the number of weapons in circulation is often to be found in the wider population and unaddressed can lead to a rise in armed crime, criminal gangs and rampant gun violence.

Despite this trend in weapons possession, peace processes to date have barely focused on the challenge of guns in the hands of civilians. Figure 14 shows that only 9% of weapons control agreements have concentrated on civilian disarmament and weapons control among the wider population and new gun laws have only been agreed in 3% of agreements. More encouragingly, various efforts to limit weapons supply and prevent acquisition have been a part of 19% of such agreements.

Disarmament programmes based on financial incentives and generous “reintegration” packages for ex-combatants can also be poorly perceived by victims of the conflict who see former fighters being “rewarded” while they, as survivors, may receive little post-war compensation or assistance.

Figures 15 and 16 compare two tables for the period 1980 - 2006. Figure 15 shows the percentage of processes which have weapons clauses of some kind by region. Figure 16 shows the number of peace processes which have specific clauses, which address the practical assistance for the surviving victims of armed violence – for example, those who have been widowed, disabled or raped.

In each region, far more peace processes make reference to specific provisions for weapons carriers than for the surviving victims of those weapons. In Africa, for example, nearly 60% of peace processes have weapons clauses while only 33% have survivor related clauses. While the emphasis on arms-bearers may make good sense as conflict management, the lack of clauses for the victims of violence may undermine reconciliation efforts. It may suggest that in current peace making orthodoxy, dangerous groups are given priority over vulnerable groups.

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11 Small Arms Survey 2002, Oxford University Press, p79
Section 3

Talks and terrorist lists in 2006

For the second year running, the Autonomous University of Barcelona (AUB) has produced a Peace Process Yearbook. This year’s report charts key trends and events from peace processes during 2006.

Figure 17: Conflicts and peace processes 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflicts that ended during 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflicts currently underway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With interruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without a specific process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent conflicts that cannot be categorised as “armed conflicts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With interruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without a specific process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former armed conflicts that are still unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With interruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without a specific process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a consolidated process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With interruptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without a specific process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peace Process Yearbook 2007
The status of current talks

Figure 17 shows the status of peace processes in 44 armed conflicts during 2006. Overall during the year, 2 conflicts ended, 7 had a strong and consolidated peace process, 27 had interrupted processes and 8 had no process at all.

The problem of terrorist lists

The Yearbook suggested that the existence of terrorist lists has been frequently discussed as a significant brake on negotiations during the year. There are currently 138 organizations named on a range of different terrorist lists held by Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the European Union.

Figure 18 shows where these 138 groups are present regionally around the world.

Figure 19 gives an estimation, by region, of how many of the groups on the lists are considered to have an association with Al-Qaeda.

Terrorist lists of this kind are nothing new. The huge number of listed groups in Western Europe which have no Islamist or Al-Qaeda association shows that these lists are not a particular post 9/11 challenge. Restrictions on talking to certain groups and on the activities of certain groups have always existed as a hurdle for mediation.

The large number of non-Al-Qaeda listed groups in the Middle East and South Asia also shows that not all Islamist groups are associated with Al-Qaeda. Groups like Hamas and Hizbollah which may be Islamist and listed are not necessarily integral to the conflict logic of Al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terror. Finally, not all Al-Qaeda associated groups present in a country have - or want to have - a central stake in the local conflict. They may be using that country only as a base.

More detailed work needs to be done to assess the relevance of listed groups to national conflicts and to gauge the real rather than perceived problems which listings present to mediation.

Figure 18: Listed groups by regional presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East / Persian Gulf</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: Groups with an association with Al-Qaeda

Source: HD Centre