Strategic Peacebuilding: Issues and Actors

Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #28:OP:1

September 2007

This paper is a revised version of the inaugural speech as the Richard G. Starmann Sr. Research Professor of Peace Studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, delivered on November 5, 2006.

Peter Wallensteen
Richard G. Starmann Sr. Research Professor of Peace Studies
Joan B. Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies
University of Notre Dame
The Tasks of Peacebuilding

Today the acute tasks of peacebuilding engage the international community. Liberia is one case where all the problems of peacebuilding are present (see Box 1). Dignity needs to be restored to the inhabitants and the country after a traumatic war experience. The country’s economy must be stabilized and set on a sustainable path of growth. But, foremost of all, strategies must be found that do not lead to a return of war, by old or new actors. In short, peacebuilding for a society is a matter of finding predictable life in safety and dignity.

Box 1. Monrovia, Liberia, June 2006

On the top of the Sniper Hill overlooking Monrovia, the Independence Monument has been cleaned and the pictures are freshly painted. It suggests a new start for Liberia after 14 years of war. The 2005 elections led to a completely new leadership. The first woman ever elected into the chief job of government in an African country, Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has taken office. Washing the monument indicates the ambition: an end to corruption.

A UN vehicle with flashing lights leads a convoy of cars, guarded by UN troops. After all, the UN is the only armed force in the country, a popular one at that. The convoy drives straight into the dilapidated hotel next to the monument, Ducor Continental Hotel. Men in Arab turbans jump out and enter the building. They make a quick visit and are off in less than five minutes.

A wealthy young Saudi sheik was visiting Monrovia. He arrived in his private jumbo jet, spent a couple of hours in Monrovia, met with the President and left before the evening. He was looking for investment opportunities. Under normal circumstances this hotel would be an unproblematic choice. It is not so, however, in a country engaged in recovery after war. A first problem is that the hotel rooms are already occupied. There are at least ten persons in each room, meaning that around 2,000 people are living there. They are poor squatters, ‘internally displaced people, IDPs.’ There is no running water, no window panes, no electricity. Water is supplied in big plastic bags once a week by a charity. The adults have no jobs and nowhere to go. What will happen to them, if (or when) the hotel returns to its original purpose? The anxious discussions among the squatters, once the sheik has left, vibrate throughout the building.

Liberia is not alone in this situation. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program has identified 121 armed conflicts, i.e., small or large wars, since 1989 and 231 since the end of the Second World War. By historical standards this is a staggering amount. At its peak, in the early 1990s, there were 51 armed conflicts waged around the planet at the same time. In 2005 the world was
‘down’ to 31, still a very large number. This means that, since the end of the Cold War, a
majority of UN member states have had a war on their territory or have had their nationals in a
war. Including international peacekeeping efforts, dealing with wars today is a universally shared
experience.¹ Wars in seemingly distant places affect the entire planet. That means peace is
something that benefits all. Peacebuilding, as a consequence, is a global concern.

The international community understands this, and the reduction from 51 to 31 since the
early 1990s is attributable to their efforts. These are not conflicts that have ended by themselves
or even by the parties. International efforts have been central to the creation of peace, through
mediation, negotiations, peace agreements and peace arrangements. This demonstrates that
international efforts can succeed in reducing the incidence of war. After reviewing possible
explanations for the reduction, the Human Security Report 2005 concluded that international
efforts can succeed in reducing the incidence of war.² The work of the High Level Panel of the
UN Secretary-General recommended policies based on the same findings, and among the results
the UN General Assembly agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission.³

Liberia typifies one of the peacebuilding tasks: reconstruction of a society after civil war.
There are other situations as well, one of which emerges after a war where state formation has
been key, and the result is the creation of entirely new states. A case of this may be Israel-
Palestine, but also Indonesia and the East Timor issue. To this should be added the typical inter-

¹ Harbom, Lotta, Stina Högladh and Peter Wallensteen, 2006. ‘Armed Conflict and
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, www.humansecurityreport.info
³ A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004. The new Commission was
established in June 2006 by the UN General Assembly, and embarked on its first work with
Burundi and Sierra Leone.

3
There are not many of these today. The most recent is the 2003 War between the United States and its allies and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This is a conflict that has been subsequently transformed into an internationalized civil war, but also threatens to lead to the break-up of the existing state. I will discuss in general what peacebuilding could mean in all these cases: what are the issues, who are the actors, and what are the implications for an institution such as the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies?

**Peacebuilding: Identifying Key Variables**

Obviously, the tasks are many following a war. The proliferation of concepts in the literature is one indication of the complexity of the enterprise. The literature refers to state-building, the reformation of state structures; nation-building, the healing of divides and wounds that the war left behind; democracy-promotion, the creation of political structures and cultures that are in line with predominant thinking in the world today; and shaping of market conditions, the development of the internal economy and its relationship to outside economic activities. All of these ambitions have their own names and can be seen as independent tasks, even as they relate to one another. But, primarily, there is peacebuilding: to provide the conditions that make the inhabitants of a society secure in life and dignity now and for the foreseeable future. Only with this sense of basic security are people interested in investing money, time and energy in

---


doing all these other tasks. If a society or a relationship is likely to collapse again soon, why make long-term commitments?

Peacebuilding clearly is a major project. It is not easily achieved and the time-frames are not easy to establish. Some studies measure the achievements after two or five years. At best this is a first period showing that a society has overcome immediate post-war conditions. But it is not enough to say that a country or a relationship is beyond the risk of relapse after such a short period. Even under the optimal circumstances, peacebuilding is likely to be a concerted process for ten or fifteen years.

Frequently used examples in the literature and public discussions on post-war society building include the defeated powers of the Second World War. Germany and Japan began to come back to pre-World War II economic levels 15 years after their defeat. Lebanon was beginning to appear ‘normal’ in 2005, fifteen years after the end of the war, only to suffer renewed destruction in 2006. Uganda’s major war ceased in 1986; by the late 1990s the country was on an economic upturn, although the incumbent government continued to be challenged by rebels in the north of the country.

The number of years that have passed without a return to war is a crude indicator of whether a country has successfully managed the transition from war to peace. There are many considerations to disentangle when deciding which factors actually constitute peacebuilding and which do not. This can be determined through a study of the way the war ended: victory, negotiated settlement, peace agreements or other outcomes. Another important factor may be

---


how the last war started. What were the causes? Third, there is the post-war national capacity for peacebuilding. And fourth, the neighborhood in which the society finds itself plays a significant role. Is it supportive or not? Let us deal with these four sets of factors in order to determine their significance for successful peacebuilding.

**The ending of the most recent war**

Factors surrounding the commencement of post-war peacebuilding are critical: How did the latest war end? There are two typical ways of ending a war and starting a new era of peacebuilding. One is that the warring parties sign a peace agreement; another is that one of them defeats the other and imposes its own ‘peace’, that is, victory. Studies show that there is a strong correlation between earlier war experiences and relapse into renewed war. A crucial factor affecting relapse into war is the type of ending of the most recent war.

Many are often cynical about peace processes and the peace agreements they generate: negotiations appear cumbersome; there are many setbacks, political maneuvers, and preoccupation with (seemingly) insignificant details. This is not novel; almost all negotiations have this character, and ending a civil war by negotiations is a particularly difficult task. What matters is whether the negotiators deal with the appropriate issues, whether they find an agreement that has sustainable qualities, and whether the agreement includes all parties or not. These questions define the issues and actors that must be dealt with for a peace process to be successful.

As noted, there have been 121 wars since 1989, but also 144 peace agreements. In 46 conflicts a peace agreement helped to end the conflict.\(^8\) In other words, roughly one-third of all

\(^8\) Harbom, *et al.*, and www.pcr.uu.se/database
conflicts have ended through a negotiated settlement or through a cease-fire; another third end in victory while the remaining third simply continue. Ending war through peace agreements is historically novel, particularly for civil wars. The histories of Europe and North America provide few historical lessons in civil war peacemaking. Most civil wars in these areas have ended through victories rather than through peace agreements. In fact, peace has been negotiated between states, not within states. This means that, for instance, Europe is also in an era of learning to deal with the problem of finding internal peace – peace within the state – as can be seen, from Belfast to the Balkans, from the Basque country to Nagorno Karabach. The Western world cannot claim that it has an advantage in understanding peace processes; it is learning at the same time as the others. There should be ample space for exchanging experiences among negotiators, but that still seems to be rare.

Who are the actors? Researchers and practitioners tend to immediately think of the warring parties. However, a recent study of this by Desirée Nilsson suggests that the inclusion of non-warring parties increases durability of the agreement. This is the first work along this line, and it is suggestive: To bring in more stakeholders may make negotiations more complex, but the result may become more lasting, as there are more actors with an interest in the agreement. In particular, non-armed actors – the civil society – obtain a role, and thus an interest in the implementation of agreements. It goes without saying that this also means giving more of a role to women in the peace process as such. The results are likely to improve the quality of post-war society.

Wars may also end in victories. Victories can have a lasting quality. However, a major study of civil wars and peacebuilding since 1944 concludes that peacebuilding has a greater

---

chance of keeping the peace when it comes after a peace agreement rather than a victory.\textsuperscript{10} Peace agreements clearly are important for the outcomes. Furthermore, there have been very few studies of the impact of different types of victories on peacebuilding. As mentioned, in the present discussion on the Iraq situation, the experiences of Germany and Japan are often referenced; however, a most significant point is constantly overlooked. The leadership of Germany and Japan capitulated, that is, they admitted defeat and instructed their troops to surrender. They became prisoners of war and were treated according to international law of the time, that is, with respect and predictability. In the Iraq War of 2003 there was never an official act of capitulation by the losing side, although there were many acts of victory by the winner. There is an important legal and psychological difference in these two situations, which probably is significant for peacebuilding after victory.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{The origins of the latest war}

The way the previous war started also provides lessons for appropriate strategies of peacebuilding. There is an increasing body of work on the general causes of civil war. Largely, research has gone into factors associated with ‘greed’, ‘need’, and ‘creed’: actors fighting for

\textsuperscript{10} Doyle and Sambanis, p. 789.
\textsuperscript{11} Woodward asserts that President Bush in 2003 wanted to end the war on Iraq on an aircraft carrier, to remind the public of Japan’s capitulation in 1945 (Bob Woodward, 2006. \textit{State of Denial. Bush at War, Part III}, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 186). A difference that escaped Woodward is that in 1945 Japanese officers signed the act of surrender on instructions from the Emperor while, in 2003, there were no Iraqis onboard the ship. As part of the capitulation, the Japanese authorities had to save and protect civil and military property, but following the US victory nobody had that responsibility, thus resulting in massive looting. In the same vein, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 was only seen as a way of militarily defeating the insurgency (ibid., p. 275), and the possibility of an act of capitulation does not seem to have been on the mind of the American leadership. Instead, humiliating pictures of Saddam Hussein were circulated around the world.
their own gain, for the basic needs of a large segment of the population or for the creation of a ‘new’ society.\textsuperscript{12}

There has been considerable attention to economic questions. Paul Collier and associates argue that ‘lootable’ raw materials, such as diamonds, increase the likelihood of war, as they serve to finance wars as well as enrich the actors themselves.\textsuperscript{13} Interestingly, this observation has also been made by policy makers and led to action, for instance, UN targeted sanctions directed against trade of particular resources.\textsuperscript{14} Diamonds were among the first. Recent studies, by Macartan Humphreys and by Joseph Bamidele, compare different types of resource dependencies to determine which ones are more prone to conflict or more optimal for lasting peace.\textsuperscript{15} Bamidele argues in the case of Africa that resources with a large labor absorption capacity are the most conducive to peace. That means that agricultural production, by creating more employment, also plays a role in building peace.

The peacebuilding strategy that follows is not obvious. To diversify an economy is a legitimate ambition. However, to do this immediately after a war is a tremendous task. To return to the cases of Germany and Japan, both went back to previous industrial production as part of their postwar recovery (excluding armament industries, which were banned). So did Lebanon,

\textsuperscript{13} The argument is more nuanced than presented here. Among numerous studies see, for instance, Paul Collier, \textit{et al.}, 2003. \textit{Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy}, World Bank and Oxford University Press.
\textsuperscript{14} Designs for such sanctions have been developed by researchers at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies as well as at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. For an overview and evaluation of this development see, for instance, Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano (eds.), 2005. \textit{International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System}, London and New York: Frank Cass.
again becoming a tourist attraction. Many countries discovered this during the 2006 war: there were thousands of tourists in the country, most dramatically evacuated during the first weeks of the conflict with Israel. Uganda invited Asian entrepreneurs back to the country. Dramatically and quickly changing the economy is likely to be a difficult proposition that will run counter to the needs of immediate post-war reconstruction. Instead easily available or quickly mobilizable skills are often brought back to the country. This is where Liberia finds itself. The government is keen to restart the diamond and timber trade to get revenue, although these were the resources that were used for more than a decade of war. The international community supports the Liberian ambitions, but hopes that a stronger, democratic and transparent government will ensure that the incomes are used wisely. Diversification will emerge only slowly and success will also depend on the conditions of the world market.

This brings in a general concern: finding ways to share the incomes from the resources in an equitable way. A central government’s capacities and policies are significant: is there a functioning taxation system, are there tariffs of produce crossing the borders, is there a reasonably functioning sales tax and is government revenue used for the creation of funds for long-term investment? A situation where a few control most of the wealth and the rest are marginalized is clearly an unlikely scenario for peacebuilding.

However, studies point to the significance of unemployment, which Marx once described as a ‘reserve army’. In Marxist thinking it was a way for capitalism to depress wages. Keynesian thinking differs on this point.16 What we see today is a much more literal meaning of this: if war is the only ‘job’ around, and somebody is paying, then why not take on this job? It is an option

16 Peter Skott, 1989, finds that, theoretically, one explanation does not exclude the other; see ‘Effective Demand, Class Struggle and Cyclical Growth’, International Economic Review, 30 (1989:1): 231-47. Also women and elderly have been analyzed from the perspective of being ‘reserve armies’ for a capitalist economy.
that is referred to in stories of unemployed in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, as well as from young people in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or in the rundown areas of Los Angeles. Joining the drug lords may pay better than finishing school. In this way, the ‘reserve army’ becomes an ‘active army’. Thus, to think about employment creation as part of peacebuilding makes a lot of sense. After war, there is a lot of work that needs to be done.

Increasingly, the issue of governance and leadership is receiving attention. The strengths and weaknesses of the state and local conflict resolution capacity, the erosion of state authority and with that, the undermining of a body that can deal with conflicts on a local level. A ‘good’ state, in other words, would be one that can constitute a local capacity to deal with conflict and be an expression of the ‘conflict carrying capacity’ of society.\textsuperscript{17} The decline of state institutions in this fundamental way suggests that states are not merely law-and-order providers, but also bestow an element of redress, even ‘justice’. If that ability is not present, the result could become chaotic. Thus, in the fear of creating too strong a state, some prefer no state at all; in the fear of having no state, others prefer an authoritarian order. Surely there must be intelligent constructions in-between!

This is a future challenge for peacebuilding: what type of state is sufficiently strong to distribute the costs and benefits of society in a legitimate way, but still not so strong that it can overrun the economy or suppress groups in society? This is the direction in which the debate on peacebuilding may be moving, for instance, from the works of Roland Paris.\textsuperscript{18} Paris and others, be they practitioners or academics, criticize the early imposition of democratic institutions such

\textsuperscript{17} This concept has been elaborated particularly by J. Craig Jenkins and Doug Bond, 2001. ‘Conflict Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis and Reconstruction’, \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution}, 45 (1): 3-31.

as national elections. They express a preference for postponing this type of political measure in favor of institution-building. This is not the last word on this, clearly, but it is an important critique of some prevalent strategies for peacebuilding.

Thus, analyzing the causes of war brings us to the role of the same actors in peacebuilding. The state is an obvious institution to watch, but also who controls it, and the way opposition acts in the new conditions. If some of the causes are properly addressed, even if it takes time, it is likely to reduce the danger of a return to war.

Capacity of peacebuilding

Third, who is doing peacebuilding? There is increasing evidence to underline the significance of basing peacebuilding on local capacity. In many conflicts it can be observed that the internal mediators and the local third parties, what are sometimes called ‘moderates’, or the groups that are in-between, are those targeted by the belligerents and militants. This means that the ‘center’, where often much of the population actually is located politically speaking, stands without spokespersons. The extreme sides may manage to polarize the situation. When this results in civil wars, international efforts at peacebuilding enter as a replacement for local capacity. This may be necessary but it is also a major problem. There are now studies emerging of recent experiences of international peacebuilding efforts. Roland Kostic’s work on Bosnia-Herzegovina is one example; John Heathershaw’s work on Tajikistan is another. They both seem to bring out the same message, albeit with different emphases and meaning: international

---

efforts may lead to a stifling of local initiative and delay or prevent the emergence of local
capacity to deal with the situation.

An important conclusion is that international peacebuilding has to have as its primary
goal to enhance local capacity that is in place, and thus that peacebuilding will have to be shaped
differently in different situations.

There is a danger of unproductive tension between local and international capacity.\textsuperscript{20}
There are different mandates driving these two efforts. Often international peacebuilding will
have more access to resources comparatively speaking, but also be less committed to a particular
situation. The experts and managers will move on within a short period of time, but the locals
will remain in the situation. Finding ways in which these two levels can connect and support
each other is highly significant.

The Neighborhood

A fourth issue concerns the neighborhood in which peacebuilding takes place.

Neighboring countries may contribute to a civil war directly (by supplying their own troops,
allowing bases for warring parties, expressing political support, etc.) or indirectly (e.g., by not
being capable to control their own borders). Clearly, what happens in one country is to some
extent dependent on what happens with the neighbor(s).\textsuperscript{21} There are interconnections, and the
closer a neighbor is to the situation, the closer these interconnections are likely to be. There are
concepts such as ‘regional conflict complexes’ and ‘regional security communities’ expressing

\textsuperscript{20} On this score, recent case studies point in the same direction as the statistical work by Doyle
and Sambanis.

\textsuperscript{21} Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 2005. ’Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions,
exactly this. Regional spill-over effect can be seen in the African region. There are also elements of a reversal. Peace in one country may support peace in another: Liberia and Sierra Leone interact and so do developments in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and possibly Southern Sudan. Certainly the picture is not complete, but there is a discernable trend of slowly but systematically unfolding peacebuilding activities in many African states during the past half-decade. This is in stark contrast to the Middle East, where war-fighting strategies have been dominating the agenda of the main actors since the collapse of the Oslo Process by late 2000 and since September 11, 2001. In other words, it is a region that requires considerable attention. It may be the area most acute to deal with, as it is one that finds itself on the quickest trajectory of disaster.

Policy Implications: A Focus on the Middle East?

What do these findings and observations mean for peacebuilding in general, and, in particular, for an institution that celebrates its 20th anniversary and wants to devote itself to strategies for peacebuilding?

In this overview it has been found that

- Countries with dependence on one commodity for export are at risk of renewed war.
- Unemployment provides an additional risk for conflict,
- Together these two factors provide for a discrepancy in wealth that is potentially dangerous.
  - Peacebuilding policies need to address the issues of sharing resources, finding investment and creating jobs.
- Weak local capability to deal with conflict through a functioning state or another locally legitimate framework, provides a further risk.
  - Peacebuilding has to include reinforcing local capacity.

---

• If there have been previous wars along the lines that are in danger of displaying themselves again, it provides particular urgency for peacebuilding.
• If peace agreements have failed or victories have not served to solve conflicts, the issues are likely to be difficult, but strategic peacebuilding may find it natural to focus on difficult cases.

One area where these factors combine to create a continuous regional problem, with global repercussions is the Middle East. Unemployment has been increasing, often as a result of deliberate political actions (disbanding an army, closing down of government services, strangling of funding other than humanitarian efforts), although there are huge resources available (oil prices have been exceptionally high for a long period of time). Peace agreements have failed (the Oslo process resulted in nine agreements in a creative peace process on Palestine during the 1990s, but few of them are functioning today) and there is a recurrence of war, threats of new wars and increasing regional interconnections between these conflicts.

Clearly this region has to be high on the agenda for the peacebuilding community. Next year the agreed solution to one key element in this conflict, the Palestinian state, will be 60 years old (The UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947). It has been pointed out that this is an unusual conflict as ‘everybody’ appears to agree on the resolution, the creation of two separate states, but it has been impossible to reach this stage. Building on this one may argue that a reasonable target is that this resolution should not remain without implementation on its next anniversary: why not set the target to solve this conflict by 2017? If such a target is set, then the actions that are necessary can be figured out and the world galvanized into action, very much as it has set the goals of reducing poverty by half by 2015. It means making a serious road map

---

23 Indeed, a Saudi sheik may invest in a hotel in Liberia. This may be good for Liberia, but it is far away from the region where the wealth was generated.
24 The resolution states that the two states (one Arab, one Jewish) and the special regime for Jerusalem ‘shall come into existence in Palestine...not later than 1 October 1948’ (GA Res 1947, 181 (III): Part I, A.3.
for peace, laying out the steps that have to be taken to arrive at a viable two-state solution, and reaching a regional order that supports such a solution.

Who are the actors to deal with this? Clearly these are matters for political leadership and that is where it ultimately has to be dealt with. However, everything that is done by one government alone will be judged as part of its vested interests. Thus, only collective, multilateral efforts will have a fruitful impact; the consensus of the permanent members of the Security Council is a crucial factor, but also the inclusion of the governments of the region, whatever shape or form they take. The overarching goal is peacebuilding, not other possible agendas at the same time. A concerted effort requires clear goals to succeed.

The political level is, however, not the only one or even the one where one may start the most easily. This survey of research makes clear that supporting local capacity for conflict resolution and peacebuilding is central. There are groups interested in peacebuilding throughout the region, as well as outside it. They are key for a project like this and must be involved. Women constitute the most significant and marginalized force in doing this. They need be have a central role in such a process.

What then can be done? Box 2 contains a proposal as an example of the multifaceted task that peacebuilding involves. It is suggested as something that can be done by a university department or institute, and involving the resources of university cooperation.

To my knowledge, there is no precedent for such an approach to a central conflict maintained over a long period of time. Strategic peacebuilding requires a strategic decision to embark on a program. Being strategic means that the perspective is long-term, that it is carefully targeted, involves a process with many actors and some unpredictability, and, in the end, that it also generates a peaceful result.
Box 2. **Universities in Peacebuilding**

Universities are a general resource for societal development, the University of Notre Dame is one that might take a leading role, and it could be done through the Kroc Institute.

There are ten concerns with an ambition of creating a long-term, goal-oriented peacebuilding task in the Middle East, focusing on Palestine as part of a peaceful regional order.

1. **Training**  
Workshops on mediation and conflict resolution. Build on alumni, and others with advanced training.

2. **Connect teaching and training to local universities**  
Identify and support relevant local universities.

3. **Media development**  
Contribute to responsible media coverage of this and other conflicts.

4. **Materials**  
There is very little in Arabic, Kurdish or Hebrew on conflict resolution, and much on strategies for battle and victory. Alternative stories from local traditions, recorded by locals, include writers, poets, and artists.

5. **Policy research**  
Thrash out possible solutions to concrete problems, sequencing of different measures, consider how resources can be amassed.

6. **Availability**  
Assist local research in becoming available internationally.

7. **Build on and reinforce existing university networks**  
Support local and regional university networks.

8. **Institute regular evaluations**  
Useful for sharing experience, evaluating progress.

9. **Planning**  
Take time to prepare properly.

10. **Costs**  
Find alternatives. Slogan: Peacebuilding is cheaper than war-making.